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The aim of this dissertation is to show that Aristotle’s ontology cannot provide a 
model for mathematics. To show this, I argue that (i) mathematical objects must be seen 
as fictional entities in the light of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and (ii) Aristotle’s 
mathematical fictionalism is not compatible with his metaphysical realism. My 
interpretation differs from that of other fictionalists in denying this compatibility. 
For Aristotle, mathematical objects are “something resulting from abstraction 
(ta\ e)c a)faire/sewj).” For example, geometry investigates a man not qua man, but 
qua solid or figure. Traditionally, Aristotle’s abstraction has been interpreted as an 
epistemic process by which a universal concept is obtained from particulars; I rather 
show his abstraction as a linguistic analysis or conceptual separation by which a certain 
group of properties are selected: e. g., if a science, X, studies a qua triangle, X studies the 
v 
 
properties which belong to a in virtue of a’s being a triangle and ignores a’s other 
properties. 
Aristotle’s theory of abstraction implies a mathematical naïve realism, in that 
mathematical objects are properties of sensible objects. But the difficulty with this 
mathematical naïve realism is that, since most geometrical objects do not have physical 
instantiations in the sensible world, things abstracted from sensible objects cannot supply 
all the necessary objects of mathematics. This is the so-called “precision problem.”  
In order to solve this problem, Aristotle abandons his mathematical realism and 
claims that mathematical objects exist in sensibles not as actualities but ‘as matter 
(u(likw=j).’ This claim entails a mathematical fictionalism in metaphysical terms. Most 
fictionalist interpretations argue that the fictionality of mathematical objects does not 
harm the truth of mathematics for Aristotle, insofar as objects’ matter is abstracted from 
sensibles. None of these interpretations, however, is successful in reconciling Aristotle’s 
mathematical fictionalism with his realism. 
For Aristotle, sciences are concerned with ‘what is (to\ o)\n)’ and not with ‘what is 
not (to\ mh\ o)\n).’ Aristotle’s concept of truth rests on a realist correspondence to ‘what is 
(to\ o)\n)’: “what is true is to say of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not.” Thus, 
insofar as mathematical objects are fictional, Aristotle’s metaphysics cannot account for 
the truth of mathematics.   
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Although there is a fairly general consensus on what Aristotelianism is, there is 
still an ongoing debate on the nature of his philosophy of mathematics. There are two 
main reasons for this failure on commentators’ part to pin down his views. Despite a 
number of references to the subject,
1
 Aristotle’s corpus nowhere features a systematic 
presentation of his philosophy of math. Another reason may be an ambivalence felt by 
Aristotle towards the theme. While Aristotle never doubts that mathematics is true in the 
sense that there are mathematical facts described by the science (or discipline) of 
mathematics, he declines to identify mathematical objects with anything in the actual 
world. More puzzlingly, he argues that a mathematical entity cannot exist separated from 
sensible objects. Mueller describes Aristotle’s bind in this respect as resulting from a 
conflict between a Platonist epistemology of mathematics and non-Platonic ontology.
2
 
While this attitude makes Aristotle’s theories complicated and even dubious, it also 
makes his position philosophically interesting.  
The prevalence of physicalism, in recent years, has led to the inception and 
                                                           
1
 Most but not all of Aristotle’s remarks on mathematics can be found in Mathematics in Aristotle 
by Heath (Heath (1949)). Aristotle deals with the problems of philosophy of mathematics mainly 
in Met. XIII and XIV. But a full account of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics requires 
consideration of a much broader range of material, such as Phys., III and IV; DA., I and III; APo., 
I; DC., II; Met., X, etc. In particular, Phys., III and IV are essential to any reconstruction of 
Aristotle’s positive theory; Met., XIII and XIV focus more on Aristotle’s criticism of Platonists’ 
theory of mathematics. 
2
 For more detailed discussion of the dilemma which Aristotle proposed to solve regarding 
mathematical objects, see Mueller (1970) p. 157; Hussey (1992) in Mueller (ed.) (1991) Vol. 24, 
n. 4, p. 133.  
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strengthening of several nominalization programs in the philosophy of mathematics.
3
 
However, as Benaceraff points out, although nominalists can provide themselves with a 
scientifically acceptable epistemology, they have trouble in providing a model for 
mathematics.
4
 In fact, we see that Aristotle struggled with the same problem: how to 
account for the truth of mathematics without positing Platonic entities. 
Aristotle’s discussions of philosophical issues concerning mathematics bear 
many points of close similarity with modern debates in the philosophy of mathematics. 
For instance, there are similarities between Met., XIII-XIV and Frege’s The Foundation 
of Arithmetic. In XIII-XIV, Aristotle deals with such problems as the ontological status of 
mathematical objects, the applicability of mathematics, the reducibility of number to units, 
etc., with wit and sometimes sarcasm, just like Frege.  
Nevertheless, the purpose of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics is not the 
same as his successor’s. While Frege devotes his philosophical and logical work to 
providing foundations for mathematics, in the belief that that mathematics in his time 
rested on shaky grounds, Aristotle does not feel the need to provide a philosophical 
grounding for mathematics. Instead, Aristotle tries to gain credit for his metaphysics by 
showing that his metaphysics can provide a semantics for mathematics.  
                                                           
3
 For the development of such recent programs and the current debates, see Irvine (ed.), (1990) 
pp. xxii and xvii-xxiii. 
4
 Benaceraff (1973). Benaceraff diagnoses that the problem in the philosophy of mathematics 
arises from the conflict between the semantics and the epistemology that tends to go with 
mathematics. He says that ‘two quite distinct kinds of concerns have separately motivated 
accounts of the nature of mathematical truth: (1) the concern for having a homogeneous 
semantical theory in which semantics for the propositions of mathematics parallel the semantics 
for the rest of the language, and (2) the concern that the account of mathematical truth mesh with 
a reasonable epistemology.’ (Benaceraff  (1983) p. 661). 
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The motivation behind Aristotle’s development of his theory of mathematics is to 
criticize metaphysical Platonism.
5
 Plato argues for the existence of Forms by relying on 
differences between objects of sciences and sensible objects;
 6
 mathematical objects are 
his favorite examples for revealing such differences, in that they differ by definition from 
sensible objects in not having sensible properties such as color or weight. Plato argues 
that, since objects of sciences cannot be sensible objects, they must be Forms. Aristotle’s 
philosophy of mathematics can be seen as his response to such a Platonic argument. If 
there is any single thesis Aristotle consistently maintains in his theory of mathematics, it 
is that Platonic Forms are not necessary to explain mathematical truth. To prove this 
thesis, Aristotle tried to show that mathematical objects are identifiable with some entities 
existent in his ontology.      
I hypothesize that Aristotle makes two different attempts to show the absence of 
any need to posit Platonic entities to account for mathematical truth.
7
 Initially, Aristotle 
seeks to show that mathematical objects are certain aspects or properties of sensible 
objects. In order to do this, he introduces a theory of abstraction.
8
 Aristotle’s abstraction 
is different from that of the nominalists, which is an epistemic process for obtaining a 
universal concept from particulars.
9
 In my view, Aristotle’s abstraction describes a 
linguistic analysis identifying the primitive subject of a predicate, that is to say, removing 
                                                           
5
 In Chapter One, §1, discuss what metaphysical issues Aristotle aim to resolve in his philosophy 
of mathematics. 
6
 For Plato’s arguments from sciences, see Chapter One, §1. 
7
 For grounds for this hypothesis, see Chapter Three, §4. 
8
 I deal with Aristotle’s theory of abstraction in Chapter Two. 
9




or abstract other contingent features of a thing to discover which property (or properties) 
belongs to in its own right.
10
  This interpretation is also distinguished from the 
traditional one according to which abstraction describes a mental operation by which the 
intellect separates a universal from sensible elements.
11
 Aristotle successfully shows how 
we can conceptually separate a certain group of properties from a sensible object by 
means of this linguistic abstraction.  
Based on this, Aristotle argues that mathematical objects are nothing but 
properties of sensible objects conceptually separated by abstraction; since such separation 
by abstraction is only conceptual, mathematical objects do not exist ontologically 
separated from sensible objects. We may call this position mathematical naïve realism.
12
 
However, faced with the so-called precision problem, namely that properties of sensible 
objects do not satisfy the definition of mathematical objects,
13
 Aristotle later makes the 
different claim that mathematical objects are not in sensible objects and exist only as 
matter. Since this claim is incompatible with mathematical naïve realism, I argue, it is 
reasonable to suppose that it represents an entirely alternative line of reasoning, marking 
a break with Aristotle’s original position. 
 Nevertheless, it is not clear what Aristotle meant to say by the claim that 
mathematicals exist as matter. As the remark is not developed into a complete theory, it 
leaves open the possibility of various interpretations. We will examine four principal 
                                                           
10
 For my analysis of Aristotle’s abstraction, see Chapter Two, §3. 
11
 For my crticisim of the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s Abstraction, see Chapter Two, 
§5. 
12
 In Chapter Three, §1 clarify issues involved with Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics.  
13






I begin by considering two so-called fictionalistic positions. One is Lear’s view 
that mathematical objects are constructed out of basic elements such as points, lines, or 
circles, and that those elements are obtained from sensible objects by abstraction.
15
 The 
other view is that we abstract only pure extension from sensible objects, constructing 
geometrical objects through our intellect’s imposing forms on this extension.
16
 This view 
identifies pure extension with the matter of mathematical objects. Both views can avoid 
the precision problem, while accommodating Aristotle’s thesis that mathematical objects 
are obtained from sensible objects by abstraction. They both, however, run into the same 
problem that they turn mathematical objects into fictional entities. 
In recent years, there has been a tendency to interpret Aristotle as expressing 
some kind of fictionalism: For Aristotle, mathematical objects are constructed fictional 
entities grounded in the actual world. Nonetheless, it is hard to see how mathematical 
fictionalism can be squared with Aristotle’s scientific realism; and given the realism of 
his theory of truth, mathematics cannot be true if mathematical objects do not exist. This 
is the only possible consistent fictionalistic interpretation of Aristotle since there is no 
way that mathematics can be true for him if mathematicals do not exist.
17
 
Despite these differences between Aristotle’s view and fictionalism, there is one 
good reason that commentators tend to view Aristotle’s view as fictionalism: the claim 
                                                           
14
 I examine these four positions in Chapter Four. 
15
 For Lear’s view and my criticism, see Chapter Four, §1. 
16
 I review this constructivistic interpretation in Chapter Four, §2. 
17




that mathematical objects are not in sensible objects and exist only in matter makes it 
difficult to identify mathematical objects as any kind of actual entities in Aristotle’s 
metaphysics.
18
 This issue, though, may be more complicated than it first appears; ‘being’ 
has many different senses in Aristotle. Aristotle’s ontological inventory features not only 
all items belonging to each category as beings, but also potential beings as these are 
contrasted with actual beings.
19
 In addition, Aristotle frequently uses the notion of 
‘matter’ to mean ‘potentiality,’ e.g., the matter of a statue is the potentiality of the statue. 
Thus, there would seem to be a way to make mathematical objects something existent by 




A difficulty with this interpretation is, though, that Aristotle uses the term 
‘potentiality’ homonymously, so that not every kind of potentiality can be seen as a mode 
of existence.
21
 Only when the matter of mathematical objects can be called potentiality in 
the sense of another mode of existence, will there be a ground to say that mathematical 
objects exist in Aristotle’s ontology. However, pure extension, the matter of mathematical 
objects, differs from those potentialities which are considered to involve another mode of 
existence.
22
 First, unlike, for instance, an incomplete substance such as a boy, extension 
qua potentiality does not have the internal causal power to actualize itself or something 
                                                           
18
 For the idealistic aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics, see Chapter Three, §5. 
19
 For discussion of potentiality as another mode of existence, see Chapter Four, §3, 3,3. 
20
 In Chapter Three, §3, I discuss the view that mathematical objects can be assimilated to 
potential beings in Aristotle’s ontology.  
21
 For Aristotle’s homonymous uses of the term, ‘potentiality,’ see Chapter Four, §3, 3.2.  
22
 For differences between the matter of mathematical matter and other potential beings involving 
a mode of existence, see Chapter Four, §3, 3.3. 
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else into its actuality. Secondly, while Aristotle maintains that actuality is prior to its 
potentiality in existence in the sense that potentiality’s existence depends on actuality’s, 
the existence of pure extension is prior to that of any of its possible actualizations, i.e., 
geometrical figures. Moreover, the fact that geometrical objects are not actualized in the 
sensible world makes it doubtful whether geometrical objects exist in any form of 
actuality at all. For Aristotle, something which is only in potentiality and never actualized, 
(e.g., infinity) is considered not as existent but rather as a kind of non-being.
23
 
 Hintikka claims, though, that there is an actuality of each geometrical object; 
geometrical objects are actualized in the intellect, and such mental actualization hardly 
differs for Aristotle from physical actualization in the external world.
24
 This argument is 
based on Aristotle’s claim of an identity between the thinking intellect and objects of 
thinking. Since, when the intellect thinks some object, a, it becomes identical with a, 
Hintikka infers that when a is thought by the intellect, a is actualized therein. However, 
when Aristotle makes the claim of an identity between the subject and objects of thought, 
he uses the term ‘thinking’ in a specific sense: by ‘thinking’ in this context he means 
knowing. When ‘thinking’ is used in this sense, the objects of thinking are restricted to 
the forms of existing things in the external world. And since mathematical objects do not 
exist in the external world, they cannot be objects of thinking, either. 
Due to the realism of his theory of truth, for Aristotle, mathematics can be true 
                                                           
23
 For the ontological status of non-actualizable potentiality in Aristotle’s metaphysics, see 
Chapter Four, §3, 3.4. 
24
 I discuss Hintikka’s view in Chapter Four, §4. 
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only if mathematical objects exist.
25
 Nevertheless, neither Aristotle nor his commentators 
have shown that mathematical objects can be identified with some entities in his ontology. 
In this sense, Aristotle’s metaphysics cannot be a model for mathematics. The conclusion 
of this work is thus that Aristotle was not successful in showing how mathematics can be 
true within his metaphysics.  
 
                                                           
25
 For the necessity of the existence of mathematical objects for an account of the truth of 




Aristotle’s Scientific Realism and Mathematics 
 
 1. The Arguments from Sciences 
 
Among Plato’s many arguments for the existence of Forms in Aristotle’s works, there are 
the so called ‘arguments from sciences (AFS).’
26
 These arguments posit that there will be 
Forms of all things of which there are sciences.
27
  Given that one of the motivations of 
Platonism is to explain how scientific knowledge (e)pisth/mh) is possible, the AFS can 
be understood as critical in the continuation of a Platonic heritage beyond the ideas of 
Plato himself.   
 Unfortunately, despite their importance, the arguments from sciences are not 
stated in their entirety in Aristotle’s surviving works. This makes it an open question  
whether the arguments were taken directly from Plato or rather reframed by Aristotle 
himself. Nevertheless, the fact that Aristotle refers to the arguments without further 
citational specification is enough to suggest that the arguments would have been familiar 
to members of the Academy.   
                                                           
26
 Other Platonists’ arguments for the existence of Forms can be found at Met., I, 9, 991b20-
992a10; VII, 8, 1033b20-1034a9; XI, 2, 1060a2-26; E., I, 6, 1096a17-1096b6, etc. 
27
 Met., XIII, 4, 1079a7-8. Aristotle also mentions the arguments of the sciences at Ibid., I, 9, 
990b11-12. 1079a7-1079b3 is almost verbally identical to 990b11-991a9. 
10 
 
 Despite this central failure in transmission, we do owe one version of the 
complete form of the AFS to Alexander of Aphrodisias,
28
 who supposes that they are 
presented in full in a lost work of Aristotle's called On Forms.
29
 The arguments are taken 




(1) If every science does its work with reference to a single identical thing, 
and not to any other particulars, there must be, corresponding to each 
science, something other than sensible things, which is eternal and is the 
pattern of the particulars in each field of  the science in question. Now 
that is just what the Form is. 
(2) The things of which there are sciences must exist; now the sciences are 
concerned with things other than particular things; for the latter are 
indefinite and indeterminate, while the objects of the sciences are 
determinate; therefore there are things other than the particulars and these 
are the Forms. 
(3) If medicine is the science not of this particular instance of health, but 
just of health, there must be such a thing as health-itself, and if geometry is 
                                                           
28
 Alexander was the most celebrated Ancient Greek commentator on Aristotle. His 
commentaries on Prior Analytics (Book I), Topics, Meteorology, Sense and Sensibilia, and 
Metaphysics (Book I-V and a summary of his commentary on the rest of Metaphysics) still 
survive and significantly shaped the Arab reception of Aristotle, some in Arabic translation. 
29
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics, 79.5-15 (see Alexamder (1989) pp. 115-
116). Some of the purported arguments may also be found in fragments 3 and 4 of On the Forms 
in Ross (1952). For the disussion of AFS, see Cherniss (1944); Owen (1957); Annas (1975a). 
30
 Trans., J. J. Cleary ( see Cleary (1987) p. 97). 
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knowledge not of this equal and this commensurate, but of what is just 
equal and what is just commensurate, there must be an equal-itself and a 
commensurate-itself, and these are the Forms. 
  
Whether or not these arguments were presented by Plato himself or reconstructed later by 
someone else, these Platonic claims about sensible particulars and the Forms are found in 
many places in the Dialogues.
31
 In Phaedo, 74a-c, for instance, Plato argues that equal 
things are different from the Equal itself; since the former are deficient—things are 
sometimes equal but sometimes not—only the latter may stand an object of knowledge.
32
 
Similarly, (1) argues that a science does not deal with particular F-things but a single 
item, F itself, e.g., geometry does not study triangular things such as a bronze isosceles 
triangle but the triangle itself. Since F-things are different from F-itself, F-things cannot 
be objects of a science; (3) may be regarded as complementing (1) by examples.  
Meanwhile, according to the second argument, while the objects of a science are 
definite, particulars are indefinite, so that the objects of a science must be other things 
than particulars. We can find the reason that Plato thinks that particulars are indefinite in 
                                                           
31
 Ross identifies the arguments from the sciences with arguments similar to those presented at 
Republic, 479a-480a, and Timaeus, 51d-52a. On the basis of these passages, Ross reconstructs the 
AFS as follows: “If knowledge exists, there must exist an unchangeable object of knowledge. 
Knowledge does exist. Therefore there exists an unchangeable object. Sensible objects are 
changeable. Therefore there exist non-sensible realities.” Ross (1924) Vol. I, p.193. 
32
 This deficiency or imperfection of sensible particulars is an important issue in Aristotle’s 
philosophy of mathematics, which has been parsed as ‘the precision problem’, namely that 
sensible objects do not perfectly instantiate mathematical objects. For a discussion of the 
precision problem, see Chapter Two, §3. 
12 
 
the Dialogues. Plato’s argument here is that sensible particulars are in constant change 
and so never in the same state,
33
 and any account given of thing in such a state will 
similarily lack accuracy and consistency.
34
 Futher, according to Aristotle, at the very 
beginning, for Plato, the search for knowledge led to definitions, but Plato thought that 
defintions could not be found in things in constant change. Aristotle reports that:  
 
 
Socrates, being busy himself about ethical matters, but nothing about the whole 
nature and seeking the universal in these [ethical matters], gave his attention for 
the first time to definitions. Plato, accepting this through such as this [procedure], 
supposed that this comes to be about different things, and not about sensibles; 
because it is impossible that the common definition be about any of the sensibles, 
for they are always changing. 
 
Swkra/touj de\ peri\ me\n ta\ h)qika\ pragmateuome/nou peri\ de\ th=j 
o(/lhj fu/sewj ou)qe/n, e)n me/ntoi tou/toij to\ kaqo/lou zhtou=ntoj kai\ 
peri\ o(rismw=n e)pisth/santoj prw/tou th\n dia/noian, e)kei=non 
a)podeca/menoj dia\ to\ toiou=ton u(pe/laben w(j peri\ e(te/rwn tou=to 
gigno/menon kai\ ou) tw=n ai)sqhtw=n: a)du/naton ga\r ei)=nai to\n koino\n 
o(/ron tw=n ai)sqhtw=n tino/j, a)ei/ ge metaballo/ntwn.35 
 
 
 To clarify the issues on which Aristotle begins to diverge from Plato, we should 
consider the arguments’ main theses again. Here we will frame the arguments even more 
succinctly:  
 
                                                           
33
 Phaedo, 78e. 
34
 Timaeus, 29b3-5. Plato draws a distinction between wha always is and never become (ti/ 
to\ o)/n a)ei/ ge/nesin de\ ou)k e)/xon) and what becomes and never is (ti/ to\ gigno/menon me\n 
a)ei/ o)/n de/ ou)de/pote) (Timaeus, 27d5-28a), and connects each with its epistemological 
counterpart: the former is grasped by no/hsij and the latter by do/ca (Ibid., 28a1-4). 
35
 Met., I, 6, 987b1-7. 
13 
 
1. Sciences are of something existent (to\ o)/n) 
2. So, there must exist objects of sciences.  
3. Sensible particular things differ from the objects of sciences; the former are 
indefinite, the latter definite. 
4. There must be objects of sciences other than sensible particulars. 
5. Those things are Platonic forms. 
  
 An underlying assumption of these claims is that sciences exist as bodies of 
knowledge.
36
 Neither Aristotle nor Plato addresses the question of whether there is any 
knowledge at all, one familiar to modern epistemology. They rather accept the existence 
of knowledge as a given fact. The Academy had from the outset taught a great variety of 
disciplines, divided into the two categories of Physics and Mathematics, the former 
including natural sciences such as zoology and botany and the latter incorporating 
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and harmony.
37
 Their interest, then, lies in the nature of 
the objects of knowledge and the conditions that make knowledge possible.
38
 Further, it 
                                                           
36
 Here ‘science’ is the translation of ‘e)pisth/mh’. Depending on the context, e)pisth/mh could 
mean ‘knowledge’ as opposed to do/ca, (Rep. V, 476a-480a; VI, 509d-511e; VII, 514a-521b), 
‘theoretical knowledge’ as opposed to poihtikh/ (E, VI, 5), or ‘an organized body of 
knowledge’ (Met., VI, 1). 
*All translations, unless otherwise stated, are mine. I have used square brackets, ‘[…],’ to 
indicate places where certain words have to be supplied. 
37
 Lasserre (1964) p. 15. But mathematics was not yet rigorously systematized in Plato’s time. 
The Academy seems to have used the Elements of Hippocrates of Chios, which does not survive 
(see Maziarz (1968) p.98). 
38
 For Aristotle’s criticism of skeptics and those who assert that all knowledge requires 
demonstration, refer to Apo., I, 2, 72b5-73a20. 
14 
 
is Aristotle who develops the concept of a science as an organized body of rational 
knowledge with its own proper object.
39
   
 Aristotle also shares with Plato the Parmenidean legacy that knowledge is of 
beings (to\ o(/n). For Aristotle, a demonstrative science or demonstration (a)po/deicij) 
must be about something (peri/ tinw=n)40 and ‘each science marks off a certain class of 
things for itself and busies itself about this as about something that exists and is (e(ka/sth 
ga\r tou/twn perigrayame/nh ti ge/noj au(tv= peri\ tou=to pragmateu/etai w(j 
u(pa/rxon kai\ o)/n).41  So, as Apostle points out, for Aristotle, “sciences are concerned 
with what exists and not with what does not exist.”
42
  
 Moreover, since Aristotle agrees with Plato that particulars cannot be the objects 
of knowledge,
43
 he also argues that something other than particulars should be the 
objects of sciences, identifying these with universals. He argues that, if there are no 
universals, there will be no middle terms, and hence no demonstrations; but, since there 
are actually sound demonstrations, there must be universals. The middle term can be said 
to be a universal because it must be distributed in at least more than one item in a valid 
inference; because a demonstration requires true pairs of universal affirmative 
propositions like AaB & BaC, where B is the common term which links both items A and 
                                                           
39
 For Aristotle, scientific knowledge (e)pisth/mh) is the knowledge of a cause (ai)ti/a) (APo., I, 
10, 76a25-30), while opinion (do/ca) is about the contingent (sumbebhko/j) (Ibid., 33, 88b30-
89a5). 
40
 Republic, V, 476e-477a; Met., 997a5-6; Met., XI, 7, 1064a2-3; APo., I, 11, 77a6-77a9. 
41
 Met., XI, 7, 1064a2-3. 
42
 Apostle (1952) p.11. Cf. Apo, I, 10, 76b17-23. 
43





 The universal is “what by nature is predicated of plural things (o(\ e)pi\ pleio/nwn 
pe/fuke kathgorei=sqai),”45 such that it can be true of many.  
 Aristotle’s argument for the existence of universals recalls Plato’s argument for 
the existence of Forms. Just as Plato argues for the existence of Forms on the basis of the 
existence of knowledge, Aristotle argues on the basis of the truth of a science.   Why 
does Aristotle make such an effort to prove the existence of universals?  We should 
remember here that, for Aristotle, the sciences deal with universals. Thus, in order to 
maintain his scientific realism, it is necessary for him to show that universals exist. 
Aristotle’s endeavor to prove the existence of universals thus represents another facet of 
his strong scientific realism. 
 This parallel between Plato’s and Aristotle’s constitution of scientific knowledge 
suggests that Aristotle agrees with his forebear on all the theses 1 through 4. What 
Aristotle denies is only that 5 follows from them. He says on this topic, “Thus, it is not 
necessary that there is to be a form or some one thing apart from the many, even if there 
are to be demonstrations (ei)/dh me\n ou)=n ei)=nai h)\ e(/n ti para\ ta\ polla\ ou)k 
                                                           
44
 “If there is to be demonstration, however, it is necessary that one thing is true of many; for if 
this is not the case, there will be no universal; and if there is no universal, there will be no middle; 
thus, there will be no demonstration, either. Therefore, there must be some thing and the same 
thing, non-homonymous, [holding] of many things (ei) a)po/deicij e)/stai, ei)=nai me/ntoi e(\n 
kata\ pollw=n a)lhqe\j ei)pei=n a)na/gkh: ou) ga\r e)/stai to\ kaqo/lou, a)\n mh\ tou=to v)=: 
e)a\n de\ to\ kaqo/lou mh\ v)=, to\ me/son ou)k e)/stai, w(/st' ou)d' a)po/deicij. dei= a)/ra ti e(\n 
kai\ to\ au)to\ e)pi\ pleio/nwn ei)=nai mh\ o(mw/numon (APo., I, 11, 77a6-77a9) ).” 
45
 Int., 7, 17a39-40. See also Met., 13,1038b11. Cf. Apr., I, 1, 24a17-18; 24b28-30. 
16 
 
a)na/gkh, ei) a)po/deicij e)/stai).”46  Although Aristotle assumes universals as the 
objects of science, Aristotle’s universals are different from Platonic Forms, in that they 
are not separated from particulars but inhere in individuals. We should note that an 
important features of a Form is its separateness from particulars; for Plato, each Form is 
an ‘au(to\ kaq’ au(to/’ being, namely, it exists in its own right47. On account, further, of 
the inseparability of universals from individual objects, Aristotle’s scientific realism 
emerges as a form of anti-Platonism, even as both Aristotle and Plato posit some entity 
entities other than individual particulars as the objects of a science.   
 This analysis reveals two features of Aristotle’s philosophy of the sciences: its 
realism and anti-Platonism. Insofar as Aristotle takes issue with the idea that the objects 
of sciences are necessarily separated from particulars, he is an anti-Platonist. 
Nevertheless, his position cannot simply be assimilated to nominalism; since he accepts 





 2. Aristotle’s Mathematical Realism  
 
Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics reflects his view of science in general, embodying 
his conception of mathematics as the prime example of a science.  On the one hand, as 
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 Apo., I, 11, 77a5-7 
47
 Parmenides., 130b-c.  
48
 Barnes labels him as a weak Platonist in this regard. See Barnes (1985) p. 98. 
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an anti-Platonist, Aristotle objects to the idea that mathematical objects exist 
independently in ontological terms of sensible particular substances.
49
 Since only 
substance can exist by itself, this means that Aristotle must deny that mathematical 
objects are substances.
50
  He is thus led to argue no separation between mathematical 
objects and the sensible particulars that embody them.
51
 But that does not mean that 
mathematicals do not exist, any more than the inseparability of other categorial beings 
from individual substances entails in turn these beings’ non-existence. Aristotle says: 
 
 
Thus since it is true to say without qualification that not only things which 
are separable but also things which are inseparable exist (for instance that 
moving things exist), it is true also to say without qualification that the 
objects of mathematics exist and such things as they [mathematicians] are 
talking about. 
 
w(/st' e)pei\ a(plw=j le/gein a)lhqe\j mh\ mo/non ta\ xwrista\ ei)=nai 
a)lla\ kai\ ta\ mh\ xwrista/ ¨oi(=on kinou/mena ei)=nai©, 
kai\ ta\ maqhmatika\ o(/ti e)/stin a(plw=j a)lhqe\j ei)pei=n, 




                                                           
49
 For the ontological dependency of mathematical objects on sensible individuals, see Met., XIII, 
2, 1077a16; 1077a26; 1077b1. 
50
 Substances are always ontologically prior to the other kinds of beings. For the ontological 
dependency of other categorical beings on substance, see Cat., 5, 2a34.  
51
 For Aristotle’s claim of the inseparability of mathematical objects from sensible things, see 
Met., XIII, 2, 1076b12; 1076b36; 1077a2; 1077a9. For instance, lines are not substances (Ibid., 
1077a32); and number cannot exist separately from sensibles (Ibid., 8, 1083b10; 1083b31; 9, 
1085a26). 
52
 Ibid., 1077b31-34. 
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Aristotle here argues that not only separable things but also inseparable things can be said 
to exist. Since, for Aristotle, the categories are ways of being and other categories of 
beings are inseparable from substances, he can further claim that mathematical objects 
exist without being concerned with their inseparability.  Aristotle confirms the existence 
of mathematical objects in several passages. For example, at the opening of Met., XIII, 
his discussion of the ontological status of mathematicals makes it clear that the subject of 
the chapter is not whether mathematicals exist but rather how:  “the subject of our 
discussion will be not about whether they exist but how they exist (h( a)mfisbh/thsij 
h(mi=n e)/stai ou) peri\ tou= ei=nai a)lla\ peri\ tou= tro/pou).”53 Thus, for Aristotle, 
the existence of mathematicals is not in question; the only ontological problem 
concerning mathematical objects is their mode of existence.
54
 Aristotle diverges from 
mathematical Platonism not on the ground of the non-existence of mathematical objects 
but by means of a denial of their self-subsistence.  
 
 3. Aristotle’s Criticism of Mathematical Platonism  
 
Aristotle’s supposed refutation of mathematical Platonism is especially relevant to the 
AFS; this is not only because the AFS directly imply mathematical Platonism as their 
corollary but also because both Plato and Aristotle regard mathematics as the best case 
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 Met., XIII, 1, 1076a36-37. 
54
 Barnes argues the same point concerning numbers. He says, “For if numbers do not exist at all, 
then arithmetic studies nothing, i.e., there is no such thing as arithmetic. But that is absurd: it is a 
datum that arithmetic exists.” See Barnes (1985) p. 102. 
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supporting the existence of scientific objects other than particulars. It seems, then, that 
Aristotle refutes mathematical Platonism in order to refute the ASF itself. In this sense, 
Met., Book XIII and XIV, where Aristotle attacks mathematical Platonism, could be seen 
as his response to AFS.
55
 In fact, Met., XIII-XIV is the only place in which Aristotle 
directly deals with these arguments.
56
  
 It is an interesting issue whether Aristotle’s criticism of mathematical Platonism 
in Met., XIII-XIV, is successful. Rather than considering the issue closely, the focus of 
this dissertation lies on whether Aristotle provides an alternative theory to mathematical 
Platonism, to give an account of the truth of mathematics. While fascinating, the earlier 
question is perhaps too large to form the subject of any single dissertation, not least 
because Plato’s own early theory differs markedly from his development of it, even 
within Dialogues. The matter is further complicated by the admission of Plato’s so-called 
unwritten doctrine, and by the departures from Plato’s view introduced by his successors. 
In consequence of this last point, it is difficult to know exactly which positions Aristotle 
means to place into doubt on different occasions, as in this indicative instance: 
 
 
But it is not possible for such a kind of things to exist in separation either; 
for if there are to be solids besides perceptible solids, separated from them, 
distinct and prior to perceptible solids, it is obvious that there must be 
distinct and separate planes besides [perceptible] planes, and the same 
argument applies to points and lines as well. But if so, there will again be 
distinct and separate planes and lines and points besides those of the 
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 Annas agrees with this point. For the relationship between AFS and Aristotle’s criticism of 
mathematical Platonism, see Annas (1976) p.23 and 142. 
56
  Aristotle seems specifically to allude to AFS at Met., XIII, 4, 1079a7-8. His counter 
arguments against AFS are found at Ibid., 2, 1076b39-1077a14.  
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mathematical solids (for the uncompounded is prior to the compounded 
and if there are non-perceptible ones, by the same argument there are 
planes existing by themselves prior to those in the unchanging solids. So 
these planes and lines and solids are distinct from those that belong 
together with the separate solids; the latter belong together with the 
mathematical solids, while the former are prior to the mathematical 
solids.) Then again there will be lines and points in the prior lines; there 
will be distinct prior points, though there are no more prior to them. The 
piling up becomes absurd: we get one set of solids over and above 
perceptible planes (those besides perceptible planes, those in the 
mathematical solids, and those besides the latter), four sets of lines, and 
five sets of points, which of them will be the object of the mathematical 
branches of knowledge? Not the planes and lines and points in the 
unchanging solids, for knowledge always deals with what is prior. 
 
a)lla\ mh\n ou)de\ kexwrisme/naj g' ei)=nai fu/seij toiau/taj 
dunato/n. ei) ga\r e)/stai sterea\ para\ ta\ ai)sqhta\ kexwrisme/na 
tou/twn e(/tera kai\ pro/tera tw=n ai)sqhtw=n, dh=lon o(/ti 
kai\ para\ ta\ e)pi/peda e(/tera a)nagkai=on ei)=nai e)pi/peda 
kexwrisme/na kai\ stigma\j kai\ gramma/j ¨tou= ga\r au)tou= 
lo/gou©: ei) de\ tau=ta, pa/lin para\ ta\ tou= stereou= tou= 
maqhmatikou= e)pi/peda kai\ gramma\j kai\ stigma\j e(/tera 
kexwrisme/na ¨pro/tera ga\r tw=n sugkeime/nwn 
e)sti\ ta\ a)su/nqeta: kai\ ei)/per tw=n ai)sqhtw=n pro/tera sw/mata 
mh\ ai)sqhta/, t%= au)t%= lo/g% kai\ tw=n e)pipe/dwn tw=n e)n toi=j 
a)kinh/toij stereoi=j ta\ au)ta\ kaq' au(ta/, w(/ste e(/tera tau=ta 
e)pi/peda kai\ grammai\ tw=n a(/ma toi=j stereoi=j toi=j 
kexwrisme/noij: ta\ me\n ga\r a(/ma toi=j maqhmatikoi=j stereoi=j 
ta\ de\ pro/tera tw=n maqhmatikw=n sterew=n©. pa/lin toi/nun 
tou/twn tw=n e)pipe/dwn e)/sontai grammai/, w(=n pro/teron deh/sei 
e(te/raj gramma\j kai\ stigma\j ei)=nai dia\ to\n au)to\n lo/gon: 
kai\ tou/twn <tw=n> e)k tai=j prote/raij grammai=j e(te/raj 
prote/raj stigma/j, w(=n ou)ke/ti pro/terai e(/terai. a)/topo/j te 
dh\ gi/gnetai h( sw/reusij ¨sumbai/nei ga\r sterea\ me\n 
monaxa\ para\ ta\ ai)sqhta/, e)pi/peda 
de\ tritta\ para\ ta\ ai)sqhta/ ta/ te para\ ta\ ai)sqhta\ kai\ ta\ e)n 
toi=j maqhmatikoi=j stereoi=j kai\ <ta\> para\ ta\ e)n 
tou/toisgrammai\ de\ tetracai/, stigmai\ de\ pentacai/: w(/ste 
peri\ poi=a ai( e)pisth=mai e)/sontai ai( maqhmatikai\ tou/twn; ou) 
21 
 
ga\r dh\ peri\ ta\ e)n t%= stere%= t%= a)kinh/t% e)pi/peda 
kai\ gramma\j kai\ stigma/j: a)ei\ ga\r peri\ ta\ pro/tera 
h( e)pisth/mh©. 57 
 
 
 The main point of the argument is that, once we posit ideal geometrical objects as 
ontologically separate from perceptible ones, we are led into an absurd multiple 
reduplication of such ideal objects. For example, suppose that there are the physical solid 
and its corresponding ideal solid. Then, there should be also an ideal plane, line, and 
point corresponding to the physical plane, line, and point, respectively. But since the ideal 
solid is composed of planes, there should be ideal planes of the ideal solid. So, we come 
to have other ideal planes besides the ideal plane we posited along with the ideal solid at 
the beginning. But since each plane is composed of lines, we will also have posited the 
ideal line at the beginning, and lines of which the ideal plane is composed, and lines of 
which planes of the ideal solid are composed. We can apply the same argument to lines 
and points as well. As a result, we come to have two sets of solids: perceptible and ideal 
solids; three sets of planes: perceptible, ideal planes and planes as the components of the 
ideal solid; and by the same logic, four sets of lines and five sets of points.
58
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 Ibid., 1076b11-1076b36. The argument at Ibid., III, 2, 997b33-998a6 is almost the same, but a 
little longer. 
58
 Aristotle argues that this also holds of numbers: “The same argument [applies] also to 
numbers: for besides each set of points there will be distinct units, and also besides each group of 
things, besides perceptible things and again besides intelligible things. Thus, there will be [many] 
kinds of numbers (o( d' au)to\j lo/goj kai\ peri\ tw=n a)riqmw=n: par' e(ka/staj ga\r ta\j 
stigma\j e(/terai e)/sontai mona/dej, kai\ par' e(/kasta ta\ o)/nta, <ta\> ai)sqhta/, ei)=ta 
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 Apart from commentators’ disagreement on subtle points of this argument, it 
would seem that Aristotle’s correctness in these claims depends on what theory he is 
attacking. For example, since Plato in the middle period identifies mathematicals with the 
intermediates rather than Forms, the middle Plato would argue that both the ideal plane 
and the planes as components of the ideal solid are intermediates; since the intermediates 
can be plural, it is not problematic that there are plural numbers of the same kind of 
geometrical objects.
59
 The middle Plato may be not thus vulnerable to the reduplication 
problem. Likewise, the problem need not trouble Speusippus either, because he rejects 
the existence of Forms, while maintaining the existence of ideal numbers.
60
 Since only 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ta\ nohta/, w(/st' e)/stai ge/nh tw=n maqhmatikw=n a)riqmw=n) (Ibid., XIII, 3,1076b35-
1076b39).” 
59
 The intermediates differ from sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, but, unlike 
Forms, the intermediates do not have to be unique; that is, there can be many of the same type.  
Aristotle says, “besides perceptible things and Forms, he says, there are the objects of 
mathematics between these [two], differing from perceptible things in being eternal and 
unchangeable, from Forms in that there are many alike, whereas the Form itself is in each case 
unique (e)/ti de\ para\ ta\ ai)sqhta\ kai\ ta\ ei)/dh ta\ maqhmatika\ tw=n pragma/twn ei)=nai/ 
fhsi metacu/, diafe/ronta tw=n me\n ai)sqhtw=n t%= a)i/+dia kai\ a)ki/nhta ei)=nai, tw=n d' 
ei)dw=n t%= ta\ me\n po/ll' a)/tta o(/moia ei)=nai to\ de\ ei)=doj au)to\ e(\n e(/kaston mo/non) (Met., 
I, 6, 987b14-18) .” But it is also controversial whether Plato actually did believe in the 
intermediates in this sense. According to Aristotle, the notion of the intermediates is introduced as 
the solution to the uniqueness problem, viz. that while each Form is unique, mathematical objects 
are supposed to be plural, i.e., a geometrical theorem mentions two intersecting circles. But the 
Dialogues do not seem to have noticed this problem nor to be impelled to find a solution to it. 
The most explicit argument for the intermediates can be found in Republic, VI, 509d-511a, and 
Philebus, 56c-59d, but these passages do not throw up the uniqueness problem. For this issue, see 
Annas (1975a) pp.19-21. 
60
 fr. 42a-e. For the testimonia and fragments of Speusippus, refer to Parente (1980) and 
Leonardo Tarán, (1981) Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related 





 and identifies them with corresponding mathematical 
objects,
62
 it would seem that only Xenocrates is fully liable to the criticism that Aristotle 
mounts in this passage.  
 Nevertheless, some of Aristotle’s anti-Platonic arguments deserve attention 
insofar as they can help us reconstruct his positive view of mathematics and his 
motivation in introducing abstraction into his theory of mathematics. The following 
objection, for instance, reveals Aristotle’s view of astronomy, which he regards as a 
branch of mathematics (we will also see that this view gives rise to a problem which 
requires the theory of abstraction for its solution): 
 
 
For the objects of astronomy will exist apart from sensible objects just as 
the objects of geometry; but how can a heaven and its parts, or anything 
else exist with movement [apart from the sensible heaven]? And similarly 
with the objects of optics and harmonics; for there will be utterance and 
seeing apart from sensible and particular objects. Therefore, it is obvious 
that the other senses and objects of perception [will exist separately, 
too]...But if this is the case, there will be [separate] animals too, if there 
are [separate] senses.   
 
peri\ a(\ ga\r h( a)strologi/a e)sti/n, o(moi/wj e)/stai 
para\ ta\ ai)sqhta\ kai\ peri\ a(\ h( gewmetri/a: ei)=nai d' ou)rano\n 
kai\ ta\ mo/ria au)tou= pw=j dunato/n, h)\ a)/llo o(tiou=n e)/xon 
ki/nhsin; o(moi/wj de\ kai\ ta\ o)ptika\ kai\ ta\ a(rmonika/: e)/stai 
ga\r fwnh/ te kai\ o)/yij para\ ta\ ai)sqhta\ kai\ ta\ kaq' e(/kasta, 
w(/ste dh=lon o(/ti kai\ ai( a)/llai ai)sqh/seij kai\ ta\ a)/lla 
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 fr. 30. For the fragments of Xenocrates, refer to Margherita Isnardi Parente (1982) Frammenti; 
Senocrate-Ermodoro ; Edizione, traduzione e commento, Napoli: Bibliopolis.  
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ai)sqhta...ei) de\ tau=ta, kai\ z%=a e)/sontai, ei)/per 




 Aristotle takes astronomy to be a counterexample to AFS. Astronomy is a science 
lying on the borderline between physics and pure mathematics. On the one hand, it 
involves the study of physical objects, while on the other, it was treated as a branch of 
mathematics by the ancient Greeks. At first glance, the argument seems to appeal to our 
common sense that the objects of astronomy are sensible objects, stars in the heavens; 
there is no other separate, ideal heaven;
64
 there are not ideal sounds as the objects of 
harmony separated from perceptual sounds, etc. But we should remember that from the 
beginning Platonism does not appeal to our common sense. On the contrary, it 
consistently devalues it: opinion (do/ca), which is concerned with the world of physical 
objects, blinds us to the truth. Thus, the fact that AFS implies something incompatible 
with our common sense beliefs cannot be a ground for rejecting mathematical 
Platonism—until we provide a better reason to rely on those beliefs. 
 But, in the case of astronomy, there is a better reason to think that its objects are 
sensible. One of the premises of AFS is that sensible objects are deficient as the objects 
of a science, in that they are in constant change and consequently never in the same state. 
But it was commonly believed among ancient Greeks that the movements and structures 
of the heavenly bodies were perpetual, regular and complete. If the movement and 
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 Met., XIII, 2, 1077a1-9. 
64
 Aristotle believes that there is only one heaven (Met., XII, 8, 1074a31-33).  
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structure of the heavenly body are perpetually uniform and regular, there is no reason to 
posit separate entities as the objects of astronomy other than the visible heavenly bodies. 
And that suffices to show that AFS is not universally true; namely, it is not always the 
case that the objects of a science must be separated from physical objects. 
 Aristotle also argues the same point with optics and harmonics. But, obviously, it 
does not follow from the fact that the objects of astronomy are not distinct from visible 
stars that the objects of other sciences are likewise not distict from sensibles; it could be 
that astronomy here represents an exceptional case. Were this so, AFS would be still 
valid for a sub-class of all those sensible objects that exhibit no regularity. 
 In order to appreciate the force of the argument, it is important to grasp the 
polemical character of Aristotle’s claims in Met., XIII-XIV: he focuses primarily on 
revealing the absurdity of his opponents’ positions rather than developing his own, and 
seeks mostly to persuade opponents of his view rather than to prove it, appealing to 
plausibility or likelihood rather than any secure demonstration. This polemical 
characteristic especially comes out in his frequent employment of reductio ad absurdum 
as a purported method of proof. He accepts opponents’ theses as the premises of his 
argument insofar as they serve his purpose even when he likely considers them false.  
 As suggested earlier, harmony and optics were regarded by Aristotle’s 
contemporaries as the sibling sciences of astronomy, insofar as they are all branches of 
mathematics.
65
 Thus, the Greeks would be inclined to think that they shared common 
characteristics with astronomy, meaning that Aristotle’s assimilation of some properties 
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 Republic, VII, 530d. 
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of astronomy to those of harmonics and optics was likely to dispose his interlocutors to 
agreement. At the same time, the persuasiveness of Aristotle’s argument relies on the 
assumption that the movements of heavenly bodies are perfect enough to satisfy the 
criteria for objects of a science. But the following passage of Plato, however, denies just 
such an assumption:        
  
 
But as for the ratio of night to day, of day and night to a month, of a month 
to a year, or of the other stars to these and one another, don’t you think 
he’ll regard as a strange person one who believes that they are always the 
same and never deviate at all, which possess bodies and are visible objects, 
and seeks to grasp the truth out of them in some way?  
 
th\n de\ nukto\j pro\j h(me/ran summetri/an kai\ tou/twn pro\j mh=na 
kai\ mhno\j pro\j e)niauto\n kai\ tw=n a)/llwn a)/strwn pro/j te 
tau=ta kai\ pro\j a)/llhla, ou)k a)/topon, oi)/ei, h(gh/setai to\n 
nomi/zonta gi/gnesqai/ te tau=ta a)ei\ w(sau/twj kai\ ou)damv= 
ou)de\n paralla/ttein, sw=ma/ te e)/xonta kai\ o(rw/mena, 




Plato here argues that the motions of heavenly bodies do not meet the criteria for the 
objects of a science because they are not always in the same state; thus they are not the 
objects of astronomy. Since Plato thinks that the visible motions of stars are not the 
objects of astronomy, he has every reason to apply AFS to the case of astronomy, too. 
Thus he argues: 
 
 
                                                           
66
 Republic, VII, 530a7-b4. 
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We should consider the decorations in the sky to be the most beautiful and 
most exact among such [visible] things, seeing that they are embroidered 
on a visible surface, but to fall far short of true ones—the motions, that are 
the real fastness and the real slowness [being expressed] by true numbers 
and all true figures, that are in relation to one another, and carry round the 
things in them; the motions are apprehended by reason and thought but not 
by sight. 
     
tau=ta me\n ta\ e)n t%= ou)ran%= poiki/lmata, e)pei/per e)n o(rat%= 
pepoi/kiltai, ka/llista me\n h(gei=sqai kai\ a)kribe/stata tw=n 
toiou/twn e)/xein, tw=n de\ a)lhqinw=n polu\ e)ndei=n, a(\j to\ o)\n ta/xoj 
kai\ h( ou)=sa braduth\j e)n t%= a)lhqin%= a)riqm%= kai\ pa=si toi=j 
a)lhqe/si sxh/masi fora/j te pro\j a)/llhla fe/retai 




Although the passage is hard to translate and lends itself to a range of interpretations,
68
 it 
is clear that Plato distinguishes the true motions (tw=n a)lhqinw=n)69 from the actual 
motions of heavenly bodies. And he suggests that only the former are entitled to be 
objects of astronomy as a branch of mathematics, since they trace out true geometrical 
figures, and their inter-relations aptly expressible in terms of true numbers, that is, the 
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 Ibid., 529c7-d5. 
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 For the translation issue of this passage, see Adam (1929) pp. 186-187. 
69
 Most commentators agree on translating ‘tw=n a)lhqinw=n’ as ‘true motions’, but it is not clear 
what ‘true motion’ might amount to, and the term has lent itself to a variety of interpretations. For 
various interpretations of ‘true motions’, see Seung (1996) pp.117-119. I accept the view that 
Plato’s real astronomy is just pure mathematics; for Plato, the objects of astronomy are identical 
to the objects of pure mathematics such as pure geometry and arithmetic. This view is advocated 
by Seung and Mueller. See Seung (1996) pp. 118-119 and Mueller (1980). 
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ratio of the speeds of motions may be calculated in terms of true numbers;
70
 in addition, 
these relations are not directly observable but may only be grasped only by reason. 
 Plato accepts that astronomers investigate the visible motions of stars. But he 
distinguishes such empirical astronomy from the real astronomy whose objects are the 
real motions mentioned above. Since empirical astronomy deals with sensible stars whose 
motions vary or are erratic, it does not qualify as a science.  
 If real astronomy does not treat the visible heavenly bodies, what is the role of 
their observation in astronomy? It would be difficult to deny that astronomy is based on 
such observation, or, at least, that observation is necessary for astronomy. In Plato’s time, 
astronomy was a fairly descriptive science which made rapid advances on the back of 
accurate observations. For example, Eudoxus’ Phainomena was no more than a 
description of the motions of visible stars.
71
 Plato does not deny the role of observation 
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 What are the true numbers? Plato makes a distinction between pure numbers and material 
numbers: while a pure number is composed of absolutely equal units, an empirical number whose 
units are unequal, is a collection of sensible things. For this distinction between two different 
kinds of numbers, see Philebus, 56 d-e, 57c-e; Republic, VII, 525 c-e. It is notable that Aristotle 
also preserves this distinction (Met., X, 1, 1052b35;1053a2; cf. Phy., IV, 11,  219b5-10).  
 For Plato, depending on which number it deals with, arithmetic is also divided into two 
kinds: arithmetic of the Many and philosopher’s arithmetic. As the names indicate, the arithmetic 
of the Many is an empirical study of the phenomenal world which calculates the numbers of 
sensible things, while philosopher’s arithmetic is a pure arithmetic which studies the 
characteristics of pure numbers not found in the empirical world. Since the study of pure 
arithmetic is independent of our experience, we may also call it a priori arithmetic.  
 Plato applies this dichotomy to other mathematical sciences such as geometry, astronomy, 
harmony, and optics, as well. See Philebus, 55d-57a, 57c; Republic, VII, 527a-b; 529d-e; 530a-b; 
531b-c. 
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 See Lasserre (1964) pp. 144-168. Cf., Met., XIII, 1073b3-17. The Phainomena is the earliest 
Greek work that describes star groups as constellations. The original is now lost. 
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“Accordingly,” said I, “we must use the embroidery of the heaven for our 
study of those [realities], just as if someone [would do who] chanced upon 
diagrams exquisitely drawn and worked out by Daedalus or some 
consummate artist. For anyone acquainted with geometry in some degree, 
seeing such things, would think that they are most beautifully finished by 
workmanship, but he would think it absurd to study them in all earnest for 
finding in such things the truth of equal or double or any other ratio.”…I 
said, “Hence, using problems just as if we do geometry, we participate in 
the study of astronomy, and will let be the things in the heaven, if we 
really will make the intelligent part of the soul useful from its being 
useless by participating in the study of astronomy. 
 
Ou)kou=n, ei)=pon, tv= peri\ to\n ou)rano\n poikili/# paradei/gmasi 
xrhste/on th=j pro\j e)kei=na maqh/sewj e(/neka, o(moi/wj w(/sper a)\n 
ei)/ tij e)ntu/xoi u(po\ Daida/lou h)/ tinoj a)/llou dhmiourgou= 
h)\ grafe/wj diafero/ntwj gegramme/noij kai\ e)kpeponhme/noij 
diagra/mmasin. h(gh/saito ga\r a)/n pou/ tij e)/mpeiroj gewmetri/aj, 
i)dw\n ta\ toiau=ta, ka/llista me\n e)/xein a)pergasi/#, geloi=on 
mh\n e)piskopei=n au)ta\ spoudv= w(j th\n a)lh/qeian e)n au)toi=j 
lhyo/menon i)/swn h)\ diplasi/wn h)\ a)/llhj tino\j 
summetri/aj...Problh/masin a)/ra, h)=n d' e)gw/, xrw/menoi w(/sper 
gewmetri/an ou(/tw kai\ a)stronomi/an me/timen, ta\ d' e)n t%= 
ou)ran%= e)a/somen, ei) me/llomen o)/ntwj a)stronomi/aj 
metalamba/nontej xrh/simon to\ fu/sei fro/nimon e)n tv= yuxv= e)c 




Once the perfection of the stars’ motions is denied, astronomy loses its force as a counter 
example against AFS. By the time of Plato, astronomers had discovered the apparent 
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irregularity of planetary motions, indeed devoting much of their attention to accounting 
for this irregularity. For instance, they found from observation that planets such as the 
Moon, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn revolve much more slowly from west to east, in 
the direction of the circle of the zodiac, than they do from east to west; and that Venus in 
the course of its synodic revolution draws the line of a saw-tooth. Since they commonly 
conceived the universe to be a sphere or hemisphere and stars to move on the surface of 
the sphere, tracing out a circle, it had become the astronomers’ central preoccupation in 
those days to account for such irregularities, in dealing with which they typically had 
recourse to theories of the interactions between the motions of individual stars. 
 It is hard to imagine that Aristotle presented his argument from astronomy in 
ignorance of such astronomical facts—he refers to the systems of Eudoxus in his works.
73
 
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s argument supposes the perfection of the stars’ motion, possibly 
in consequence of Eudoxus’ success in reconciling traditional assumptions with 
observational facts.
74
 Eudoxus believed, on the one hand, like other contemporaries, that 
the motions of heavenly bodies are regular, uniform and circular, and on the other hand, 
was unable to discount his observation. It was one of Eudoxus’ great astronomical 
achievements to reconstruct the original motions of stars by accounting for the 
irregularities in terms of the interplay between the rotations of four distinct spheres. In 
explaining the irregularities of the so called ‘wandering stars,’ Eudoxus posits four 
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 Aristotle was after all one of the two greatest pupils of Eudoxus. He mentions Eudoxus’ system 
at DC., 291a29-291b11; Met. 1073b18-31. cf., 1073b3-17. 
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distinct spheres, each of which has its own individual rotation. For example, he converts 
the saw-toothed curve which Venus traces out into the two twists of the hippopede
75
 and 
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 A hippopede is a figure of eight curve used by Eudoxus in his planetary theory. Hippopede 
means literally "foot of a horse." It is often known as the hippopede of Proclus, after Proclus who 
was the first to study it, together with Eudoxus, and also as the horse fetter.  
“Eudoxus developed one of the first explanations of planetary movement which 
accounts for the observable phenomena of retrograde motion. The mathematical construct he 
developed uses two counter-rotating concentric spheres with offset axes of rotation. The 
combined motion of these spheres causes a planetary motion called a "hippopede", which when 
combined with the planet's normal easterly track across the backdrop of the fixed stars, causes the 
planet to move briefly in the opposite direction (URL=http://hsci.cas.ou.edu/images/ applets/ 
hippopede.html).” 
76
 Eudoxus was probably the first astronomer who provided a mathematical explanation for the 
irregularities of the motions of the heavenly bodies. His system has two main distinguishable 
features: (i) he supposes not one, but four, different spheres for each planet and (ii) while he, like 
other astronomers, locates fixed stars on the surfaces of the spheres, he locates wandering stars 
between the surfaces of the spheres and the Earth. The following passage from Aristotle allows us 
to figure out how Eudoxus explains the motions of the stars in his system. “This discussion shows 
that their movements are faster or slower according to their distances. since it is admitted that the 
outermost revolution of the heaven is simple and fastest, whereas that of the other [inner spheres] 
is slower and composite (for each by its own revolution is going against [the motion of] the 
heaven), it is, then, reasonable that the star nearest to the simple and primary revolution 
completes its own revolution in the longest time and the one farthest away in the shortest, and 
with the others, the nearer one always in a longer time, and the farther one in a shorter time. For 
the nearest of all is most influenced [by the primary motion], and the farthest least, owing to its 
distance. Again, those between these two [are influenced] in proportion to their distances, as the 
mathematicians show (Sumbai/nei de\ kata\ lo/gon gi/gnesqai ta\j e(ka/stou kinh/seij 
toi=j a)posth/masi t%= ta\j me\n ei)=nai qa/ttouj ta\j de\ bradute/raj: e)pei\ ga\r 
u(po/keitai th\n me\n e)sxa/thn tou= ou)ranou= perifora\n a(plh=n t' ei)=nai kai\ taxi/sthn, 
ta\j de\ tw=n a)/llwn bradute/raj te kai\ plei/ouj ¨e(/kaston ga\r a)ntife/retai t%= 
ou)ran%= kata\ to\n au(tou= ku/klon©, eu)/logon h)/dh to\ me\n e)gguta/tw th=j a(plh=j 
kai\ prw/thj perifora=j e)n plei/st% xro/n% diie/nai to\n au(tou= ku/klon, 
to\ de\ porrwta/tw e)n e)laxi/st%, tw=n d' a)/llwn to\ e)ggu/teron a)ei\ e)n plei/oni, 
32 
 
 It is not certain whether Plato knew of Eudoxus’ new astronomical theory, since 
there is no passage in the Dialogues which refers unequivocally either to it or a theory 
modeled on it. If Plato was not then abreast of Eudoxus, his astronomical views may be 
ignored as being obsolete. But it is more likely that Plato was familiar with the theory and 
rejected it due to his antipathy to his contemporary astronomers who based their study on 
the observation of visible stars. More fundamentally, as we have seen before, Plato is 
deeply skeptical toward the possibility of a science of sensible things.   
 After all, if Aristotle’s view on astronomy is accepted, astronomy would present a 
cogent counterexample to AFS. We have seen that Plato distinguishes pure astronomy 
from empirical astronomy. But the ground of the distinction is the imperfection of the 
heavenly bodies’ motions. Now, since it is assumed that the motions of the stars trace out 
perfect geometrical figures, Plato’s distinction between pure and empirical astronomy 
lacks any basis.  
 However, there is another problem. The first argument of AFS posited that, while 
the objects of sciences are simple, sensible particulars are complex.
77
 For instance, 
geometry does not study triangular things such as a bronze isosceles triangle but the 
triangle itself; and while the triangle itself has only the necessary properties of triangle, a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to\ de\ porrw/teron e)n e)la/ttoni. To\ me\n ga\r e)gguta/tw ma/lista kratei=tai, 
to\ de\ porrwta/tw pa/ntwn h(/kista dia\ th\n a)po/stasin: ta\ de\ metacu\ kata\ lo/gon 
h)/dh th=j a)posta/sewj, w(/sper kai\ deiknu/ousin oi( maqhmatikoi/) (DC., 291a32-
291b10).”  
 For Arisotle’s explanation of Eudoxus’ four spheres, see Met., XII, 8, 1073b18-31. Cf. 
Ibid., 1073b3-17. See also Dicks (1970) pp.151-189. For Greek philosophical works treating 
ancient astronomy, see Heath (1932). 
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 Phaedo, 74ff. and 78ff.; Republic, V, 476e-479 and VII, 523a. 
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sensible particular triangular thing has other non-geometrical properties as well which are 
irrelevant to any geometrical study. Similarly, the visible motion of a star has not only 
mathematical properties, such as speed or the circular orbit dealt with by arithmetic or 
geometry, but also has other non-mathematical properties. As we will see later on, this is 
the problem which Aristotle purposes to solve by introducing abstraction. I will deal with 




 Although controversies remain over the finer points of Aristotle’s criticism of 
Plato’s philosophy of mathematics, overall his criticism of mathematical Platonism is 
persuasive and effective. Aristotle is the first philosopher who directly develops a 
criticism of mathematical Platonism. He invented a number of anti-Platonic arguments in 
the philosophy of mathematics, some of which (as below) survive into contemporary 
debates:   
 
 
The properties of numbers apply in a musical scale, in the heaven, and in 
many other cases. Those who assert that only mathematical number exists 
cannot say anything such as this according to their hypotheses; but they 
used to say that sciences will not be concerned with these [sensible] things. 
But we say that they are, as we said before. And it is obvious that 
mathematical objects are not separate; if they were separate, their 
properties would not apply to bodies.     
 
ta\ pa/qh ta\ tw=n a)riqmw=n e)n a(rmoni/# u(pa/rxei kai\ e)n t%= 
ou)ran%= kai\ e)n polloi=j a)/lloij. toi=j de\ to\n maqhmatiko\n 
mo/non le/gousin ei)=nai a)riqmo\n ou)qe\n toiou=ton e)nde/xetai 
le/gein kata\ ta\j u(poqe/seij, a)ll' o(/ti ou)k e)/sontai au)tw=n 
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ai( e)pisth=mai e)le/geto. h(mei=j de/ famen ei)=nai, kaqa/per ei)/pomen 
pro/teron. kai\ dh=lon o(/ti ou) kexw/ristai ta\ maqhmatika/: ou) 
ga\r a)\n kexwrisme/nwn ta\ pa/qh u(ph=rxen e)n toi=j sw/masin.79 
 
 
Thus, for Aristotle, Platonism cannot account for the applicability of mathematics to the 
sensible world. One way to explain the applicability of mathematical theory to the 
physical world would be to show that mathematics is a theory of a certain aspect of 
physical objects in the same way that physics is. But, since Platonists assert that 
mathematical objects are distinct from physical objects, they find themselves having to 
explain the relevance of mathematical objects to the physical world,
80
 for instance, as 
teased out by Balaguer in terms of causal relations: 
  
 
For since Platonists maintain that mathematical objects exist outside of 
spacetime, they endorse what we might call the principle of causal 
isolation (PCI), which says that there are no causal interactions between 
mathematical and physical objects. But this gives rise to the following 
question: If there are no mathematical facts that are causally relevant to 
any physical facts, why is mathematical theory (which presumably is 
concerned with mathematical facts) relevant to physical theory (which 
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 Met., XIV, 3, 1090a24-30. A similar passage can be found at Ibid., 1090a9-15. 
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 “It is evident, then, both that the contrary theory will say the contrary, and that the problem 
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Platonists might argue for some kind of a relationship between Forms and physical 
objects: a physical object participates in or imitates a Form; and this relationship is 
downward only, that is to say, a Form, F-ness, is the cause of a particular thing’s being F, 
but F-ness is causally independent of an F-thing; namely, it exists by itself. But as Plato 
himself recognizes, without further explanation of what such terms as ‘participate’ or 
‘imitate’ means, the attempt to explain the relationship between a Form and its 
corresponding particular can be no more than ad hoc or a mere metaphor.
82
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Aristotle’s Theory of Abstraction 
 
 1. The eed for Introducing Abstraction 
 
Let us suppose that Aristotle’s criticism of mathematical Platonism is successful. 
Aristotle may then have proved the validity of his anti-Platonism in mathematics, but 
would still be far from having secured the whole of his theory. The more important 
question for Aristotle’s theory of mathematics is whether he can provide an account of 
mathematical truth which is coherent with his realistic view of the sciences and theory of 
truth.   
Obviously, how mathematics can be true for Aristotle depends on what kind of 
theory of truth Aristotle is taken to have. On this score, Aristotle is faithful to ‘what is 
(to\ o)/n)’ : “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say 
of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true (to\ me\n ga\r le/gein to\ o)\n 
mh\ ei)=nai h)\ to\ mh\ o)\n ei)=nai yeu=doj, to\ de\ to\ o)\n ei)=nai kai\ to\ mh\ o)\n mh\ ei)=nai 
a)lhqe/j).”83 As such, Aristotle’s problem concerning the philosophy of mathematics 
comes down to showing that mathematicals are some kind of existents in his ontology.  
 Since there are not only particular individuals but also universals in Aristotle’s 
ontological inventory, he is in a better position to maintain scientific realism than 
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nominalists. However, the complexity of particulars remains a problem for him; while a 
science deals with F-itself, there is no F-itself separated from F-things in the Aristotelian 
world; and an F-thing is different from F-itself, because it has other properties than F-
ness (and necessary properties of F-ness). Thus Aristotle needs to show that the F-itself 
which a science is talking about is nothing but a universal, F-ness, in particular F-things. 
He attempts to show this by proving that, although a universal, F-ness, cannot be 
ontologically separated from a particular F-thing, a legitimate conceptual separation does 
obtain between the universal and the particular by abstraction.
84
 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I first offer my own account of Aristotle’s 
abstraction, and show how this abstraction solves the complexity problem of particulars. 
Next, I compare Aristotle’s theory of abstraction with that of other empiricists in an 
attempt to reveal its distinctive characteristics.  Finally, I consider the traditional 
interpretation of Aristotle’s abstraction, examining texts that seemingly support the 
traditional view. The aim here is to show that the Aristotelian texts in questions do not 
decisively support the traditional view, and that my interpretation can still be maintained.  
 
 2. The origin of Aristotle’s Abstraction 
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The term ‘abstraction’, etymologically speaking, is the translation of the Greek word, 
‘a)fai/reisij’ from the verb, ‘a)fairei=n’.  ‘a)fairei=n’ means literally ‘to take from’ 
or ‘take away from.’
85
 ‘pro/sqesij’ is often used along with ‘a)fai/reisij’ to express 
the two contrary actions of adding and subtracting. For instance: 
 
 
The things which simply come to be come to be absolutely: some of them 
by change of shape, like a statue; some by addition (prosqe/sei), like 
things which grow; some by subtraction (a)faire/sei) as a Hermes 
[comes to be] out of the stone.  
 
gi/gnetai de\ ta\ gigno/mena a(plw=j ta\ me\n metasxhmati/sei, 
oi(=on a)ndria/j, ta\ de\ prosqe/sei, oi(=on ta\ au)cano/mena, ta\ d' 
a)faire/sei, oi(=on e)k tou= li/qou o(  (Ermh=j.86 
 
 
In Plato, ‘a)fairew’ and ‘prosti/qhmi’ refer to a kind of dialectical method, and may 
respectively be translated as ‘subtracting’ and ‘adding’: 
 
 
I often repeat it on purpose, in order that nothing may escape us, and that 
you may add (prosqv=j) or subtract (a)fe/lvj) something if you wish. 
And Cebes said: “I do not want to add (prsqei=nai) or subtract 
(a)felei=n) anything at present. And that is what I say.” 
 
kai\ e)cepi/thdej polla/kij a)nalamba/nw, i(/na mh/ ti diafu/gv 
h(ma=j, ei)/ te/ ti bou/lei, prosqv=j h)\ a)fe/lvj.` Kai\ o( Ke/bhj,  )All' 
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ou)de\n e)/gwge e)n t%= paro/nti, e)/fh, ou)/te a)felei=n ou)/te 




It is in Topics where ‘a)fai/resij’ is first used as a technical term. Again, ‘a)fai/reisij’ 
appears as one of a pair with ‘pro/sqesij’; and both feature as part of a dialectical 
method used to decide which of two items is the more desirable.
88
 For example, when 
there are three different items, a, b, and c, and a and b are added to c separately, if the 
whole resulting from adding a to c is better than the whole of b and c, then a is more 
preferable.
89
 Similarly, the rule of subtraction is also employed as a decision procedure. 
When two different objects of choice, a and b form part of c and each of a and b is 
subtracted from c, the element whose absence renders the remainder worse may be 
deemed the more desirable.
90
 It is important that the origin of the terminology is traced to 
a dialectical context, since this provides a clue to the special characteristics of Aristotle’s 
abstraction, which connotes a logical or linguistic method, rather than a private mental 
operation.  
 The fact that the word for ‘abstraction’ often appears as a pair with ‘addition 
(a)fai/resij)’ throughout Aristotle’s works is another indication of the operation’s 
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logical character. In fact, in most passages in which ‘a)fai/reisij’ appears as a technical 
term, it can better be translated by ‘subtraction’.
91
 Throughout Aristotle’s oeuvre, indeed, 
the philosophical sense of addition always indicates a linguistic operation as a dialectical 
method. For instance, Aristotle asks whether a formula with an addition may count as a 
definition,
92
 and argues that, since anything which is snub also must be a snub nose, the 
definition of ‘snub’ should include the formula of a snub nose. Thus, one can define 
‘snub’ from an addition, namely, the definition of snub is the formula of a snub nose. 
Although it is not clear what exactly Aristotle means by ‘the formula [constructed] from 
an addition’ (to\ e)k prosqe/sewj lo/goj),93 it is obvious that the addition involves 
combining two concepts, namely, it is a linguistic operation. If its correlate term, 
addition, refers to a linguistic operation, it is reasonable to expect that ‘subtraction’ will 
also be a matter of the same sort of linguistic or logical method.  
 
 3. Abstraction—a Way to Find the Primitive Subject 
 
I claimed earlier that Aristotle introduces abstraction to refute Plato’s arguments from the 
sciences and to defeat mathematical Platonism. Abstraction as a method of decision, 
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however, has nothing to do with anti-Platonic argument. However, we can find another 
type of abstraction in Posterior Analytics. Aristotle there employs abstraction as a way to 
find the primary subject of a given predicate. This sort of abstraction, I will show, is 
identical with the mathematical abstraction which Aristotle exploits in Met., XIII and XV, 
to criticize AFS by rebuting mathematical Platonism. First, I will explain how abstraction 
is used to identify the primitive subject of a predicate, before expounding how such 
abstraction can be used to defeat Platonic scientific realism.  
 In Posterior Analytics, I, 5, Aristotle poses a question as to how we can confirm 
that a certain acquired knowledge of an object is universal. He asks, ‘how we can know 
that every triangle has angles equal to the sum of two right angles’?
94
 Aristotle argues 
that we do not know this theorem universally or absolutely, even if we prove it separately 
of each kind of triangle, until we know that the property belongs to them qua triangle, not 
qua isosceles, scalene or equilateral: 
 
 
…even if you prove for each [kind of] triangle, either by one or by another  
demonstration, that each has two right angles…you do not yet know of 
triangles that they have two right angles, universally nor even of every 
triangle…For you do not know it of triangles qua triangle…So when do 
you not know universally, and when do you know absolutely?  
 
...ou)d' a)/n tij dei/cv kaq' e(/kaston to\ tri/gwnon a)podei/cei h)\ mi#= 
h)\ e(te/r# o(/ti du/o o)rqa\j e)/xei e(/kaston...ou)/pw oi)=de to\ tri/gwnon 
o(/ti du/o o)rqai=j...ou)de\ kaq' o(/lou trigw/nou...ou) ga\r v(= tri/gwnon 
oi)=den, ou)de\ pa=n tri/gwnon... Po/t' ou)=n ou)k oi)=de kaqo/lou, 
kai\ po/t' oi)=den a(plw=j.95 
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Two questions come up: First, what exactly does the ‘qua’ mean? Second, how can we 
decide whether a property belongs to each triangle qua triangle, qua equilateral or qua 
isosceles? In fact, answers to both questions can be found in the text. Let us examine 
Aristotle’s solution for the first question first.  
 Aristotle suggests abstraction as a way to decide whether a certain property 
belongs to an object qua A or qua B. For instance, given a bronze isosceles triangle, 
suppose that we need to decide whether the property, having angles equal to two right 
angles, belongs to it qua triangle or qua isosceles or qua bronze. To decide this, Aristotle 
proposes, we only have to remove (a)fairei=n) each of the physical triangle’s predicates 
successively, e.g., being bronze, being isosceles, and being triangular, and check whether 
the property still holds; for instance, even if we remove ‘being bronze’ from a given 
triangle of this description, it has still angles equal to two right angles because it is not 
only a bronze isosceles triangle, but isosceles triangles in general which have angles of 
180 degrees. Likewise, even after ‘being isosceles’ is removed, it will have the property 
of ‘having angles of 180 degrees’. But if we remove or abstract (a)fairei=n) ‘being a 
triangle’ from the list of its predicates, it will no longer have the property of being equal 
to right angles. This confirms, Aristotle argues, that the property belongs to it qua 





It is clear that, after [other things] have been abstracted, it belongs to the 
primitive subject, e.g. two right angles will belong to bronze isosceles 
triangles, even after both being bronze and being isosceles have been 
removed. But not when figure or limit have been. But [two right angles 
do] not [belong to these items] primitively. Then, what is the primitive 
subject? If when triangle is abstracted, [two right angles do not belong to 
it], then, it is in virtue of this that it belongs to the other items as well, and 
it is to this that the demonstration applies universally. 
 
dh=lon o(/ti o(/tan a)fairoume/nwn u(pa/rxv prw/t%. oi(=on t%= 
i)soskelei= xalk%= trigw/n%    u(pa/rcousi du/o o)rqai/, 
a)lla\ kai\ tou= xalkou=n ei)=nai a)faireqe/ntoj kai\ tou= 
i)soskele/j. a)ll' ou) tou= sxh/matoj h)\ pe/ratoj. a)ll' ou) prw/twn. 
ti/noj ou)=n prw/tou; ei) dh\ trigw/nou, kata\ tou=to u(pa/rxei 




Since for Aristotle the question whether A belongs to B qua C is the equivalent to the 
question whether A is a property of B and C is the primitive subject of A,
97
 abstraction 
can be regarded as a way to determine what a property belongs to not coincidentally, but 
primitively; e.g. ‘having angles equal to two right angles’ may belong to something 
brazen or isosceles coincidentally, but will belong primitively (u(pa/rxei prw/twn) to 
something triangular. Thus, ‘triangle’, which remains after other (less general) predicates 
of the whole compound thing have been removed, stands as the primary subject of the 
property of ‘having angles equal to right angles’. 
 The order of abstraction is important in this procedure. As Aristotle himself 
recognizes, for instance, the property of ‘having the sum of its internal angles equal to 
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two right angles’ would disappear not only when the aspect of triangularity but also when 
the aspect of figure is removed from the bronze isosceles triangle.
98
 But since the 
property does not belong to it qua figure, figure cannot be the primitive subject of that 
property. While ‘having angles equal to two right angles’ will not belong to a bronze 
isosceles triangle when ‘being a figure’ is abstracted, that property does not belong to a 
bronze isosceles triangle in virtue of its being a figure; it is obvious that not every figure 
has angles equal to two right angles, but any triangle does. This means that the order of 
subtraction (abstraction) is crucial in deciding the subject to which properties belong 
primitively. Notice that in the illustration with the bronze isosceles triangle, Aristotle 
subtracts each predicate in order of increasing generality, i.e. first bronze, through to 
isosceles, triangle, and figure.
99
  
 So far we have taken it for granted that if we remove or abstract (a)fairei=n) 
‘being a triangle’ from the list of predicates of a bronze isosceles triangle, the property of 
‘having angles equal to two right angles’ is no longer guaranteed to pertain to it. This was 
the rationale of thinking that the property of ‘having angles equal to two right angles’ 
belongs to a bronze isosceles triangle qua triangle. But on what ground can we say that if 
something is not triangular, then it does not always have the property of having 180 
degree angles? In this case, we know that there are counterexamples that not everything 
which is brazen and isosceles has angles summing to 180 degrees. But it is not always 
easy to find such counterexamples. Moreover, Aristotle does not suggest any way to find 
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such counter examples; nor does he even mention finding a counterexample in relation to 
his abstraction. In order to determine the character of abstraction, i.e., whether it is a 
private mental process or a sort of conceptual analysis, it is important to know more 
about its way of deciding whether a property belongs to an object after the removal from 
it of certain predicates; abstraction is an integral part of such a decision process.  
 We can begin to deal with this theme by considering what Aristotle means in 
saying that A belongs to B primitively or that B is the primitive subject of A. In the 
example of the bronze isosceles triangle, ‘having angles equal to two right angles’, which 
primitively belongs to a triangle, will always belong to a triangle. Since Aristotle defines 
‘coincidentally F’ as ‘F but neither always nor usually F,’
100
 we can infer that, if A 
belongs to B primitively, A belong to B not coincidentally, and vice versa. Coincidence is 
also elsewhere in Aristotle opposed to necessity.
101
 A primitive property—let us call a 
property, F, a primitive property of an object, a, iff F primitively belongs to a, or a is the 
primitive subject of F—is opposed to a coincidental property in this second sense too. 
Aristotle certainly believes that the proposition that the property, ‘having angles equal to 
two right angles,’ belongs to triangles is demonstrable;
102
 and what is understandable in 
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 Met., VI, 2, 1026b27-33. Here, the term, ‘coincidental’ is the translation of ‘sumbebhko/j.’ 
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virtue of demonstrative understanding is necessary.
103
 Thus, from these two facts, it can 
be inferred that by ‘A is the primitive subject of B’ or ‘B belongs to A primitively’ 
Aristotle means ‘A belongs to B not coincidentally; since he opposes ‘coincidentally’ to 
‘always’ or ‘necessarily’, it could be also said that by ‘A primitively belongs to B’ he 
means ‘A always or necessarily belongs to B’.  
 A problem of this interpretation is that it includes all A’s necessary properties as 
its primitive properties. But even if we remove ‘being a triangle’ from a certain figure’s 
predicates, some of those necessary properties will still belong to it. For instance, 
although ‘being a figure’ always and necessarily belongs to a triangle, it does not belong 
to a bronze isosceles triangle qua triangle. So we need to narrow down the range of the 
primitive properties, while preserving two opposite senses of  ‘coincidental’, i.e., 
‘always’ and ‘necessary’.   
 We find, in this connection, that Aristotle frequently also uses ‘by coincidence 
(kata\ sumbebhko/j)’ to mean something opposite to ‘in its own right (kaq\’ au(to/).’ 
Aristotle uses the expression, ‘ta\ kaq\’ au(ta\ u(pa/rxonta’ or ‘ta\ kaq’ 
au(ta\ paqh/mata (properties in its own right or kath’ hauta properties) ’as a technical 
term with a contrasting sense to ‘ta\ sumbebhko/ta (coincidental property)’. While 
coincidental properties (ta\ sumbebhko/ta) are not necessary,104 properties in their 
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 Apo., I, 3, 72b19-25; 5, 74b5-12; Phys, II, 200a15-19. For the proof of this theorem, see 
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own right must be held necessary to their subjects;
105
 while there is no science of the 
coincidental because “all science is of that which is always, every demonstrative science 
is concerned with properties in its own right.”
106
  It is noteworthy here that the primitive 
properties which are constrasted with coincidental properties have a far narrow range 
than necessary properities. Further, a science does not study all the necessary properties 
of its objects; for instance, it is obvious that geometry does not demonstrate all the 
necessary properties of a triangle, such as being existent,
107
 being capable of being 
thought, being a figure, etc. This distinguishes kath’ hauta properties as objects of 
sciences from necessary properties.
108
 Moreover, the fact that kath’ hauta properties are 
the objects of scientific demonstration provides a ground on which the primitive 
properties may be identified as kath’ auto properties. We have seen earlier that Aristotle 
used ‘having angles equal to two right angles’ as an example of a primitive property of a 
triangle as an illustration of a mathematical demonstration.
109
 The inference that ‘A 
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 Apr., I, 35, 48a29-40. An issue involved in the identification of primitive properties with kath’ 
hauta properties is whether Aristotle’s own example of a primitive property of a triangle, ‘having 
angles equal to two right angles,’ can be legitimately among the kath’ hauta properties of a 
triangle. Aristotle calls the property, ‘having angles equal to two right angles’ as 'to\ kaq' 
au(to\ sumbebhko/j' of a triangle. Since he takes that property as an example of a primitive 
property of a triangle, if primitive properties can be identified with kath’ hauta properties, a 
to\ kaq' au(to\ sumbebhko/j of a triangle should be a member of the group of kath’ hauta 
properties of a triangle.  
 Nevertheless, there are a couple of problems in identifying to\ kaq' 
au(to\ sumbebhko/j with  a kath’ hauto property. The first problem is that, as the term, 
48 
 
belongs to a primitively’ means ‘A is a kath’ hauto property of a’ finds further 
confirmation in the following passage: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
‘to\ kaq' au(to\ sumbebhko/j’, indicates, Aristotle might seem to sort it out as a kind of 
coincidental property. But, according to Aristotle, “to\ sumbebhko\j (the coincidental) is what 
happens but not always nor of necessity (to\ sumbebhko\j e)/sti o(\ gi/gnetai me/n, ou)k a)ei\ d' 
ou)d' e)c a)na/gkhj (Met., XI, 8, 1065a1-2 )),” whereas  kath' hauta properties are necessary to 
their subject. However, for Aristotle, ‘to\ sumbebhko/j' is sometimes used to mean just a 
property in general. 'sumbebhko/j' is derived from 'sumbebhke/nai', the perfect form of the 
verb, 'sumbai/nein', which literally means 'come together' without any necessary suggestion that 
that this coming together must be not by necessity.  Thus, ‘ta\ kaq’ au(ta\ sumbebhko/ta’ 
may be translated into ‘accidental properties in its own right,’ but may mean also just ‘properties 
in its own right’. Adopting the second reading, 'ta\ kaq' au(ta\ sumbebhko/ta' can be seen as 
an expression referring to kath’ hauta properties along with other expressions such as ‘ta\ kaq\' 
au(ta\ u(pa/rxonta’ and ‘ta\ kaq' au(ta\ paqh/mata’. There are passages in which obviously 
the latter reading is the more appropriate (especially at 75a18-19 and 75b1-2). Further, the 
characteristics of kath’ hauta properties described by Aristotle at 74b5-12 bear comparison to 
those of to\ kaq' au(to\ sumbebhko/j: kath’ hauta properties are what a demonstrative science 
or knowledge is concerned with and they are necessary to their subject. Likewise, ta\ kaq' 
au(ta\ sumbebhko/ta necessarily (or universally) belong to their subject and they are objects of 
scientific demonstrations. We have seen earlier that Aristotle used the property, ‘having angles 
equal to two right angles’, as an example of to\ kaq' au(to\ sumbebhko/j, by way of illustrating 
a mathematical demonstration (Apr., I, 35, 48a29-40); ‘ta\ kaq' au(ta\ sumbebhko/ta’  are 
said to be what demonstrations make plain (75b2-3). The second problem, though, is more serious. 
Although Aristotle gives us an account of two senses of belonging kath’ hauto, ‘having angles 
equal to two right angles’, his own example of to\ kaq' au(to\ sumbebhko/j, does not seem to 
fit into either of these two senses: the account of what is ‘having angles equal to two right angles’ 
does not requires the concept ‘triangle’, nor does it appear in the definition of a triangle. 
Admitting that Aristotle’s account leaves us uncertain about what Aristotle had in mind on the 
proper classification of ‘having angles equal to two right angles, Tiles suggests that the second 
type of kath’ hauta predications of a triangle enter as premises into the demonstration of the 
theorem that a triangle has angles equal to two right angles (see Tiles (1983) pp, 10-11). This 
arguably works despite the fact that ‘having angles equal to two right angles’ does not fit into 
either of Aristotle’s two accounts of kath’ hauto. Tiles’ paper, “Why the Triangle has Two Right 




Let “of every case” and “in its own” be defined in this way. I call 
universal what holds of every case and in itself and qua itself. It is evident 
that, therefore, that whatever is universal belongs from necessity to its 
objects. To belong in its own and qua itself are the same thing, e.g., point 
and straight belong to line in itself for they belong to it qua line, and two 
right angles belong to triangle qua triangle for the triangle is in its own 
equal to two right angles. 
 
To\ me\n ou)=n kata\ panto\j kai\ kaq' au(to\ diwri/sqw to\n tro/pon 
tou=ton: kaqo/lou de\ le/gw o(\ a)\n kata\ panto/j te u(pa/rxv 
kai\ kaq' au(to\ kai\ v(= au)to/. fanero\n a)/ra o(/ti o(/sa kaqo/lou, e)c 
a)na/gkhj u(pa/rxei toi=j pra/gmasin. to\ kaq' au(to\ de\ kai\ v(= 
au)to\ tau)to/n, oi(=on kaq' au(th\n tv= grammv= u(pa/rxei 
stigmh\ kai\ to\ eu)qu/ kai\ ga\r v(= grammh/, kai\ t%= trigw/n% v(= 




In this passage, Aristotle equates what belongs kaq' au(to/ with what belongs to v(= au)to/ 
(to\ kaq' au(to\ de\ kai\ v(= au)to\ tau)to/n ). The example clarifies what the statement 
that to\ kaq' au(to\ de\ kai\ v(= au)to\ tau)to/n means: ‘having a point’ and ‘being 
straight’ are kaq' au(to properties of a line because they belong to line qua line. And it 
has been shown that A belongs to B qua B if and only if A is a primitive property of B.  
 What does it mean for A to be a kath’ hauto property of B or that A belongs to B 
kath’ hauto?  The most illuminating passage regarding the nature of kath’ hauta 
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properties is in Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle suggests two criteria for a kath’ 




(1) if A appears in the definition of B, or 
(2) if A is a property of B and B appears in the definition of A. 
  
Aristotle illustrates the first sense by the example of lines and triangles: since the 
definition of triangle contains the concept of ‘line’,
112
 ‘line’ belongs to ‘triangle’ in its 
own right. To explain his second sense, Aristotle takes two examples: (i) number and its 
properties such as odd, even, prime, composite, equilateral and oblong, and (ii) line and 
its properties such as being curved and being straight. It is impossible to define ‘odd’ or 
‘prime’, for instance, without making some reference to ‘number,’ since they are 
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 Aristotle’s account of the meaning of ‘kath’ hauto’ can be found at Apo., I, 4, 73a34-73b17;  
6, 74b7-10; 22, 83b13-18; Met., V, 18, 1022a14-35. All these passages commonly explain these 
two senses of ‘kath’ hauto.’ At 73a34-38 and 1022a14-35, other meanings of ‘kath’ hauto’ are 
also found, which are irrelevant to our present discussion of the meaning of ‘primitive property.’ 
For instance, the distinction between kaq' au(to and sumbebhko/j in the third use of kath’ 
hauto at 73a34-38 corresponds to the distinction between substance and the other categories of 
beings in Categories; its fourth use lends itself to a distinction of two different kinds of events. 
Even if, however, we admit those other usages of the term, the fact that the process of selecting 
kath’ hauta properties has a fundamentally linguistic character will remain the same.For a full 
discussion of the four meanings of ‘kath’ hauto’ refer to Barnes (1994) pp, 112-117. 
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 See The Elements, I, Def. 19. 
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 Aristotle says that “odd belongs to number and number itself inheres in its account of 
number.” (Apo., I, 22, 84a15-17). See also Barnes (1994) pp, 180-181. 
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 Thus once we know the definition of A and B, we can have the list of kath’ hauta 
properties of each A and B. How we can attain to a definition of each item is another 
matter. But after attaining to this definition, the process of eliciting kath’ hauta properties 
from the definition is purely linguistic (or conceptual in the sense that the process is 
totally constituted by conceptual analysis). Since the process plays a central role in 
Aristotle’s abstraction, his abstraction may also be characterized as being linguistic. Let 
us recap what has been argued about abstraction. 
 In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle introduces abstraction as an apparatus for 
determining the truth value of the following form of sentence: 
 
 (i) A belongs to B qua C. 
 
It was shown that we can determine whether (i) is the case or not by means of abstraction. 
That is, A belongs to B qua C if and only if: 
 
(ii) A does not always belong to B when C is abstracted or removed from the list 
of predicates of B.  
 
This procedure, however, threw up the problem of how to decide if A always belongs to 




 (iii) A belongs to B, and A belongs to C primitively (or C is the primitive subject 
of A). 
 
in order to know whether A does not always belong to B, when C is abstracted from the 
list of predicates of B, we only have to establish whether (iii) holds. C, then, will be 
established as the primitive subject of A if and only if  
 
 (iv) A is a kath’ hauto property of C. 
 
Since, given the definition of C, the procedure to decide whether (iv) true or not, is 
constituted of an analysis of relations between relevant concepts, we can likewise 
determine the truth of (ii) by the same form of conceptual analysis.  
 When Aristotle’s abstraction is understood as a part of the process of selecting a 
certain group of properties, the ‘qua’ operator, in the form of sentence, ‘a conceives of x 
qua y,’ can be regarded as a kind of function, whose input is an ordered pair, <x, y> and 
its value is a set of kath’ hauta proprites of y which belong to x. And the role of 
abstraction is to determine which property of x is a kath’ hauto property of y. Thus, in the 
given sentence, ‘a conceives of x qua y,’ abstraction has nothing to do with the verb, 
‘conceives of.’ I will come back to this point when examining the traditional 
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 4. Abstraction and Aristotle’s Criticism of Mathematical Platonism 
 
This interpretation of abstraction so far suggested is not only textually supported, but 
boasts the further advantage of making his philosophy avoid those difficulties that beset 
traditional abstractionist philosophies.
115
 An important question, though, is whether 
Aristotle’s theory of abstraction fulfils his purpose in introducing it. 
 I said earlier that Aristotle introduced abstraction as a logical apparatus to rebut 
Plato’s AFS. The problems which Aristotle needs to solve regarding AFS are as follows: 
on the one hand, he needs to show that it is not necessary to posit separate scientific 
objects apart from sensible particulars; while, on the other hand, he also needs to show 
that the objects of sciences are objectively real, namely, they exist independently of our 
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 See Chapter Three, §6. 
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 “We attend less to a property and it disappears. By making one characteristic after another 
disappear, we get more and more abstract concepts...Inattention is a most efficacious logical 
faculty; presumably this accounts for the absentmindedness of professors. Suppose there are a 
black and a white cat sitting side by side before us. We stop attending to their color and they 
become colorless. We stop attending to their color and they become colorless, but they are still 
sitting side by side. We stop attending to their posture and they are no longer sitting (though they 
have not assumed another posture) but each one is still in its place. We stop attending to position; 
they cease to have place but still remain different. In this way, perhaps, we obtain from each one 
of them a general concept of Cat. By continued application of this procedure, we obtain from 
each object a more and more bloodless phantom. Finally we thus obtain from each object a 
something wholly deprived of content; but the something obtained from one object is different 
from the something obtained from another object—though it is not easy to say how (Frege (1952) 
pp. 84-85) .” 
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mind. Let us, first, consider how his theory of abstraction provides a solution for the first 
problem. 
 In AFS, Plato argued for the separate existence of objects of sciences on the basis 
of differences between objects of sciences and sensible particulars. There were two main 
differences between objects of these groups: First, while the objects of sciences maintain 
their identities cross-temporally, sensible particulars did not have such cross-temporal 
identities since they were in constant change over time. Since sensible particulars are 
indefinite in this sense, they elude definition.  Aristotle avoids this problem of the 
indefiniteness of sensible particulars by making a distinction between essential and 
accidental properties: insofar as a sensible individual thing does not undergo its 
substantial changes, it maintains its identity. Even if its accidental properties change, we 
have still the same answer to the question of what the thing is. Thus, we can have a 
definition of a sensible object insofar as its essential properties are not changed. 
Nevertheless, this distinction between accidental properties and essences leaves another 
problem unresolved: A sensible object does not have self-identity because of its 
complexity. A triangle considered on the basis of geometrical theorems does not have 
such properties as being ‘branzen’ or ‘isosceles’ other than ‘triangular,’ which a 
particular bronze isosceles triangle has. Because of this complexity of sensible particulars, 
while we can have the definition of a triangle itself, there cannot be a definition of a 
particular bronze isosceles triangular thing; in the case of a sensible particular triangular 
thing, we may thus arrive at several different answers to the question of what it is. 
55 
 
It is this complexity problem for which Aristotle introduces abstraction as a 
solution. Aristotle argues that the complexity of a sensible particular does not imply the 
separate existence of objects of sciences. According to Aristotle, a geometer studies not 
the triangle itself separated from any sensible triangular thing, but a bronze isosceles 
triangle qua triangle. But what does he exactly mean when he says that a geometer 
studies a particular isosceles triangle qua triangle? We can consider the following 
formula: 
 
 (F1) A studies B qua C. 
 
Suppose that ‘A’ represents a certain science, ‘B’ a particular sensible object, and C one 
of the objects of the science, respectively. Since to study an object is to study what 
properties the object has, it can be generally said that the objects of A are B’s properties. 
But A does not study all the properties of B; for instance, coincidental properties are 
excluded in that a science does not concern itself with purely coincidental properties.
116
 
Nevertheless, it was also argued that not every necessary property belongs to B qua C.
117
 
We now, by means of abstraction, can determine which properties are to be selected, i.e., 
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 Aristotle argues that there is no science of the coincidental “for all science is of that which is 
always or for the most part, but the coincidental is neither of these classes  (e)pisth/mh me\n 
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 See Chapter Two, §3. 
56 
 
properties which do not always belong to B when C is abstracted or removed from B. 
Since a property belongs to B qua C if and only if it belongs to B and belongs to C 
primitively, (F1) can be rewritten as: 
 
 (F2) A studies such properties of B that belong primitively to C.  
 
But we also know that a property, F, primarily belongs to C if and only if F is a kath’ 
hauto property of C. So, the original formula amounts to saying that: 
 
 (F3) A studies kath’ hauta properties of C which belong to B. 
 
For example, if physics studies Socrates qua moving thing, it studies those properties of 
Socrates which are the kath’ hauta properties of a moving thing. So, as Lear put it, ‘qua’ 
operator filters out all the other predicates except the predicates which refer to the kath’ 
hauta properties of C, the term which follows the qua operator.
118
   
 Plato argues that an object of a science is ontologically separated from sensible 
particulars on the basis of particulars’ complexity. According to Plato, an object of a 
science, say C, has only properties necessary to itself, e.g., a triangle studied in geometry 
does not have such properties as color, weight, etc. which are coincidental to a triangle. 
Whereas, any sensible particular, B, will also have other properties which are not 
necessary to C, e.g., a bronze sphere has non-geometrical properties as well. While C can 
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be identified with only C itself and nothing else, B can be identified with something other 
than C, say, D, insofar as B has the essential property of D as well. Since B cannot be 
equal to C, Plato maintains, C must exist apart from B if C exists at all.  But, according 
to Aristotle’s analysis, when A studies B qua C, C is only one of many true predicates of 
B, and the objects of A, namely, kath’ hauta properties of C, are nothing but certain 
properties of B. Since C only has to be a predicate of A, B does not have to be identical 
with C; so that the complexity of B, which was the ground of the non-identity between B 
and C, cannot be a reason to posit the separate existence of C from B.  
 The fact that a scientific study, A, takes account exclusively of the kath’ hauta 
properties of C among the properties of B makes it appear as though A deals with a 
separate entity, namely, C. But as we have seen, such separation is conceptually possible 
by means of abstraction. Since such abstraction is conceptual, in Aristotle’s view, the 
separation is not real, but only conceptual; it is only for the sake of investigation. He 
says: 
 
Each [question] would be best investigated in this way—by supposing 
what is not separate as being separate, as the arithmetician and the 
geometer do. For a man qua man is one and indivisible; and [the 
arithmetician] supposes it as one and indivisible, and then considers 
whether something belongs to a man qua indivisible. But the geometer 
[supposes him] neither qua man nor qua indivisible, but qua a solid. For 
even if he had not been indivisible, it is evident that some [properties] 
would have belonged to him apart from being such things… 
 
a)/rista d' a)\n ou(/tw qewrhqei/h e(/kaston, ei)/ tij 
to\ mh\ kexwrisme/non qei/h xwri/saj, o(/per o( a)riqmhtiko\j poiei= 
kai\ o( gewme/trhj. e(\n me\n ga\r kai\ a)diai/reton o( a)/nqrwpoj v(= 
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a)/nqrwpoj: o( d' e)/qeto e(\n a)diai/reton, ei)=t' e)qew/rhsen ei)/ ti t%= 
a)nqrw/p% sumbe/bhken v(= a)diai/retoj. o( de\ gewme/trhj ou)/q' v(= 
a)/nqrwpoj ou)/q' v(= a)diai/retoj a)ll' v(= stereo/n. a(\ ga\r ka)\n ei) mh/ 
pou h)=n a)diai/retoj u(ph=rxen au)t%=, dh=lon o(/ti kai\ a)/neu tou/twn 
e)nde/xetai au)t%= u(pa/rxein...119 
 
 
Since it turns out that the objects of A are certain properties of B, there is no need to posit 
C’s separate existence. Thus, Aristotle can solve the problem of complexity by way of 
abstraction. In addition, he can also maintain his scientific realism; as beings in categories 
other than substance, all the properties of A are real properties for Aristotle. 
 
 5. Abstraction as a Way of Obtaining Universals 
 
Throughout the history of philosophy, abstraction has been regarded by empiricists as a 
nominalistic way of explaining how we acquire general concepts. For example, in his 
Essay, Locke says that particular ideas are made to represent all objects of the same kind 
by the mind’s separating such ideas from other existence and from the circumstances of 
real Existence.
120
 In a Lockean sense general ideas (universals) are the product of 
abstraction;
121
 and abstraction is a mental operation by which what is common among 
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 Met., XIII, 3, 1078a21-28. See also Phys., II, 1, 193b23. 
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 Locke (1975) BK. II, Ch. 11, §9. See also Yolton (1993), p. 7. 
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 Berkeley uses the term ‘abstraction’ in a similar way, further dividing, however, 
into two kinds.
 
 The first kind of abstraction concerns the mind’s conceiving each quality 
singly apart from those other qualities with which it is united.
 123
 The second involves 
the obtaining of a general idea (such as ‘man’ or ‘book’) from particulars through the 
mind’s leaving out of those particularities that distinguish them one from another, 
retaining only what is common to all. The second abstraction corresponds exactly to 
Locke’s; and the basic meaning of abstraction is preserved: something common is 
retained and something else is left out.
124
 The second form of abstraction would appear 
essential in the constitution of general terms such as ‘book’, ‘animal’, and ‘man’. But, 
unlike Locke, Berkeley denies that there are such general ideas acquired through 
abstraction. It is notable, however, that even the first type of abstraction still refers to a 
subjective mental process; it entails a deliberate lack of attention to certain circumstantial 
features of objects. Since Hume is committed to the same particularist ontology as 
Berkeley, he arrives at a similar view of abstraction and the existence of general ideas.   
 Whether or not these thinkers agree on the existence of general ideas, they all 
understand abstraction as (i) a subjective mental operation, and (ii) an epistemic process 
                                                                                                                                                                             
generality is a certain way of the mind’s conceiving things or ideas (Locke (1975)  BK. III, Ch. 
3, §6 and§11). 
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 Ibid., BK. II, Ch. 11, §9.  
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 Berkeley (1710) Intro. §7. 
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 But, unlike Locke, Berkely explicitly denies the existence of general or abstract ideas, which 
general terms stand for. See Ibid., Intro. §10. 
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by which we obtain universals from particulars. This meaning of abstraction was 
generally retained up to Frege and may here be dubbed epistemic abstraction.
125
 And 
such a form of abstraction has usually been a way for nominalists to provide a semantics 
for universal concepts without committing themselves to the existence of Platonic entities. 
The usual nominalist strategy has been to seek to reduce universals in ontological terms 
to the products of the mental activity of abstraction. 
 The interpretation of Aristotle’s abstraction has been significantly affected, even 
warped, by the prevalent understanding of abstraction in modern philosophy. 
Traditionally, commentators have interpreted Aristotle’s abstraction as the process 
through which the mind acquires a universal from particulars. For instance, Thomas 
comments that universals are abstracted from particulars by abstraction in Aristotle.
126
 At 
the same time, though, more recent commentators have begun to query this traditional 
interpretation. These commentators tend to interpret Aristotle’s abstraction as a linguistic 
or logical process, rather than a psychological;
127
 presumably, this tendency is due to 
Frege’s devastating criticism of psychologism, a kind of subjectivism in the philosophy 
of mathematics. Overall, I agree that the recent commentators’ line of interpretation is the 
correct way to understand Aristotle’s abstraction, although I would differ from them in 
some of my emphases and readings of particular passages and arguments.  
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 To work out the detail of this reading, though, we would do well, first of all, to 
revisit some of the passages in Aristotle that would seem to lend support to the traditional 
interpretation. We should also pause before the fact that Aristotle would seem to 
introduce abstraction with a similar motivation to that of the nominalists, i.e., to provide a 
semantics for the universal concepts used without positing Platonic entities; this has led 
to an assimilation of his abstractions to that of the nominalists. Unfortunately, those who 
interpret Aristotle’s abstraction as a linguistic analysis have not provided us with either 
any analysis of those passages or any argumentation against the traditional view. 
 The first passage we will look at is the one which some commentators have 
taken to imply that universals are the product of abstraction.
 128





It is evident also that if any perception has been lost, some knowledge 
must be also lost, which it is impossible to get since we learn either by 
induction or by demonstration. And demonstration proceeds from 
universals and induction from particulars; but it is impossible to consider 
universals except through induction since one will be able to make 
familiar even the things said as a result of abstraction through induction 
that some things belongs to each genus, even if they are not separate, in 
so far as each thing is [considered] qua such, and it is impossible to get 
an induction without having perception, for perception is of particulars; 
it is impossible to gain scientific knowledge of them; for [it can be 
gained] neither from universals without induction, nor through induction 
without perception. 
 
Fanero\n de\ kai\ o(/ti, ei)/ tij ai)/sqhsij e)kle/loipen, a)na/gkh 
kai\ e)pisth/mhn tina\ e)kleloipe/nai, h(\n a)du/naton labei=n, 
                                                           
128
 See Mueller (1970) p. 160. 
62 
 
ei)/per manqa/nomen h)\ e)pagwgv= h)\ a)podei/cei, e)/sti d' h( me\n 
a)po/deicij e)k tw=n kaqo/lou, h( d' e)pagwgh\ e)k tw=n kata\ me/roj, 
a)du/naton de\ ta\ kaqo/lou qewrh=sai mh\ di' e)pagwgh=j 
¨e)pei\    kai\ ta\ e)c a)faire/sewj lego/mena e)/stai di' 
e)pagwgh=j gnw/rima poiei=n, o(/ti u(pa/rxei e(ka/st% ge/nei e)/nia, 
kai\ ei) mh\ xwrista/ e)stin, v(= toiondi\ e(/kaston©, e)paxqh=nai 
de\ mh\ e)/xontaj ai)/sqhsin a)du/naton. tw=n ga\r kaq' e(/kaston 
h( ai)/sqhsij: ou) ga\r e)nde/xetai labei=n au)tw=n th\n e)pisth/mhn: 
ou)/te ga\r e)k tw=n kaqo/lou a)/neu e)pagwgh=j, ou)/te di' 
e)pagwgh=j a)/neu th=j ai)sqh/sewj.129  
 
 
In this passage, Aristotle seems to assume that the ‘things said as a result of abstraction 
(ta\ e)c a)faire/sewj lego/mena)’ are universals; because what is abstracted is grasped 
by induction, and what is grasped by induction is a universal. Thus, it is plausible to 
suppose that ‘the things said as a result of abstraction’ will be universals insofar as they 
are grasped by induction. But does the passage mean to say that universals are acquired 
by abstraction? From the fact that some things abstracted are universals, it does not 
follow that universals are acquired by abstraction;
130
 in the passage, it is not abstraction, 
but induction by which a universal is acquired from particulars.  In other words, it is 
quite possible that universals have been already acquired by induction before they are 
abstracted. In another passage, Aristotle again adduces induction as the epistemological 
process by which a general concept is obtained from particulars: 
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When one of the undifferentiated things makes a stand, there is a primitive 
universal in the soul; for although you perceive particulars, perception is 
of universals, e.g., of man, not of Callias the man. Then, a stand is made 
among such things, until something partless and universal makes a stand, 
e.g., such an animal, until animal does; and with animal a stand is made in 
the same way. Thus, it is evident that it is necessary for us to acquire 
knowledge of the primitives by induction; for perception produces 
universals in this way.      
 
sta/ntoj ga\r tw=n a)diafo/rwn e(no/j, prw=ton me\n e)n tv= yuxv= 
kaqo/lou ¨kai\ ga\r ai)sqa/netai me\n to\ kaq' e(/kaston, h( d' 
ai)/sqhsij tou= kaqo/lou e)sti/n, oi(=on a)nqrw/pou, a)ll' ou) 
Kalli/ou a)nqrw/pou©: pa/lin e)n tou/toij i(/statai, e(/wj a)\n 
ta\ a)merh= stv= kai\ ta\ kaqo/lou, oi(=on toiondi\ z%=on, e(/wj z%=on, 
kai\ e)n tou/t% w(sau/twj. dh=lon dh\ o(/ti h(mi=n ta\ prw=ta e)pagwgv= 





It is noticeable that, here, Aristotle does not mention abstraction at all in accounting for 
the process of general concept acquisition. Another important point is that Aristotle 
maintains that there is (in a sense) perception of universals.
132
 This is a quite different 
position from that of other abstractionists. Since they adhere to an ontology of particulars, 
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i.e., “all things that exist are only particulars,”
133
 universals or general ideas have to be 
invented by the mind, and abstraction is an epistemic apparatus by which universals are 
produced. Thus, Locke says, 
  
General and Universal, belong not to the real existence of Things; but are 
the Invention and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it for its own 
use, and concern only Signs, whether Words, or Ideas. Words are general, 
as has been said, when used, for Signs of general Ideas; and so are 
applicable indifferently, when used, for Signs of general Ideas; and so are 
applicable indifferently to many particular Things; And Ideas are general, 
when they are set up, as the Representatives of many particular Things: 
But universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them 






But, for Aristotle, since universals exist independently of our mind, in order to have a 
general concept, we need not invent it, we need only have the requisite capacity for 
grasping it. This obviates for Aristotle’s account of concept-acquisition any need for any 
such mental operation as epistemic abstraction. If Aristotle does not require such an 
epistemic apparatus as the nominalists’ abstraction, it is fairly reasonable to infer that his 
sort of abstraction must be something different from that of the nominalists. 
 If there is anything analogous to epistemic abstraction in Aristotle, it would be 
induction rather than abstraction. On this point, we can examine another passage 
interpreted by some commentators to mean that Aristotle holds some version of 
abstraction to be involved in grasping a universal: 
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And it is necessary to seek first what they all have in common, looking at 
things which are similar and undifferentiated. Then [do the same thing] 
again for other things which are in the same kind as the first group and are 
of the same form as one another but of a different form from the first 
group. When we have grasped what is common among all these, and 
similarly for the other groups, we must investigate again whether those 
things you have grasped have anything in common, until you come to a 
single account; for this will be the definition of the object. If you reach not 
a single account but at two or more, then it is plain that what you are 
seeking is not one item but several.       
 
Zhtei=n de\ dei= e)pible/ponta e)pi\ ta\ o(/moia kai\ a)dia/fora, 
prw=ton ti/ a(/panta tau)to\n e)/xousin, ei)=ta pa/lin e)f' e(te/roij, 
a(\ e)n tau)t%= me\n ge/nei e)kei/noij, ei)si\ de\ au(toi=j me\n tau)ta\ t%= 
ei)/dei, e)kei/nwn d' e(/tera. o(/tan d' e)pi\ tou/twn lhfqv= ti/ pa/nta 
tau)to/n, kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/llwn o(moi/wj, e)pi\ tw=n ei)lhmme/nwn 
pa/lin skopei=n ei) tau)to/n, e(/wj a)\n ei)j e(/na e)/lqv lo/gon: ou(=toj 
ga\r e)/stai tou= pra/gmatoj o(rismo/j. e)a\n de\ mh\ badi/zv ei)j e(/na 
a)ll' ei)j du/o h)\ plei/ouj, dh=lon o(/ti ou)k a)\n ei)/h e(/n ti ei)=nai 
to\ zhtou/menon, a)lla\ plei/w.135   
 
 
Barnes interprets this passage as describing a method of definition by abstraction.
136
 
Obviously, the passage is closely reminiscent of Locke’s explanation of the process of 
obtaining a general idea by abstraction. Locke writes: 
 
And thus they come to have a general Name, and a general idea. Wherein 
they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex Idea they had of 
Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, retain only 
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While Aristotle is describing a way of defining a general term, Locke is describing the 
process of obtaining a general concept; nevertheless, in both passages, defining a general 
term and obtaining a general concept seem to be characterized as involving the same 
procedure, namely, leaving out something different and retaining something common 
among particulars. If this is so, we have an indication that Aristotle has the same, or a 
similar, epistemic method to the nominalists’ abstraction.   
 However, in order to determine whether the processes as presented in the two 
passages are exactly the same, we must address ourselves to the following two questions. 
The first is what Locke means by ‘what is common to them all’; in the case of Aristotle, 
this phrase would be parsed as a universal. But, because of his ontology, Locke cannot 
maintain that any common element among particulars exists. For Locke, a general 
concept refers to a general idea which has its genesis and is held purely in our mind. Thus, 
there is good reason to resist the identification of the epistemic process described in the 
first passage with that of the second. The second question concerns whether Aristotle 
would label the process involved in the definitional method as ‘abstraction’. Even if the 
two processes are the same, it could be the case that the process Aristotle is talking about 
in the first passage is something other than his sort of abstraction.  
 There are in fact several reasons to think that this process is not Aristotle’s 
abstraction. First, he does not use the term ‘abstraction (a)fai/resij)’ at all in the 
passage; secondly,  abstraction in his sense is generally applied to a single particular 
thing like a man, or horse, rather than to a group of particulars sharing a certain property, 
67 
 
other than in the case of selecting by abstraction a numerical property from a group of 
things; and thirdly, in most passages where Aristotle mentions abstraction, the term 
appears alongside ‘separation (xwrismo/j)’ or ‘qua ($)= ’, while in this passage these 
terms are noticeable by their absence. Finally, as we already have seen, for Aristotle, 
induction is the process through which a universal is acquired from particulars. So, it may 
be the case that what Aristotle describes in the passage is not definition by abstraction but 
definition by induction or inductive definition. The next passage confirms this inference:   
 
Having made these distinctions, we must distinguish how many forms of 
dialectical arguments there are. There is induction as well as deduction. 
And what deduction is has been said before. And induction is the progress 
from the particulars to the universal. For instance, if the one who has 
knowledge is the best pilot and the best charioteer, then in general the one 
who knows is best in each [area].  
 
Diwrisme/nwn de\ tou/twn xrh\ diele/sqai po/sa tw=n lo/gwn ei)/dh 
tw=n dialektikw=n. e)/sti de\ to\ me\n e)pagwgh/, to\ de\ sullogismo/j. 
kai\ sullogismo\j me\n ti/ e)stin, ei)/rhtai pro/teron. 
e)pagwgh\ de\ h( a)po\ tw=n kaq' e(/kasta e)pi\ to\ kaqo/lou e)/fodoj: 
oi(=on ei) e)/sti kubernh/thj o( e)pista/menoj kra/tistoj, 
kai\ h(ni/oxoj, kai\ o(/lwj e)sti\n o( e)pista/menoj peri\ e(/kaston 
a)/ristoj.138 
 
This passage is unequivocal that it is induction that makes the transition from particulars 
to a universal; whereas Aristotle never explicitly says that abstraction is necessary for 
acquiring universals. Furthermore, the example given of induction shows that induction, 
as much as epistemic abstraction, involves taking what is common among particular 
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instances. So we have every indication that the first passage is concerned not with 
explicating definition by abstraction but rather definition by induction. 
  
 6. Abstraction as a Mental Operation. 
 
Our final area of enquiry in this chapter will be the idea that Aristotle’s abstraction is a 
mental operation. This idea retains some currency among modern commentators; for 
instance, Annas considers Aristotle’s abstraction to be an act of ignorance (i.e., willed 
inattention),
139
 and Mignucci argues that abstraction is a mental activity at any rate.
140
  
 Before examining the relevant texts, it is appropriate first to clarify the meaning 
of ‘mental’. I will confine the meaning of ‘mental’ to subjective inner private experience, 
such as the experience of qualia, pain, ignoring, paying attention, etc. In this narrow 
sense, I would argue that Aristotelian abstraction is far from being mental. In the case of 
Frege, for instance, abstraction refers to a deliberate lack of attention.
141
 In these contexts 
it is legitimate for him to call any attempt to found arithmetic on the basis of abstraction 
psychologism, or a subjectivism in the philosophy of mathematics.  
 There are several places which seem to imply that Aristotle’s abstraction is a 
mental activity in the narrow sense.  The following is one:  
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One thinks of those things which are spoken of as in abstraction just as, if 
one thought of the snub, not qua snub, but actually separately qua concave, 
one would think of it apart from the flesh in which the concave [exists]. 
One thinks of mathematical objects which are not separate, as separate, 
when one thinks of them.  
  
ta\ de\ e)n a)faire/sei lego/mena <noei=> w(/sper a)/n ei)/ <tij> 
to\ simo\n v(= me\n simo\n ou)/, kexwrisme/nwj de\ v(= koi=lon [ei)/ tij] 
e)no/ei [e)nergei/#], a)/neu th=j sarko\j a)\n e)no/ei e)n v(= 
to\ koi=lonou(/tw ta\ maqhmatika/, ou) kexwrisme/na <o)/nta>, w(j 




It is tempting to read the first sentence as saying that to abstract the figure of snub is to 
conceive of snub, not qua snub, but qua concave. This reading tends to buttress a view of 
abstraction as a mental act of ignoring of a private or subjective character, because to 
conceive of snub only qua concave is to pay attention only to relevant aspects of snub 
and to ignore other, circumstantial aspects. Equally, though, the sentence could be also 
read as meaning that we can think of the concavity without considering other elements of 
the snub by abstracting the concavity from the snub. On this reading, it is one thing to 
separate some aspect of an object by abstraction, and another thing to think of that 
separated aspect. To clarify this point, let us consider the following sentence: 
 
 (i) We conceive of the snub qua concave. 
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In my analysis of Aristotle’s abstraction, this sentence means that we conceive only kath’ 
hauta properties of concavity among the properties of a snub. What abstraction engages 
in is the process of selecting or separating those kath’ hauta properties from other 
properties; abstraction has nothing to do with the mental act of ‘conceiving’. Suppose that 
X represents a verb, Y, a sensible object, and Z a predicate of Y, respectively. Then, (i) 
can be formulated more generally as follows: 
  
 (ii) We X Y qua Z. 
 
I argued earlier that ‘qua’ can seen as a linguistic function mapping an ordered pair, <Y, 
Z>, to a set of kath’ hauta properties of Z which also belong to Y;
143
 when we identify 
abstraction with a method of selecting a group of predicates, it is obvious that X does not 
get involved in the process of abstraction.  For the function, qua, what determines the 
value of qua are the values of Y and Z; X does not change the value of qua at all. We can 
replace X with a verb such as ‘conceive,’ ‘study,’ ‘investigate,’ etc., but whatever verb 
we choose, the verb does not partake of the process of abstraction. In the case of (i), due 
to abstraction, i.e., by (conceptually or linguistically) separating kath’ hauta properties of 
concavity from the snub by abstraction, we can think only of the concavity without 
considering material aspects of the snub. But thinking (only the concativity) is not 
abstraction; abstraction is the process of selecting (picking out) those kath’ hauta 
properties of concavity.  
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 Greek grammar also supports this interpretation. In the text, ‘ta\ e)n a)faire/sei 
lego/mena’ is the grammatical object of ‘noei=’; and it is natural to regard the phrase 
‘to\ simo\n v(= me\n simo\n ou)/, kexwrisme/nwj de\ v(= koi=lon’ in the sentence after 
‘w(/sper a)/n’ as an example of ‘ta\ e)n a)faire/sei lego/mena’. Thus, the above 
passage does not equate thinking with abstraction; it only explains by taking a concrete 
example what it would be like to think of ‘a thing which is separated by abstraction’: 
thinking of ‘a thing separated abstraction’ is like thinking of ‘the snub qua concave’. That 
is, the snub qua concave is an example of ‘ta\ e)n a)faire/sei lego/mena’144 Further, 
the passage offers no more information on how abstraction is accomplished; we have 
only an example of abstracted things. 
 There is another reason to prefer the second reading. Suppose that the first 
reading is right. This would identify abstraction with conceiving or thinking generally. In 
De Anima, III, Aristotle uses ‘thinking (noei=n)’ in two different senses. In a narrow sense, 
‘thinking (noei=n)’ means knowing for Aristotle, rather than merely ‘thinking about 
things’.  But the term is also used in such a general way that it could refer to any 
intellectual activity such as reasoning, conceptual analysis, paying attention, etc.
145
  It is 
not certain whether Aristotle uses ‘no/hsij’ (thinking or thought) technically in the 
narrow sense or in the broader sense in the above passage. But the second reading is 
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constistent with whichever sense he may have intended. Let us consider each case 
separately.  
 Suppose that, in the above passage, Aristotle uses ‘think’ not technically but in a 
broad sense. Then, this passage simply does not provide us with enough information to 
decide whether abstraction is an inner private mental process or not; because thinking in 
such a broad sense may include not only private mental operations, but also publicly 
communicable intellectual activities such as mathematical calculation, logical inference, 
conceptual analysis, etc.  
 Now, suppose that he uses the term technically. In Aristotle’s technical usage, 
‘no/hsij’ is frequently used in contrast with perception (ai)/sqhsij).146 Thinking is 
distinguished from perceiving in that: (i) only a few animals have the capacity of thinking, 
whereas all animals are capable of perceiving.
147
 (ii) Thought is fallible but the 
perception of proper objects (h( ai)/sqhsij tw=n i)di/wn) always true or liable to falsity to 
a minimal degree.
148
 But, to emphasize the passivity of thinking, Aristotle also likens 
thinking to perceiving: to think is to receive the forms of objects of thought, just as 
perception is to receive the forms of perceptible objects;
149
 thinking as the process of 
receiving the form is passive; because to think is to become (in a sense) the object of the 
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thinking by receiving its form.
150
 It is difficult to equate thinking in this sense with such 
an active mental operation as abstraction. Abstraction—whether it is a mental activity 
such as generalization, paying attention to something, disregarding, or is conceptual 
analysis—involves very active operations, in which the mind, the subject of abstraction, 
always manipulates or modifies the objects of abstraction; whereas, in thinking (in the 
narrow sense), the mind is not comparably active; for Aristotle, thinking is a passive 
process rather than an active one. 
 Those holding to a view of Aristotelian abstraction as a mental process might, 
however, object that, for Aristotle, thinking is not quite entirely passive. In fact, Aristotle 
argues that the intellect also has an active role in thinking: 
 
 
Since just as in the whole of nature there is some matter to each genus 
(and this is potentially all of them), but its cause is different and 
productive in the sense that it makes all things, e.g., an art is related to its 
material in this way, and these differences must be also in the soul. And 
there is such an intellect in the sense that it becomes all things, and there is 
another intellect in the sense that it produces all things, as a kind of 
disposition, like light, does; for in a way light also makes colors in 
potentiality colors in actuality.   
 
 )Epei\ d' [w(/sper] e)n a(pa/sv tv= fu/sei e)sti\ [ti] to\ me\n u(/lh 
e(ka/st% ge/nei ¨tou=to de\ o(\ pa/nta duna/mei e)kei=na©, e(/teron 
de\ to\ ai)/tion kai\ poihtiko/n, t%= poiei=n pa/nta, oi(=on h( te/xnh 
pro\j th\n u(/lhn pe/ponqen, a)na/gkh kai\ e)n tv= yuxv= u(pa/rxein 
tau/taj ta\j diafora/j: kai\ e)/stin o( me\n toiou=toj nou=j t%= 
pa/nta gi/nesqai, o( de\ t%= pa/nta poiei=n, w(j e(/cij tij, oi(=on 
                                                           
150
 Ibid., 429b3-4; 8, 431b26-432a3. The identity between thinking and its objects will be 
discussed again at Chapter Four, §4. 
74 
 
to\ fw=j: tro/pon ga/r tina kai\ to\ fw=j poiei= ta\ duna/mei o)/nta 




This is a much-discussed passage in Aristotle scholarship, on the basis of which 
Thomas drew a distinction between the passive and the active intellects, and also inferred 
that the active intellect abstracts the species from phantasmata (fanta/smata) produced 
by sense and imposes this on the passive intellect.
152
 Thomas seems to argue in the 
following way: 
  
(1) We can think of something by having its phantasma .
153
  
(2) The phantasma derive from sense perception.
154
  
(3) But, since we can think of only the form of an object,
155
 it is necessary to 
separate the pure intellectual form from the sensual elements of the object. 
(4) Such separation is possible by abstraction. 
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But, despite Thomas’ reading, what the passage above tells us is no more than that there 
must be a kind of cause in the mind, which brings about the actualization of its 
potentialities; and it is hard to connect such a role with abstraction. There is no textual 
evidence that Aristotle thinks of abstraction as a necessary condition for grasping 
intellectual forms. Rather, Aristotle is inclined to think that, in principle, each 
epistemological apparatus grasps its proper objects; i.e., the senses perceive sensible 
forms without the matter such as color, sound, or flavor,
156
 and the intellect grasps the 
intelligible form of an object such as the rationality of a man. If these claims are correct, 
it does not fall to Aristotle to explain how the intellect grasps a form separately from its 
phantasma; because the intellect only grasps the form. If Aristotle does not assume any 
cognitive process to separate a sensible form from a sensible object, there would be no 
need for him to posit a special apparatus to separate an intelligible form from a 
phantasma, either.  Moreover, Aristotle does not seem to believe that it is necessary to 
separate a form from its phantasma in order to conceive any object. It is rather the other 
way around: We always think with phantasmata
157
 and thinking is not possible without 
phantasmata. In fact, as we have seen, separation by abstraction has nothing to do with 
such epistemic processes as perceiving or knowing. Abstraction, on the view of this 
chapter, instead consists of a logical analysis in which predicates are separated from their 
subject. 
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 However, according to Aristotle, the intellect has another kind of active 
function: When intellect operates through judgment it also combines and divides 
concepts.
158
 In this sense, abstraction might be said to be a certain way of thinking; we 
saw that abstraction involved a kind of conceptual separation. There are two ways to 
respond to this redefinition of abstraction as thinking. First, if thinking includes all forms 
of conceptual analysis, there is no need to take issue with the idea that abstraction is a 
sort of thinking. My objection to the traditional line was that Aristotle’s abstraction can 
neither be identified with private mental activities nor with thinking in the technical sense, 
i.e., grasping a form of an object.  Secondly, even if division (dia)i/resij) by thought is 
a kind of conceptual analysis and is performed by thought, it is trivially true that not 
every conceptual analysis will be a form of abstraction. By ‘dia)iresij,’ Aristotle 
usually means a method of definition by genus and differentiae. So it is safe to say that 
there is no guarantee that the division of a concept by the intellect is necessarily what 
Aristotle was getting at in his term ‘abstraction’. 
 The objection to the idea that Aristotle’s abstraction is a kind of thinking is 
applicable also to mathematical cases:  
 
 
Now the mathematician also treats of these [sensible] things, but not as 
boundaries of each natural body; nor does he consider the properties as if 
it belongs to such bodies. That is why he separates [them]; for in thought 
they are separable from motion, and it makes no difference, nor does any 
falsity result, even if they are separated.  
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 Top., VI, 143a29-145b34. 
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peri\ tou/twn me\n ou)=n pragmateu/etai kai\ o( maqhmatiko/j, a)ll' 
ou)x v(= fusikou= sw/matoj pe/raj e(/kaston: 
ou)de\ ta\ sumbebhko/ta qewrei= v(= toiou/toij ou)=si sumbe/bhken: 
dio\ kai\ xwri/zei: xwrista\ ga\r tv= noh/sei kinh/sew/j e)sti, 
kai\ ou)de\n diafe/rei, ou)de\ gi/gnetai yeu=doj xwrizo/ntwn.159  
 
 
As Cleary points out,
160
 “xwrista\ ga\r tv= noh/sei kinh/sew/j e)sti” can be 
translated in two different ways. If we may translate ‘xwrista/’ as ‘separated’ and take 
‘tv= noh/sei’ to be an instrumental dative, the sentence will be rendered as ‘they are 
separated by thought’. But, if we translate ‘xwrista/’ as ‘separable’ and take ‘tv= 
noh/sei’ to be a locative dative, it translates as ‘they are separable in thought.’ Many 
commentators have adopted the first translation, the implication of which is that 
Aristotle’s abstraction is a mental activity just to the extent that thought is. For instance, 
referring to the passage, Mignucci argues that ‘the presence of a mental activity in the 
determination of the object of mathematics is confirmed’ in the text, because there 
‘Aristotle says that mathematical objects are separated by a mental act from sensible 
things.’
161
 But, as I have already argued, considering some property of a sensible 
particular as being separated from the sensible is one thing, and actively separating the 
property from the sensible another. So, the second translation seems to be more plausible. 
Then, what the sentence means is simply that after abstracting certain properties of 
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 Phy., II, 2, 193b31-35. 
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 Cleary (1985) p.34. 
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 Mignucci (1987) p. 181. 
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sensible things, we can consider or treat them as separate entities—though they are not 




Problems in Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics 
 
 1. Aristotle’s aïve Mathematical Realism 
 
I made the claim earlier that mathematics is the best case supporting AFS. Thus, to rebut 
AFS, it is important for Aristotle to show that his theory of abstraction also applies to 
mathematics and mathematical entities. Aristotle obviously seems to believe that he can 
have recourse to abstraction to explain how it is that mathematical objects are not 
separated from sensible objects.  It is relatively frequent for him to use mathematical 
examples in order to illustrate abstraction and to express mathematical objects in the 
terms of abstraction. For example, mathematical objects are referred to as “things said as 
a result of abstraction (ta\ e)c a)faire/sewj lego/mena)” “things spoken of in 
abstraction (ta\ e)n a)faire/sei lego/mena)” or “things obtained through abstraction 
(ta di’ a)faire/sewj)” etc.162  
 It has been a problem for commentators that Aristotle expresses mathematicals 
not as ‘things which are abstracted’ but as ‘something said as a result of abstraction 
(ta\ e)c afaire/sewj lego/mena)’.163 An interpretation of this phrasing is possible, 
however, that further backs up my analysis of the nature of Aristotle’s abstraction. 
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 Bonitz (1870) 126b21-26. We do not have textual information as to what Aristotle means 
exactly by those expressions.   
163
 See Mueller (1970) p.159.  
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Suppose, for example, that geometry studies a sensible object qua triangle. Then, 
according to the line of argument put forward in the last chapter, geometry would first 
decide by abstraction which properties of the sensible object primitively belong to a 
triangle. In that sense, we may say that what geometry is concerned with is not 
triangularity itself, but, rather the primitive properties of triangles. When geometry 
studies something as a triangle, it does not ask what a triangle is; it asks what properties 
of that thing universally belong to triangles (the theorems relating to triangles can be 
regarded as answers to this question); furthermore, we identify these properties by 
abstracting or removing (a)fairei=n), in order of increasing generality, other predicates 
than ‘being a triangle’ from the object. Therefore, it is more appropriate to say that the 
objects of geometry are obtained after abstraction or as a result of abstraction, than that 
they are abstracted; when we study a sensible object qua triangle, what we abstract (or 
remove) from that object are properties of the object in a certain order, and as the result 
of such abstraction, we obtain the kath’ hauta properties of a triangle which belong to the 
object. In that sense, the objects of mathematics are “things said as a result of abstraction 
(ta\ e)c a)faire/sewj lego/mena),” “things spoken of in abstraction (ta\ e)n 
a)faire/sei lego/mena),” or “things obtained through abstraction (ta di’ 
a)faire/sewj),” etc.164 
                                                           
164
 Many commentators have been convinced that those phrases exclusively refer to mathematical 
objects. For this point, see, Cleary (1985) p. 16. But if my interpretation of abstraction is correct, 
Aristotle’s abstraction is devised as a solution to the problem of complexity on which ASF relies. 
Since ASF is applied not only to mathematical but to all sciences, abstraction should not be 
confined to mathematical objects. In fact, it is not difficult to find Aristotle employing abstraction 
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 One might object at this point that geometry studies not only kath’ hauta 
properties of triangle, but also triangularity itself; geometry gives the definition of a 
triangle, namely, triangularity or a triangle is a mathematical object. But triangularity is 
also known as an object of geometry as a result of the abstraction of other predicates 
than ‘being a figure’ from a sensible object. When a geometer studies a triangular 
sensible object qua figure, he comes to know that its triangularity is a kath’ hauto 
property of a figure by abstracting the predicates of the sensible object in a proper order.  
What is abstracted is, then, not ‘being a triangle’ but the sensible object’s predicates other 
than ‘being a figure’  Thus it still makes a sense to say that mathematical objects are 
things spoken of as a result of abstraction (ta\ e)c a)faire/sewj lego/mena). 
  I have argued that, when A studies B qua C, the objects of A are nothing but 
certain properties of B. Since for Aristotle, arithmetic is a study of a sensible particular 
qua individual, and geometry studies such an individual qua line, plane, or solid,
165
 it 
should be the case that mathematics consists of a study of the properties of sensible 
particulars. Thus, if abstraction serves as a method of obtaining mathematical objects, 
Aristotle’s view on mathematics should amount to a kind of naïve realism, the view that 
mathematical objects exist as properties of sensible particulars.   
 The naïve realistic interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy mathematics seems 
also to be confirmed by the ontology developed in Categories. In Categories, quantity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to explain the objects of other sciences. For instance, at Met., XIII, 3, 1077b17-1078a21, 
abstraction is suggested as a general way to delimit the domain of each science, e.g., the science 
that has the healthy as its subject treats things qua healthy, just as geometry treats things qua line, 
plane or solid. 
165
 Met., XIII, 3, 1078a25-27. 
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appears as one of ten categories; Aristotle specifically divides quantities into two kinds: 
discrete and continuous,
166
 depending on whether or not a quantity has a common 
boundary at which its parts join together. For example, in the case of lines, a point on a 
line can mark such a boundary. The genus of continuous quantities includes geometrical 
objects such as lines and surfaces, as well as time and space. Discrete quantities have 
members including number and language, the former of which is the object of 
arithmetic.
167
 So, from the perspective of the ontology of Categories, mathematics is a 
science of quantity, which is in turn a category of the properties of individual 
substances.
168
   
 Aristotle’s categories are not only a list of kinds of predicates, but also a list of 
kinds of items in his ontology.
169
  Thus, it can be said that Aristotle takes mathematical 
objects to be a kind of beings in his ontology. Aristotle also argues that all the other 
categorical beings ontologically depend on individual substances;
170
 and since the former 
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 He also divides quantity into plurality and magnitude. The former is numerable and the latter 
measurable. This division exactly corresponds to the division between discrete and continuous 
quantities. Continuous quantity corresponds to the common sensible of magnitude, and discrete 
quantity to the common sensible of number. Aristotle explains that while plurality is potentially 
divisible into non-continuous parts, magnitude is divisible into continuous parts. He includes line, 
breadth, and surface under magnitude; number under plurality. Cat., 6, 4b20. 
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 Ibid., 6. 4b22-5a14. 
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 This is the view endorsed by Apostle, who sees Aristotle as construing mathematics as a 
science of the quantities of sensible objects. See Apostle (1952) p.14 and 18.. 
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 Michael Frede distinguishes two senses of ‘category’: ‘category’ means (i) ‘predication’ as in 
Topics, and (ii) ‘kinds of things’ as in Categories. See Frede (1981) p. 35. For another 
interpretation of the different senses of ‘category’, see also Morrison (1992) n. 3.  
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 “Thus all other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as 
subjects. So, if the primary substance did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other 
things to exist (w(/ste ta\ a)/lla pa/nta h)/toi kaq' u(pokeime/nwn tw=n prw/twn ou)siw=n 
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are predicated of the latter, but not vice versa, the former can be regarded as the 
properties (sumbebhko/ta) of the latter. Thus, the fact that the objects of mathematics 
belong to the category of quantity implies that (i) the existence of mathematical objects 
depends on the existence of individual substances, and (ii) that mathematical objects exist 
as properties of individual substances.  
 This claim of a naïve realism in mathematics finds further confirmation in 
Aristotle’s theory of perception. In De Anima, Aristotle distinguishes common sensible 
objects from proper sensible objects. Aristotle argues that some objects of sense have 
their own proper sense faculties; for instance, color is sensed only by sight, and sound 
only by hearing, etc. Other objects of sense, such as movement, rest, magnitude, number, 
figure and size, are not special to any sense faculty, but common to more than one. For 
instance, movements are perceptible by both touch and sight.
171
   
 It should be noted that Aristotle includes both magnitude and number among 
common sensible objects, each of which is the proper object of geometry and arithmetic 
respectively. Thus, it is fairly reasonable to infer that Aristotle takes mathematical objects 
                                                                                                                                                                             
le/getai h)\ e)n u(pokeime/naij au)tai=j e)sti/n. mh\ ou)sw=n ou)=n tw=n prw/twn ou)siw=n 
a)du/naton tw=n a)/llwn ti ei)=nai) (Cat., 5, 2b4-6).” Aristotle takes the individual man or 
individual horse as examples of primary substances (Ibid., 2a11-15). In Categories, a substance 
“is neither said of a subject nor in a subject (h(\ mh/te kaq' u(pokeime/nou tino\j le/getai mh/te 
e)n u(pokeime/n% tini/ e)stin) (Ibid., 2a11-13).” All other things are either said of the primary 
substances as subjects or in them as subjects. But the species of the primary substances and 
genera of those species are also called the secondary substances in that other things i.e. things 
except the primary substances are predicated of them. (Ibid., 2a19-3a5)   
171
 DA., II, 6, 418a18-19. Another passage worth looking at is Ibid., III, 1, 425a14-27, where 
Aristotle not only mentions number and geometrical properties as common sensibles, but also 
argues why there cannot be a special sense faculty for common sensibles.   
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to be properties of sensible objects. Moreover, since mathematical objects are not only 
properties of individual objects but also perceivable according to his theory of perception, 
such objects turn out to be objects of sense experience.
172
 In that sense, Aristotle’s view 
of mathematics also deserves the title of some form of mathematical empiricism.  
  
 2. The General Theory of Proportion 
 
Aristotle’s interpretation of the general theory of proportion can be taken as further 
evidence of his mathematical naïve realism. Aristotle mentions this general theory of 
proportion in several places, mostly for the purpose of arguing for the mathematicals’ 
inseparability from sensible particulars. Aristotle holds that there is a universal 
mathematics which can be applicable to different kinds of mathematical beings.
173
 
It is generally agreed that the universal mathematics to which Aristotle is 
referring is Eudoxus’ general theory of proportion.
174
 Aristotle contrasts this ‘universal’ 
mathematics with other mathematical sciences in suggesting that the first is applicable 
indifferently to any kind of quantity—that is, to numbers, lines, solids, or times—while 
other mathematical sciences deal with only a certain particular kind of quantity, e.g. 
geometry studies lines, figures and solids, and arithmetic numbers.
175
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 Corkum agrees on this point. See Corkum (2004) n. 5. 
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 Apo., I, 5, 74a18-55; 9, 76a22-25; II, 17, 99a9-11; Met., IV, 1, 1004a6-10; VI, 1, 1026a24-27; 
XIII, 3, 1077b17-20; 2, 1077a9-14; XI, 7, 1064b6-9, etc. See also Heath (1949) pp. 43 and 223. 
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 cf. Ross (1924) Vol. II, p. 415. 
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 Apo., I, 5, 74a18-25. 
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 This feature of universal mathematics is also the distinctive feature of the general 
theory of proportion as presented in Elements, Book V. The universal applicability of the 
theory in Book V, distinguishes this theory from another theory of proportion given in 
Book VII; while the former applies to all magnitudes and numbers, the latter holds good 
only of integral numbers.
176
 Aristotle’s illustration of the general theory of proportion 
also confirms that the universal mathematics he cites is the theorem presented in 
Elements: namely, that proportions alternate (if a:b::c:d, then a:c::b:d), which Aristotle 
takes as an example of a universal mathematical proposition, corresponds to proposition 
16 of Book V in Elements.
177
 On these grounds there can be little doubt by universal 
mathematics Aristotle means Eudoxus’ theory of proportion.  
 From the universal applicability of the general theory of proportion, Aristotle 




Just as the universal part of mathematics is not concerned with objects 
which exist separately apart from magnitudes and numbers, but is 
concerned with these [magnitudes and numbers], but not qua such as to 
have magnitude or to be divisible, it is evident that there can be both 
formulae and demonstrations about sensible magnitudes, but not qua 
sensible but not qua having certain definite qualities.  
 
w(/sper ga\r kai\ ta\ kaqo/lou e)n toi=j maqh/masin ou) 
peri\ kexwrisme/nwn e)sti\ para\ ta\ mege/qh kai\ tou\j a)riqmou\j 
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  The theory of proportion in Book VII is regarded as the older theory, which was developed 
by Pythagoreans before Eudoxus. See Heath (1949) p. 43. 
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 Elements, V, 16. Aristotle’s own proof of this proposition is found at Apo., I, 6, 74a24. His 
proof is slightly different from Euclid’s; the former is more algebraic. See Lear (1982) p. 166.  
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a)lla\ peri\ tou/twn me/n, ou)x v(= de\ toiau=ta oi(=a e)/xein me/geqoj 
h)\ ei)=nai diaireta/, dh=lon o(/ti e)nde/xetai kai\ peri\ tw=n ai)sqhtw=n 
megeqw=n ei)=nai kai\ lo/gouj kai\ a)podei/ceij, mh\ v(= 




Aristotle’s argument is that since the objects of the general theory of proportion are not 
separated from numbers and magnitudes, it is possible that the objects of geometry or 
arithmetic are not separated from sensible objects.  
A couple of questions can be raised: First, what is the rationale for thinking that 
the objects of the general theory of proportion, namely, proportions, are not separated 
from numbers and magnitudes? Second, does it follow from the fact that the objects of 
the general theory of proportion are not separated from numbers and magnitudes that 
other mathematical objects are not separate from sensible objects? Let us consider the 
first question first. 
 Aristotle’s own answer to the first point is that it is absurd to posit a proportion 
as a separate substance. But why is it absurd? What Aristotle has in mind seems to be the 
problem of multiplication: 
 
 
Again, there are some general propositions stated by mathematicians, 
extending beyond these substances. Then, there will be another substance 
between, and separate from, the Forms and the intermediates, which is 
neither number nor points nor spatial magnitude nor time. And if this is 
impossible, it is obvious that the former substances cannot exist apart from 
sensible objects.  
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e)/ti gra/fetai e)/nia kaqo/lou u(po\ tw=n maqhmatikw=n 
para\ tau/taj ta\j ou)si/aj. e)/stai ou)=n kai\ au(/th tij a)/llh ou)si/a 
metacu\ kexwrisme/nh tw=n t' i)dew=n kai\ tw=n metacu/, h(\ ou)/te 
a)riqmo/j e)stin ou)/te stigmai\ ou)/te me/geqoj ou)/te xro/noj. ei) 
de\ tou=to a)du/naton, dh=lon o(/ti ka)kei=na a)du/naton ei)=nai 
kexwrisme/na tw=n ai)sqhtw=n.179  
 
                      
 
According to AFS, there must be Forms of all things of which there are sciences.
180
  So, 
for Platonists, there must be also Forms of the propositions that make up the objects of 
the general theory of proportion. However, since Platonists differentiate mathematicals 
from Forms and categorize the former as intermediates, proportions should be identified 
with some intermediates. Aristotle counters at this point that a proportion cannot belong 
to the domain either of the Forms or the intermediates, but must exist as another 
substance between them. Given that Platonists distinguished mathematical objects from 
Forms on account of the former’s lack of uniqueness, it would seem reasonable to posit 
that such Platonists cannot identify a proportion with a Form. But why should it not be 
classed as an intermediate? Clearly, a proportion between two numbers, for instance, is 
different from those numbers themselves; and equally the proportion of two lines is not 
coincident with those lines. Thus, it could be said that a proportion cannot be identified 
with any of the intermediates to which it is applied.  
 That does not give us, however, a sufficient reason to exclude proportions from 
the domain of intermediates. It is accepted that intermediates are constituted of different 
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kinds of mathematical objects; for example, of numbers as well as geometrical objects 
such as figures or lines. But they all belong to the same domain, insofar as they are dealt 
with in mathematics. So, Platonists could simply add proportions to the realm of the 
intermediate as another kind of mathematical objects. Thus, unless the difference between 
a proportion and an intermediate is such as to place each of them on different ontological 
levels, there is no ground for saying that a proportion belongs to another domain than that 
of the intermediates.  
 Someone might try to base such an ontological difference on the fact that a 
proportion is not a monadic property. If a proportion can be seen as a kind of relation 
between two mathematical objects, and a relation is to be distinguished from its terms, a 
proportion also should be distinct from the mathematical objects it relates. 
Problematically, though, such a distinction between a relation and a monadic property 
would have been unfamiliar to both Plato and Aristotle.
181
 In Phaedo, for instance, Plato 
posits Forms of relations such as ‘being equal’ or ‘being tall’ along with Forms of 
monadic properties such as ‘being beautiful’. Aristotle also seems to allow the same 
ontological status to relations and to monadic properties alike; for him, both quality and 
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 Some modern philosophers distinguish relations from monadic properties. First, relations 
contain at least two terms, that is, relations defined as shared by more than one individual. Second, 
some temporal or spatial relations cannot be possessed in common by more than one individual, 
while most monadic properties may be shared by many individuals. For discussion of the 
difference between relations and monadic properties, see Russell (1992) p. 274 and O’Connor 
(1976) p. 279. 
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relation are equally dependent on individual substances in terms of existence; they are all 
equally the properties of individual substances.
182
   
 It might be argued that a proportion is always a proportion of something, namely, 
a certain kind of mathematical quantity; so that a proportion cannot exist independently 
of mathematical objects such as number or magnitudes. But that does not provide a 
reason for Platonists to accept the inseparability of a proportion from mathematical 
quantities. Although a property of being beautiful, for instance, is always a property of 
something such as a man or flower, Platonists do not think for that reason that Beauty 
itself is inseparable from whatever instantiates it; rather, they argue that a thing is 
beautiful because it participates in Beauty itself. Likewise, in the case of proportion, a 
Platonist would simply respond that different kinds of mathematical objects can have the 
same proportion because they participate in the same Form of the proportion.   
 Nevertheless, the fact that a proportion is instantiated by the mathematical 
objects of the intermediates can be taken to mark an important difference between 
proportions and the intermediates. A significant ontological distinction obtains, we 
should note, between a property itself and its instantiators in Platonism: a property, F-
ness, exists independently of F-things, and F-ness is causally or ontologically prior to F-
things or its embodiments. Thus, it seems that, for Plato, Forms and their instantiators do 
not belong to the same ontological realm. Then, if a proportion is instantiated by a pair of 
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 ‘to\ sumbe/bhkoj’, which is translated into ‘a property’ in English, literally means something 
coming together. The etymology of the term suggests that a property of an individual substance is 
something whose existence comes together with the existence of an individual substance. 
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numbers, for instance, the realm of the proportion has to be different from that of the 
numbers, just as the domain of F-ness is different from that of F-things. And since F-ness 
is always ontologically prior to its instantiators, proportions should be placed on a higher 
ontological level than other mathematical objects. Some line of reasoning of this kind 
may have underlain Aristotle’s suspicion in the above passage that Platonists should 
locate proportions not between intermediates and sensibles, but rather between Forms and 
intermediates. In other words, Aristotle believes that Platonists should assign a higher 
ontological status to proportions than to intermediates.  
  A Platonist might respond that the mathematical objects’ instantiation of 
proportions cannot be seen simply as ontologically of the same kind as sensible objects’ 
instantiation of mathematicals; while a proportion is perfectly embodied in a pair of 
mathematical quantities, a sensible object never perfectly instantiates a mathematical 
object, e.g., a pair of numbers will perfectly realize a mathematical ratio, whereas a 
bronze sphere only imitates a mathematical circle. Aristotle might argue, however, that, 
according to ASF the motivation for founding a separate domain of scientific objects 
beyond the sensible world was that sensible objects do not satisfy the conditions for being 
scientific objects. But since the proportions instantiated by mathematical objects are 
exactly those dealt with by the theory of proportion, there should be no need to posit ideal 
proportions beyond their instantiations. 
 Aristotle also exploits the inseparability of proportions for his argument for the 
inseparability of mathematical objects.  Let us allow that if a proportion does not exist 
separated from its instantiations, the theory of proportion does not give rise to the 
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problem of multiplication. Platonists, then, might accept that there is no ideal proportion 
beyond its instantiation. But given that no proportion may be said to exist inseparated 
from its instantiator, Aristotle argues, there is no reason to hold that other mathematical 
objects stand apart from sensible objects, either.
183
 So, according to Aristotle’s argument, 
Platonists have a problem with the general theory of proportion construed either way: If 
proportions exist separated from their instantiations, Platonism cannot avoid the problem 
of multiplication;
184
 if they do not, other mathematical objects may also exist 
unseparated from their instantiations, i.e., from sensible objects.  
Nevertheless, it does not seem that either horn of the dilemma is fatal to 
mathematical Platonism. First, the multiplication problem raised by the general theory of 
proportion need not be intolerable for Platonists. Since it does not involve an infinite 
regress in the way that the Third Man argument does, Platonists only have to accept the 
existence of another kind of mathematical substances in addition to the intermediates. 
That is, to posit another mathematical kind besides the intermediates threatens no 
contradiction or inconsistency for mathematical Platonism. Likewise, the second horn of 
the dilemma is manageable: if the relationship between proportions and mathematical 
quantities is not the same as that governing the instantiation of a mathematical object by a 
sensible, it does not follow from that fact that the objects of the general theory of 
proportion are not separated from numbers or magnitudes that other mathematical objects 
may not be separate from sensible objects. This was the second question we raised before.  
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 It is tempting to think that if the objects of mathematical theory on its highest 
level of generality are not separated from sensibles, it should be the case that other 
mathematical objects on lower levels of generality should likewise be inseparable from 
their embodiments. Nevertheless, although one of the features of a Form is universality, it 
is not clear whether it is a Platonic thesis that a more general concept is more likely to 
have its Form than a less general one is, e.g., that it is more probable for the Form of 
animal to exist than for the Form of human to exist;
185
 there is no explicit Platonic 
account of the relationship between Forms. Similarly, we cannot decide whether it is a 
Platonic thesis that a more general mathematical property is more likely to exist beyond 
its instantiation than a less general one is. 
 To evaluate the success of Aristotle’s argument from the general theory of 
proportion, however, we need to consider its aim. If the argument was designed to 
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 In Parmenides, Plato accepts Forms of likeness, unlikeness, unity, plurality, motion and rest 
(Parmenides, 129d-e); whereas he is perplexed over whether Forms of man, fire, and animals, 
exist; and denies Forms of hair, mud, and dirt (Ibid., 130c). One distinguishing feature of the first 
class of Forms is that they are extremely general; the other classes of Forms could be said to be 
relatively specific. However, it is not clear whether Plato is taking generality as a criterion for the 
existence of a Form. For instance, while he accepts Forms of moral concepts such as goodness, 
beauty, and justice as well (Ibid., 130b), this class of Forms could be contrasted with the second 
group of Forms not on account of degree of generality, but rather because the latter are 
undignified and worthless. Moreover, it is not certain whether Plato has a consistent criterion by 
which to decide which concepts have Forms and which do not; in Republic, he seems to assume a 
Form corresponding to every general noun (Republic, X, 596a). The Timaeus recognizes Forms 
of the four elements including fire (Timaeus, 51c); the Philebus (Philebus, 15a) accepts Forms of 
man and ox, etc.  
In the later Dialogues such as Parmenides, Sophist and Philebus, Plato attempts to 
explain the relationship among Forms, laying no especial stress on Forms’ independence. 
Nonetheless, even in the later works, there is no systematic account of the relationship between 
Forms. Thus, it is far from clear whether there is a hierarchy of Forms or not. 
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provide a decisive proof against mathematical Platonism, it would be reasonable to 
consider it a failure. As mentioned earlier, however, Met. XIII and XIV can be best 
characterized as polemic or dialectic; their main purpose is to persuade or refute 
particular opponents. Viewed in this light, the argument is fairly persuasive and effective. 
Due to lack of textual evidence, we do not know, either, whether Platonists regarded the 
problem of multiplication raised by the general theory of proportion as problematic to 
their view; or whether they invoked generality as a criterion for the existence of a Form. 
If either or both of these are the case, however, the general theory of proportion furnishes 
a strong objection against mathematical Platonism. We also considered previously 
Aristotle’s argument that the objects of applied mathematical sciences are not separated 
from sensible objects. In the text, that argument (Met., XIII, 2, 1077a1-9) immediately 
precedes Aristotle’s naïve realistic interpretation of the general theory of proportion (Ibid., 
1077a9-15). When the objects of mathematical sciences on the highest level of generality, 
on the one hand, and on the lowest, on the other hand, are not substances in the sense that 
their existence rests on the existence of something else, it will hardly be likely that only 
the intermediates, located between the objects of the general theory of mathematics and 
those of applied mathematics in terms of generality, will enjoy the status of substance in 
existing separate from sensibles. 
 Besides, regardless of the validity of the argument, the ontological implications 
Aristotle tries to draw from the general theory of proportion are clear: mathematical 
objects do not exist separated from sensible objects. Mathematicals cannot thereby be 
substances, for only substances exist by themselves, while the other categorical beings 
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depend on them ontologically. Thus it seems difficult to deny that Aristotle supports 
mathematical naïve realism given that he argues that: (i) mathematical objects exist, (ii) 
they do not exist separated from sensible objects, (iii) they exist as quantity, a kind of 
property of substance, and (iv) we can experience them; they are perceived by our 
senses.
186
 No careful reader of Aristotle’s mathematical texts can deny this naïve realistic 
element in his philosophy of mathematics.  
 
 3. Problems with Aristotle’s aïve Realism 
 
However, this is only half of the story. It seems indubitable, that is, that Aristotle’s theory 
of mathematics starts out from naïve realism; and indeed he makes every effort to 
maintain this stance. Naïve realism in mathematics is an attractive position for Aristotle; 
it is anti-Platonic and suits his scientific realism. Although there are commentators who 
assimilate Aristotle’s view on mathematics to naïve realism, however, it would also be an 
oversimplification to equate his views of mathematics with that position entirely. 
Aristotle’s mathematical naïve realism raises several problems, which Aristotle himself 
recognized. Attempting to provide solutions for those problems, he modified and 
complicated his original position; as a result, his theory came to involve quite different 
commitements, ones apparently hardly compatible with naïve realism.  
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 One issue at stake is whether his naïve realism could accommodate such 
modification and complication without losing the internal consistency of his theory. 
Commentators have struggled to provide an interpretation capable of unifying two 
seemingly incompatible aspects of his theory—a supposedly initial naïve realism and 
later modifications of Aristotle’s view. We will examine their interpretations in the next 
chapter. In the remainder of this, we will consider the difficulties Aristotle has in 
maintaining mathematical naïve realism, and why that label is not adequate to all of his 
claims about mathematics. 
 One of the grounds of Aristotle’s concern with mathematical naïve realism is that 
it blurrs the line of demarcation between mathematics and physics. According to 
mathematical naïve realism, mathematics is a study of the properties of sensible objects. 
But if mathematics and physics both study sensible substances, what distinguishes 
mathematics from a natural science? Both would seem to discuss different aspects of 
objects in the same domain, namely, the sensible world.
187
 Moreover, some objects of 
mathematics are treated by physics as well.  As Aristotle put it: 
 
 
…natural bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and points, which a 
mathematician studies…for it would be absurd if the student of nature 
were supposed to know what the sun or moon is, but none of their 
properties in its own right, particularly as it is obvious that those who 
discuss nature also discuss the shape of the moon and sun, and whether the 
earth and the cosmos are spherical or not.  
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 Another passage which is suggestive of such naïve realism is Met., XIII, 3, 1078a5-9, which 
treats mathematical properties in the same way as biological properties; both are regarded as the 




...e)pi/peda kai\ sterea\ e)/xei ta\ fusika\ sw/mata kai\ mh/kh 
kai\ stigma/j, peri\ w(=n skopei= o( maqhmatiko/j...ei) ga\r tou= 
fusikou= to\ ti/ e)stin h(/lioj h)\ selh/nh ei)de/nai, tw=n 
de\ sumbebhko/twn kaq' au(ta\ mhde/n, a)/topon, a)/llwj te kai\ o(/ti 
fai/nontai le/gontej oi( peri\ fu/sewj kai\ peri\ sxh/matoj 
selh/nhj kai\ h(li/ou, kai\ dh\ kai\ po/teron sfairoeidh\j h( gh= 
kai\ o( ko/smoj h)\ ou)/.188  
 
 
Why does Aristotle bother himself with that demarcation problem?  For Aristotle, 
mathematics and physics are supposed to be different sciences. According to Arisotle, 
ideally all true propositions in a science are deducible from a finite number of primitive 
principles or axioms (a)rxh/), which are indemonstrable. Aristotle argues that the 
principles of physics cannot be the same as those of mathematics, because while 
mathematics deals with unchanging things, physics studies things qua movable; and a 
principle of change cannot be present in unchangeable things or things qua 
unchangeable.
189
    
 Aristotle explains that mathematics is distinguished from the science of nature 
because “the mathematician also treats of these things, but not qua limits of each natural 
body (peri\ tou/twn me\n ou)=n pragmateu/etai kai\ o( maqhmatiko/j, a)ll' ou)x v(= 
fusikou= sw/matoj pe/raj e(/kaston).”190 To illustrate this point, he introduces the 
famous example of “the snub”, which is contrasted with “the concave”. Aristotle argues 
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that, while a natural science studies a nose qua snub, mathematics studies it qua concave. 
Since ‘snub’ is always a description of a nose, the study of snubness is a study of a 
certain kind of nose i.e., of a natural body; but the study of concavity of a nose does not 
have to be a study of nose. Let us consider the following sentences: 
 
 (1) A studies a nose qua snub. 
 (2) B studies a nose qua concave. 
 
According to my analysis of the ‘qua’ operator, (1) implies that A studies those properties 
of a nose which are kath’ hauta properties of snub, whereas (2) means that B studies 
those properties of a nose which are the kath’ hauta properties of something concave. The 
operation of ‘qua’ further rests on the suppositions, as articulated in chapter 2, that X is a 
kath’ hauto property of Y iff either X is a property of Y and X appears in the definition of 
Y, or if X is a property of Y and Y appears in the definition of X.
191
  Then, since 
snubness is always a property of a nose, definitions of ‘snub’ should include ‘nose’, i.e., 
snubness is no more than the concavity of a nose; so that the definition of a kath’ hauto 
property of snub also should mention ‘nose’ directly or indirectly.
192
 However, since the 
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 Apo., I, 4, 73a34-38; 6, 74b7-10; 22, 83b13-18. For the discussion of Aristotle’s criteria for a 
kath’ hauto property, see Ch. Two, Sec. 3. 
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 “For of these the formula of the snub mentions the matter of the thing, but that of the concave 
is stated apart from the matter; for the snubness exists in a nose, so that its formula includes its 
nose; for the snub is a concave nose (tou/twn ga\r o( me\n tou= simou= lo/goj meta\ th=j u(/lhj 
le/getai th=j tou= pra/gmatoj, o( de\ tou= koi/lou xwri\j th=j u(/lhj: h( ga\r simo/thj e)n 
r(ini\ gi/gnetai, dio\ kai\ o( lo/goj au)th=j meta\ tau/thj qewrei=tai: to\ simo\n ga/r e)sti 
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definition of concavity is not phrased in terms of ‘noses’, we do not have to refer to noses 
in order to define any of the kath’ hauta properties of concavity. Aristotle put it: “the 
snub is bound up with matter (for the snub is a concave nose), while concavity is 
independent of perceptible matter (to\ me\n simo\n suneilhmme/non e)sti\ meta\ th=j 
u(/lhj ¨e)/sti ga\r to\ simo\n koi/lh r(i/j©, h( de\ koilo/thj a)/neu u(/lhj 
ai)sqhth=j).”193  
 One might object that, although some kath’ hauta properties of snub cannot be 
separated from its perceptible matter, namely, a nose, some of them can be defined 
without reference to any of the sensible matter that might make up ‘snub’. For instance, 
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not qua immovable. Aristotle says, “For as there are many formulae [about things] merely qua 
moving, apart from each essence of such things and from their properties, but it is not necessary 
for this reason that there should be either something moving separate from sensibles, or some 
separate nature in such things, so there will be also formulae and sciences of moving things not 
qua moving but only qua bodies, or again only qua planes, or only qua lines, or qua divisibles, or 
qua indivisibles having position, or only qua indivisible (w(/sper ga\r kai\ v(= kinou/mena 
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v(= sw/mata mo/non, kai\ pa/lin v(= e)pi/peda mo/non kai\ v(= mh/kh mo/non, kai\ v(= 
diaireta\ kai\ v(= a)diai/reta e)/xonta de\ qe/sin kai\ v(= a)diai/reta mo/non) (Ibid., XIII, 3, 
1077b22-30).” The following passages argue much the same point: Phys., II, 2, 193b35; Met., VI, 
1, 1026a28-32; 1026a8-13; XI, 7, 1064a23-1064a35; XIII, 3, 1077b23-30. Also see Ross (1924) 
Vo., I, pp. lxxviii and ciii and Hussey (1991), p. 111. 
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assuming that the definition of snubness is the concavity of a nose, ‘being concave’ is a 
kath’ hauto property of snubness, and its definition does not contain the concept of ‘nose’. 
Moreover, ‘being concave’ is also a geometrical property. Thus, although the range of 
mathematical objects is not identical with that of physical objects, we may be able to say 
that some properties are dealt with both in mathematics and physics. However, the 
disciplines would continue to exhibit a difference: Physics talks about concavity only as a 
property of snub; it does not investigate concavity itself.  In other words, the fact that 
the snub is concave remains a theorem of snubness. To study concavity is a geometer’s 
job; only geometry studies and seeks to specify kath’ hauta properties of concavity. 
 It seems reasonable to suppose that Aristotle deployed abstraction to solve this 
problem of the demarcation between physics and mathematics while maintaining his 
mathematical naïve realism. Certainly, Aristotle had grounds for wanting mathematics 
and physics to be sciences of different (sets of) objects. Even so, the possible failure of 
the delimitation of the sciences does not threaten mathematical naïve realism; nor does it 
harm his anti-Platonism or scientific realism. Even if the boundary between the two 
sciences collapses, both anti-Platonism and scientific realism could be still preserved. 
Another problem, though, poses a more severe challenge to Aristotle’s mathematical 
naïve realism.    
 I have argued that Aristotle employs abstraction specifically in Met. XIII and 
XIV to criticize AFS by way of refuting mathematical Platonism. Nevertheless, it is not 
easy to explain how mathematical objects or mathematical properties can be obtained 
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from sensible particulars by abstraction.
194
 Notice that A can study B qua C only if B is 
C; e.g., we can study Socrates qua man only when he is a man. That is to say, we can 
obtain a certain kath’ hauto property of C, say, M, from B by abstraction only when it is 
true that B is M. This seems to be a trivial point. It is sufficient, however, to complicate 
Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics. Suppose that A studies B qua C, and that A is 
mathematics, B a sensible particular, and C triangle. Then, there will be no sensible 
particular which is substitutable for B; simply because there is no perfect instantiation of 
a triangle in sensible objects. This is the so-called precision problem, the central issue of 
interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics. 
 Naïve realistic interpreters might raise a couple of objections: First of all, 
Aristotle’s theory of abstraction is based on different ontological assumptions from 
Plato’s. While Plato assumes that a sensible particular cannot perfectly realize a Form, 
Aristotle’s universals are always in sensible particulars. Since, like other scientific objects, 
mathematical objects are universals, Aristotle would believe that, supposing abstraction 
can elicit the predicate manhood from Socrates, the same method can elicit triangularity 
from a bronze isosceles triangle. Put another way, if we cannot abstract triangularity from 
a bronze isosceles, we cannot abstract manhood from Socrates, either; but Aristotle 
admits that the latter is possible.  
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 Ross says, “the ‘spheres’ and ‘circles’ of common life are not spheres and circles at all, and it 
is not of them that geometrical proposition are true. Such propositions are true of the perfect 
geometrical figures which thought recognizes as existing in space though their boundaries do not 
coincide with those of any sensible figure.” See Ross (1924) I, p. lvi. Muller agrees with this 
point. See Mueller (1970) p. 158. 
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 Nevertheless, there seems to be an obvious difference between the instantiation 
of a mathematical object and that of an object of other sciences. Let us call A a perfect 
instantiation of B just in the case that a property of A satisfies the definition of B. Then, it 
is difficult to deny that there is a perfect instance of a mammal in the sensible world, for 
instance; but it seems to be hardly possible to find a perfect instantiation of a triangle. 
Thus, it is fair to say that some mathematical objects cannot be obtained from sensible 
particulars by abstraction, whereas this problem does not affect other scientific objects.  
 However, it might be also objected that it is one thing to hold that there can be no 
perfect instantiation of a mathematical object, but quite another to assign this view to 
Aristotle. If Aristotle believes that mathematical objects can be realized by sensible 
particulars just in the manner of the realization of other scientific objects, the precision 
problem does not occur at least within his metaphysics.  
 This objection involves two different issues: One is whether Aristotle admits that 
there exist perfect instantiations of mathematical objects in the sensible world; the other 
is whether his admission of the existence of such perfect mathematical instantiations 
exempts his philosophy of mathematics from the precision problem.  Let us consider the 
second issue first. 
 Suppose that Aristotle’s metaphysics assumes that there are perfect physical 
instances of mathematical objects. Does this assumption allow him to avoid the precision 
problem? It seems not. Even if sensible substances perfectly realize some geometrical 
properties, there are many geometrical figures which, it seems, cannot be found in the 
sensible world; for example, geometry can construct a regular polygon with 100 sides and 
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even discover theorems of it, but it is highly improbable that there exists a physical 
instance of that regular polygon.
195
  If the shape has no physical instantiation in the 
sensible world, we cannot obtain it from a sensible object by abstraction.
196
 Even in the 
case of circles and straight lines, of which Aristotle claims there are perfect physical 
instantiations, we are faced with the same problem. Geometry can study any size of circle. 
But it is impossible that physical objects could exemplify absolutely every size of circle. 
We can acquire circularity from the trace made by the movement of a heavenly body, but 
abstraction (in the sense of the progressive elimination of irrelevant properties) cannot 
help us acquire a circle of a radius of 3 cm from that particular trace. The same argument 
can be applied to straight lines as well. Thus, it seems that, insofar as Aristotle does not 
believe in the existence of a perfect physical instantiation of each possible mathematical 
object, he cannot avoid the precision problem, regardless of whether some mathematical 
forms are perfectly instantiated in the sensible world. Commentators have provided 
various divergent solutions for this precision problem. We will examine each of their 
principal positions in the next chapter. 
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geometer thinks of a geometrical figure without having any physical instantiation, that 
geometrical figure cannot be said to be gained from a physical object by abstraction. Thus, it can 
be said that Aristotelian abstraction has nothing to do with geometry. Hussey further argues that 
for mathematicians to study mathematics, they do not need to have any experience of the actual 
world because the structure of mathematical objects is totally determined by a handful of 
postulates (See Hussey (1992) p. 129). It is notable that Aristotle also argues that young people 
can be good mathematicians because mathematics requires no experience of the world (E., VI, 8, 





 4. The Problem of the Internal Consistency of Aristotle’s Theory of Mathematics 
 
Let us now return to the first issue. Many scholars have struggled with the question 
whether Aristotle admits the existence of the perfect physical instantiations of some 
mathematical objects, believing that if he does, his philosophy of mathematics is immune 
from the precision problem. But we saw that that is not the case.  Rather, to head off the 
precision problem satisfactorily, Aristotle has to show that every possible mathematical 
object can be obtained by abstraction from sensible objects.  Thus, the question about 
the existence of some perfect physical instances of particular kinds of mathematicals such 
as circles, straight lines, triangles, etc., is in no way decisive for the precision problem 
after all.  
 Nevertheless, the question is still important. Besides the precision problem, it 
raises the problem of the internal consistency of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics, 
i.e., whether Aristotle has a coherent theory of mathematics or holds more than one 
conflicting views. On the one hand, there is prima facie evidence for Aristotle’s belief in 
the existence of perfect instantiations of some mathematical objects in the sensible world. 
We already saw Aristotle’s argument that the objects of applied mathematical sciences 
such as astronomy, optics, and harmonics are something acquired from sensible 





 and the shape of the heaven is of necessity spherical.
198
 Aristotle also 





But every motion in place, which we call locomotion, is either straight or 
circular or a combination of these; for they are only two simple motions. 
And the reason is that these straight and circular [lines] are the only simple 
magnitudes. By ‘circular [motion]’ I mean [motion] around center, 
whereas ‘straight [motion]’ means the upward and downward [motion]. 
While I mean by ‘upward’ motion away from the centre, ‘downward’ 
motion toward it.  
 
Pa=sa de\ ki/nhsij o(/sh kata\ to/pon, h(\n kalou=men fora/n, 
h)\ eu)qei=a h)\ ku/kl% h)\ e)k tou/twn mikth/: a(plai= ga\r au(=tai du/o 
mo/nai. Ai)/tion d' o(/ti kai\ ta\ mege/qh tau=ta a(pla= mo/non, h(/ t' 
eu)qei=a kai\ h( periferh/j. Ku/kl% me\n ou)=n e)stin 
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 Another passage where Aristotle seems to think that there are perfectly straight physical 
objects is found at DA., I, 1, 403a10-16. He says, “Thus, if there is any of functions or affections 
peculiar to the soul, it will be possible for the soul to be separated [from the body]; if there is 
none peculiar to it, it will not be separable, just as many [properties] belong to the straight qua 
straight, e.g., touching a bronze sphere at a point, but if something straight is separated, it will not 
touch in this way; for it is inseparable, since it is always with some body (ei) me\n ou)=n e)/sti ti 
tw=n th=j yuxh=j e)/rgwn h)\ paqhma/twn i)/dion, e)nde/xoit' a)\n au)th\n xwri/zesqai: ei) 
de\ mhqe/n e)stin i)/dion au)th=j, ou)k a)\n ei)/h xwristh/, a)lla\ kaqa/per t%= eu)qei=, v(= eu)qu/, 
polla\ sumbai/nei, oi(=on a(/ptesqai th=j [xalkh=j] sfai/raj kata\ stigmh/n, ou) me/ntoi 
g' a(/yetai ou(/twj xwrisqe/n ti eu)qu/: a)xw/riston ga/r, ei)/per a)ei\ meta\ sw/mato/j 
tinoj e)stin).”  
 Commentators disagree on the interpretation of this passage. While Lear takes this 
passage as evidence for Aristotle’s belief in the perfect physical instance of mathematical straight 
line (Lear (1982) pp. 180-181), Ross excises ‘th=j xalkh=j’ from the sentence ‘a(/ptesqai th=j 
xalkh=j sfai/raj kata\ stigmh/n,’ and reads it as meaning that straightness abstracted from 
the straight thing touches a (geometrical) sphere at a single point (See Ross (1961) p. 168). Many 
commentators, however, think that th=j xalkh=j is essential for a correct reading. See Mansion 
(1978) pp. 1-20; Mckay (1979) pp. 86-91; Hamlyn (1993) pp. 78-79. 
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h( peri\ to\ me/son, eu)qei=a d' h( a)/nw kai\ ka/tw. Le/gw d' a)/nw me\n 
th\n a)po\ tou= me/sou, ka/tw de\ th\n e)pi\ to\ me/son.200   
 
 
However, he also suggests in several places that sensible substances do not fulfill the 
conditions that mathematical objects should meet.  For instance, he says: 
 
 
But on the other hand astronomy cannot be concerned with sensible 
magnitude nor with this heaven. For such sensible lines are never like 
those of which the geometer speaks (for none of sensible things is thus 
straight or round: for a [physical] circle touches a straight edge not at a 
point but as Protagoras said in his refutation of the geometers) nor are the 
motions and spiral orbits of the heaven like those which astronomy 
investigates nor have [geometrical] points the same nature as stars. 
 
a)lla\ mh\n ou)de\ tw=n ai)sqhtw=n a)\n ei)/h megeqw=n ou)de\ peri\ to\n 
ou)rano\n h( a)strologi/a to/nde. ou)/te ga\r 
ai( ai)sqhtai\ grammai\ toiau=tai/ ei)sin oi(/aj le/gei o( gewme/trhj 
¨ou)qe\n ga\r eu)qu\ tw=n ai)sqhtw=n ou(/twj ou)de\ stroggu/lon: 
a(/ptetai ga\r tou= kano/noj ou) kata\ stigmh\n o( ku/kloj a)ll' 
w(/sper Prwtago/raj e)/legen e)le/gxwn tou\j gewme/traj©, ou)/q' 
ai( kinh/seij kai\ e(/likej tou= ou)ranou= o(/moiai peri\ w(=n 
h( a)strologi/a poiei=tai tou\j lo/gouj, ou)/te ta\ shmei=a toi=j 
a)/stroij th\n au)th\n e)/xei fu/sin.201   
 
 
This passage not only denies perfect instances of mathematical properties such as 
straightness and roundness, but also claims that the objects of astronomy are not physical 
objects. This implies exactly the opposite of those passages gathered to support the naïve 
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realistic interpretation. So, some scholars take this passage as textual evidence that 
Aristotle thinks that mathematics does not directly describe physical objects.
202
 
 Some commentators attempt to preserve the consistency of Aristotle’s view on 
mathematics by denying that, for Aristotle, physical objects do not perfectly instantiate 
mathematical properties. For instance, Lear argues that the passage quoted above “need 
not to be construed as supporting the thesis that physical objects fall short of truly 
possessing geometrical properties”; since the context shows that the passage presents a 
view of Platonists’ rather than Aristotle’s own opinion.
203
 At Met., III,2, 997a34-35, after 
asking the question whether there are other kinds of substances besides sensible 
substances, Aristotle criticizes those who assert the existence both of the Forms and of 
the intermediates; this criticism goes on as far as 998a20. Thus, the passage above 
(997b34-998a6) should be seen as part of the criticism; it shows the absurdity of 
assuming the existence of other substances than sensible ones, i.e., under this supposition, 
astronomy would be led to study something other than the physical objects such as 
heavenly bodies and their movements. This reading is confirmed by the following 
passage, which immediately precedes the passage above. 
 
 
Again, if someone is going to posit the intermediates apart from and 
between the Forms and the sensible, he shall have many difficulties. For it 
is evident that similarly there will be lines apart from these Forms of lines 
and sensible lines and so with each of the other kinds. Thus, since 
astronomy is one of these [mathematical sciences] there will also be some 
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heaven apart from the sensible heaven, and a sun and a moon and similarly 
the other heavenly bodies [apart from the sensible one] along with the 
[separate] heaven. Yet how should we believe these things? For it is not 
reasonable that [these separate things] are immovable, but it is altogether 
impossible that they are moving. And similarly with those things which 
optics and mathematical harmonics deal with. For it is impossible for these 
things to exist apart from the sensible things, for the same reasons.  
 
e)/ti de\ ei)/ tij para\ ta\ ei)/dh 
kai\ ta\ ai)sqhta\ ta\ metacu\ qh/setai, polla\j a)pori/aj e(/cei: 
dh=lon ga\r w(j o(moi/wj grammai/ te para/ t' au)ta\j kai\ ta\j 
ai)sqhta\j e)/sontai kai\ e(/kaston tw=n a)/llwn genw=n: w(/st' 
e)pei/per h( a)strologi/a mi/a tou/twn e)sti/n, e)/stai tij 
kai\ ou)rano\j para\ to\n ai)sqhto\n ou)rano\n kai\ h(/lio/j te 
kai\ selh/nh kai\ ta)=lla o(moi/wj ta\ kata\ to\n ou)rano/n. kai/toi 
pw=j dei= pisteu=sai tou/toij; ou)de\ ga\r a)ki/nhton eu)/logon ei)=nai, 
kinou/menon de\ kai\ pantelw=j a)du/naton: o(moi/wj 
de\ kai\ peri\ w(=n h( o)ptikh\ pragmateu/etai kai\ h( e)n toi=j 
maqh/masin a(rmonikh/: kai\ ga\r tau=ta a)du/naton ei)=nai 
para\ ta\ ai)sqhta\ dia\ ta\j au)ta\j ai)ti/aj.204 
 
 
Clearly, this passage states that it is not reasonable to suppose that there exist objects of 
astronomy other than sensible heavenly bodies. Since this passage is an integral part of 
the whole criticism of 997a34-998a20, it would be appropriate to read the previous 
passage in such a way as to make it consistent with the latter. 
 However, there are other passages which sit much less easily with the naïve 
realistic interpretation.  For example, Aristotle says: 
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…what sort of thing is the mathematician supposed to deal with? Clearly 
not with things in this world; for none of these is the sort of thing which 
the mathematical sciences investigate.  
 
…peri\ poi=a qete/on pragmateu/esqai to\n maqhmatiko/n; ou) ga\r 
dh\ peri\ ta\ deu=ro. tou/twn ga\r ou)qe/n e)stin oi(=on 
ai( maqhmatikai\ zhtou=si tw=n e)pisthmw=n.205 
 
 
Lear argues that this passage once more does not present Aristotle’s own view; rather, it 
is the Academic Platonist’s response to the objection that the postulation of the 
intermediates involves a range of absurdities.
206
 The context in which the passage 
appears, though, offers no grounds for supposing that the speaker of these views is 
anyone other than Aristotle himself. Having criticized a Platonic doctrine that 
mathematical objects are intermediates between Forms and sensible objects in the 
immediately preceding passage (1059a5-10), Aristotle, next, asks himself what kind of 
thing mathematical objects are supposed to be and answers that they are not things of this 
world.  
 Any need to engage closely with Lear’s interpretation of this passage is lessened 
by the existence, in fact, of a number of similar passages in which Aristotle makes 
comparable assertions in unambiguously his own voice, such as the following:
207
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 Similarly, he says, “So, too is it with geometry; even if things with which it is concerned 
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[sensibles] (ou(/tw kai\ th\n gewmetri/an: ou)k ei) sumbe/bhken ai)sqhta\ ei)=nai w(=n e)sti/, 




It has, then, been sufficiently shown that the objects of mathematics are 
not substances more than bodies are, and that they are not prior to 
sensibles in being, but only in formula, and that they cannot in any way 
exist separately. But since they could not exist in sensibles either, it is 
evident that they either do not exist at all or exist in some way, and for this 
reason they do not exist absolutely for ‘exist’ is said in many ways. 
 
 (/Oti me\n ou)=n ou)/te ou)si/ai ma=llon tw=n swma/twn ei)si\n ou)/te 
pro/tera t%= ei)=nai tw=n ai)sqhtw=n a)lla\ t%= lo/g% mo/non, ou)/te 
kexwrisme/na pou ei)=nai dunato/n, ei)/rhtai i(kanw=j: e)pei\ d' ou)d' 
e)n toi=j ai)sqhtoi=j e)nede/xeto au)ta\ ei)=nai, fanero\n o(/ti h)\ o(/lwj 
ou)k e)/stin h)\ tro/pon tina\ e)/sti kai\ dia\ tou=to ou)x a(plw=j e)/stin: 




The whole paragraph constitutes an argument, which can be formulated as follows: 
 
(1) The objects of mathematics cannot exist separate from sensibles; the former 
are not ontologically prior to the latter;  
(2) They are not in sensibles. 
(3) Therefore, they do not exist absolutely. 
 
Putting it this way, (2) is one of premises from which the conclusion (3) is drawn. So, if 
we accept (3) as Aristotle’s own thesis, we should admit that (2) as also a claim made by 
Aristotle’s philosophy. 
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 Besides the question whether (2) is Aristotle’s assertion or not, it is questionable 
how (3) derives from (1) and (2). To deal with this, we need to first clarify what Aristotle 
means by saying that: (i) A does not exist separate from B, and (ii) A is in B. In 
Aristotle’s ontology, whatever exists must belong to one of the ten categories; of them, 
only substance can exist by itself; the other categories of beings exist only along with 
substances, never separately from them. In other words, beings other than substance are 
something that belong to a substance, and that a substance will bear as its properties. It 
seems to be least questionable that the sensible objects of the above passage are sensible 
substances; Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics begins with asking what other 
substances exist besides sensible substances. Thus, his assertion that mathematical 
objects cannot exist separately from sensibles can plausibly be taken to mean either: (iii) 
such objects are not substances, or (iv) such objects exist as the properties of sensible 
substances.   
 However, (iv) is excluded by (2). According to Aristotle, A is said to be in (e)n) B 
many ways.
209
 The most relevant sense is found in Met., V, 23, where Aristotle notes that 
“‘to be in something’ is used in similar, and corresponding, ways to ‘to have’ (to\ e)/n tini 
de\ ei)=nai o(motro/pwj le/getai kai\ e(pome/nwj t%= e)/xein),”210 i.e., A is in B just in 
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the case that B has A. He enumerates four uses of ‘to have’; in one, A is said to have B 
when B belongs to A and A is a kind of ‘recipient’ of B, e.g., bronze has the form of the 
statue, or a body has a disease.
211
  In this sense, if (2) is true, then it will also be true that 
no sensible substance has a mathematical object in itself, which means that mathematical 
objects do not belong to sensible substances.  Since, then, mathematical objects are 
neither substances nor belong to sensible substances, (2) implies, after all, that the objects 
of mathematics cannot be some properties of sensible objects. This is a problem; the 
implication hardly seems compatible with the mathematical naïve realism which Aristotle 
elsewhere holds.  
 Furthermore, several passages in Aristotle seem to argue against locating 
mathematical objects in sensible bodies. The most informative is found in his criticism of 




It has been already observed in the Discussion of Problems that it is 
impossible [for mathematical objects] to exist in sensible things and at the 
same time that the theory in question is a fabrication, seeing that (a) it is 
impossible for two solids to be in the same place, and that (b) according to 
the same theory all the other powers and characteristics are also to exist in 
sensible things and none of them exist separately. This is what we have 
seen so far. But, in addition to these, it is obvious that (c) it is impossible 
for any body whatever to be divided; for it is to be divided at a plane, and 
the plane at a line, and the line at a point, so that if we cannot divide the 
point, neither can line, and if we cannot divide the line, neither can others. 
What difference then does it make whether sensible things are such kind 
of things, or, they have such things in themselves, without being such kind 
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of things? The result will be the same; for when the sensible things are 
divided they will be divided, or else the sensible things cannot be divided.    
 
 (/Oti me\n toi/nun e)/n ge toi=j ai)sqhtoi=j a)du/naton ei)=nai kai\ a(/ma 
plasmati/aj o( lo/goj, ei)/rhtai me\n kai\ e)n toi=j diaporh/masin 
o(/ti du/o a(/ma sterea\ ei)=nai a)du/naton, e)/ti de\ kai\ o(/ti tou= au)tou= 
lo/gou kai\ ta\j a)/llaj duna/meij kai\ fu/seij e)n toi=j ai)sqhtoi=j 
ei)=nai kai\ mhdemi/an kexwrisme/nhn: tau=ta me\n ou)=n ei)/rhtai 
pro/teron, a)lla\ pro\j tou/toij fanero\n o(/ti a)du/naton 
diaireqh=nai o(tiou=n sw=ma: kat' e)pi/pedon ga\r diaireqh/setai, 
kai\ tou=to kata\ grammh\n kai\ au(/th kata\ stigmh/n, w(/st' ei) th\n 
stigmh\n dielei=n a)du/naton, kai\ th\n grammh/n, ei) de\ tau/thn, 
kai\ ta)=lla. ti/ ou)=n diafe/rei h)\ tau/taj ei)=nai toiau/taj fu/seij, 
h)\ au)ta\j me\n mh/, ei)=nai d' e)n au)tai=j toiau/taj fu/seij; 
to\ au)to\ ga\r sumbh/setai: diairoume/nwn ga\r tw=n ai)sqhtw=n 
diaireqh/sontai, h)\ ou)de\ ai( ai)sqhtai.213  
 
 
Aristotle here offers three objections to the idea that mathematical objects are in sensible 
things. It is generally agreed that (a) and (b) resume the two arguments of Met., B, 2, 
where Aristotle asserts: 
 
And there are some who say that these so-called intermediates between the 
Forms and the perceptible things exist, not apart from the sensible things, 
but in them; it would require a long discussion to go through all the 
impossible results of this view, but it is enough to consider the following: 
(e) It is not reasonable that this is the case only for these [intermediates]; it 
is clear that Forms also can be in the sensible things (for both of these are 
explained by the same account). Further, (f) it is necessary that there are 
two solids in the same place, and (g) that the intermediates are not 
immovable, while they are in moving things, i.e., sensible things. 
 
ei)si\ de/ tinej oi(/ fasin ei)=nai me\n ta\ metacu\ tau=ta lego/mena 
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tw=n te ei)dw=n kai\ tw=n ai)sqhtw=n, ou) mh\n xwri/j ge tw=n 
ai)sqhtw=n a)ll' e)n tou/toij: oi(=j ta\ sumbai/nonta a)du/nata 
pa/nta me\n plei/onoj lo/gou dielqei=n, i(kano\n 
de\ kai\ ta\ toiau=ta qewrh=sai. ou)/te ga\r e)pi\ tou/twn eu)/logon 
e)/xein ou(/tw mo/non, a)lla\ dh=lon o(/ti kai\ ta\ ei)/dh e)nde/xoit' a)\n e)n 
toi=j ai)sqhtoi=j ei)=nai ¨tou= ga\r au)tou= lo/gou a)mfo/tera tau=ta/ 
e)stin©, e)/ti de\ du/o sterea\ e)n t%= au)t%= a)nagkai=on ei)=nai to/p%, 





We find in the first passage of Met., XIII, 2 that (a) and (b) correspond to (f) and (e) in 
the second passage of Met., III, 2, respectively, and (g) is omitted while (c) is newly 
added. Further, the Forms mentioned in (e) are replaced by the the powers and 
characteristics in (b).  
 The arguments developed in the second passage are apparently directed against a 
particular Platonic position (which Annas terms ‘partial Platonism’),
215
 that the 
intermediates are in sensible objects; (e), (f), and (g) show what absurdities follows from 
the idea that the intermediates are in physical objects. Thus, if the assumption that (a) and 
(b) correspond to (f) and (e) in Met, B, is correct, the theory under fire from Aristotle in 
this passage would again be partial Platonism. Thus his thesis that mathematical objects 
are not in sensibles would not be incompatible with his naïve realistic claims, since 
Aristotle’s mathematical objects are not the intermediates.  
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 However, argument (c), which is newly added, does not restrict itself to the 
intermediates among possible mathematical objects. According to (c), cutting a body 
involves cutting a plane, cutting a plane involves cutting a line, and  cutting a line 
involve cutting a point; but a point cannot be divided. Thus, if a mathematical body is 
actually in a physical body and a physical body can be divided, we should accept that a 
mathematical point can be divided, which is absurd. Since the validity of the argument 
relies on the assumption that a point is indivisible, whether or not the mathematical 
objects purportedly in some physical bodies are the intermediates or not is irrelevant. 
Even if these objects are Forms, the same absurdity follows unless the Form of a point 
admits of subdivision. In this regard, Annas rightly argues that the argument is not 
limited to the intermediates but applies to any kind of ideal mathematical object.
216
  
 Nevertheless, as White argues, the scope of (c) seems to be much broader than 
Annas takes it to be, whatever Annas means by ‘ideal’. Since the geometrical definition 
of ‘point’ excludes its divisibility, if (c) is valid, geometrical objects cannot be in physical 
things; it makes no difference whether the mathematical objects contained in sensibles 
are ideal or not.
217
 Or, at least, (c) implies that geometrical objects cannot be in sensible 
objects as their actual extended parts.
218
  
 Since Aristotle here holds that mathematical objects are not in sensible objects, 
his mathematical naïve realism has to make space for a view apparently contradicted by 
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his fundamental position. Thus, if Aristotle has any consistent theory of mathematics, he 
should have given up either his naïve realism or the view that mathematics is not 
concerned with sensible objects.  It is my hypothesis that Aristotle gave up his original 
naïve realism at some point and developed another theory. There are two reasons for 
positing this hypothesis: First, naïve realism cannot evade the philosophical problems we 
have considered; and as the text indicates, Aristotle was cognizant of these problems. 
Second, it is possible to reconstruct a consistent theory of mathematics out of his claims 
which excludes naïve realism. We will see this in the next chapter. 
 But if the objects of mathematics exist neither as substances nor as properties of 
substances, then how can they exist at all? Anything existent should belong to one of the 
categories.  Rather than answering this question directly, Aristotle says:  
 
If the objects of mathematics exist, then they must exist either in sensible 
objects, as some say, or separate from sensible objects (and some say in 
this way, too), or if they exist in neither of these ways, either they do not 
exist, or they exist in some other way. Thus, the subject of our discussion 
will be not on whether they exist but on the way [in which they exist].  
 
a)na/gkh d', ei)/per e)/sti ta\ maqhmatika/, h)\ e)n toi=j ai)sqhtoi=j 
ei)=nai au)ta\ kaqa/per le/gousi/ tinej, h)\ kexwrisme/na tw=n 
ai)sqhtw=n ¨le/gousi de\ kai\ ou(/tw tine/j©: h)\ ei) mhdete/rwj, h)\ ou)k 
ei)si\n h)\ a)/llon tro/pon ei)si/n: w(/sq' h( a)mfisbh/thsij h(mi=n e)/stai 
ou) peri\ tou= ei)=nai a)lla\ peri\ tou= tro/pou.219  
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He enumerates four possibilities: (i) mathematical objects do not exist, (ii) they exist in 
sensible objects, i.e., they are properties of sensible substances, (iii) they exist separated 
from sensible objects, i.e., they are another kind of substance, and (iv) they exist in some 
other way (a)/llon tro/pon ei)si/n). He eliminates the first possibility without further 
argument as incompatible with his scientific realism; insofar as mathematics is a 
legitimate science, it must have existent objects. But since, as we saw, Aristotle denies 
(ii) and (iii) in the previous passage (1077b12-16), only (iv) remains.  
 What kind of beings, then, can mathematical objects be if they are neither 
substances nor properties of substances? We saw that Aristotle’s initial answer to this 
question is that they do not exist absolutely.
220
 But what does he mean by saying that 
something exists ‘not absolutely’? Aristotle elsewhere clarifies that ‘to exist absolutely 
(ei)=nai a(plw=j)’ means ‘to exist in respect of substance (ei)=nai kat’ ou)sian).’221 This 
does not get us anywhere; we have already argued that mathematical objects do not exist 
as substances. But the following passage gives us some hint. 
 
That is why the geometers speak correctly: they talk about existing things 
and they do exist, for what exists does in two ways, either in actuality or as 
material.  
 
dia\ tou=to o)rqw=j oi( gewme/trai le/gousi, kai\ peri\ o)/ntwn 
diale/gontai, kai\ o)/nta e)sti/n: ditto\n ga\r to\ o)/n, to\ me\n 
e)ntelexei/# to\ d' u(likw=j.222  
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Aristotle’s answer is that mathematical objects exist as matter or in a matter-like way 
(u(likw=j). But what he means by ‘matter-like’ is confusing.  
 First, it is far from clear why he uses the term ‘matter-like’ instead of ‘in 
potentiality.’ It is very tempting to read ‘matter-like’ as ‘in potentiality’ because: (i) the 
contrast with ‘actuality’ would make us expect ‘in potentiality’ in the place of ‘matter-
like’; (ii) Aristotle frequently uses the terms ‘matter’ and ‘potentiality’ coextensively,
 223
 
and. (iii) he suggests the idea that mathematical objects exist as matter as an answer to the 
question what kind of being they are if neither substances nor some other category of 
beings in his ontology, where potentiality figures as another mode of being.
224
 A relevant 
passage runs: 
 
…‘being’ and ‘non-being’ are said on the one hand in accordance with the 
figures of the categories and on the other in accordance with the 
potentiality or actuality of these or of their opposites… 
 
...to\ o)\n le/getai kai\ to\ mh\ o)\n to\ me\n kata\ ta\ sxh/mata tw=n 
kathgoriw=n, to\ de\ kata\ du/namin h)\ e)ne/rgeian tou/twn 
h)\ ta)nanti/a...225  
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Nevertheless, it is still quite possible that Aristotle intentionally chooses a different term 
in order to indicate something other than potentiality; and even if by ‘matter’ he means 
‘potentiality’, it is not clear, either, in what sense mathematical objects exist in 
potentiality, since the term ‘potentiality’ also has more than one sense in Aristotle.
226
 
Secondly, if mathematics studies something obtained from a sensible object by 
abstraction, then this should be the form of the sensible object rather than its matter, e.g., 
when a geometer studies a bronze sphere, he attends to its form, namely, the sphericity of 
the bronze, not its bronze matter. Thirdly, unless mathematics is a study of mere 
possibilia, the triangles considered by geometry, for example, must be actually existent 
triangles. If we are to have knowledge of them, it is consonant with Aristotle’s realism 
vis-à-vis the sciences that they must exist. But if mathematical objects do not exist in 
actuality in sensible objects, where do they then exist in actuality?  
  These difficulties arise due to an ambiguity attaching to the concept, ‘matter’. 
This ambiguity, however, provides room for various interpretations. As we will see in the 
next chapter, this short passage has prompted especially voluminous commentary in 
relation to interpreters’ broad sense of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics; on the one 
hand, commentators have sought to make the passage congruent with Aristotle’s other 
assertions, while on the other, they have exploited it more tendentiously as the foundation 
of their own lines of exegesis. 
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 Although it is not easy to work out what it means to say that mathematicals exist 
in a matter-like way or as matter, it is obvious that this passage cannot easily be made to 
conform with the naïve realistic interpretation. If geometry is the study of the properties 
of sensible objects, it must be the study of their shapes; if the dichotomy of form and 
matter is applicable in this case, then objects’ shapes should be identified with their forms, 
not their matter. Thus, Aristotle’s claim that mathematicals exist as matter could be seen 
as textual evidence that Aristotle did not think mathematics is the study of the properties 
of sensible things. 
 
 5. Idealism in Aristotle’s View of Mathematics 
 
What is, then, his alternative view to his naïve realism?  Aristotle elsewhere provides us 
with passages which imply a kind of mathematical idealism. Among these, the following 
is especially informative. 
 
Geometrical constructions are also discovered in actuality because they 
(mathematicians) discover [them] by dividing [the given figures]. If they 
had been already divided, they would have been obvious; but as it is they 
are in there potentially. Why is the triangle two right angles? It is because 
the angles around one point are equal to two right angles. Thus, if the line 
parallel to the side had been drawn up, the reason would have been clear 
immediately on seeing [it]. Why is there universally a right angle in the 
semi-circle? Because if three lines are equal, the two which are the base 
and the one set upright from the centre, it is clear on seeing it to one who 
knows that.  Thus, it is evident that the things in potentiality are 
discovered by being brought into actuality; the reason is that thinking is 
the actuality, so that the potentiality is from actuality, and because of this 
120 
 
they know by constructing, for the individual actuality is posterior in 
generation.  
  
eu(ri/sketai de\ kai\ ta\ diagra/mmata e)nergei/#: diairou=ntej 
ga\r eu(ri/skousin. ei) d' h)=n divrhme/na, fanera\ a)\n h)=n: nu=n d' 
e)nupa/rxei duna/mei. dia\ ti/ du/o o)rqai\ to\ tri/gwnon; o(/ti 
ai( peri\ mi/an stigmh\n gwni/ai i)/sai du/o o)rqai=j. ei) ou)=n a)nh=kto 
h( para\ th\n pleura/n, i)do/nti a)\n h)=n eu)qu\j dh=lon dia\ ti/. e)n 
h(mikukli/% o)rqh\ kaqo/lou dia\ ti/; e)a\n i)/sai trei=j, h(/ te ba/sij 
du/o kai\ h( e)k me/sou e)pistaqei=sa o)rqh/, i)do/nti dh=lon t%= 
e)kei=no ei)do/ti. w(/ste fanero\n o(/ti ta\ duna/mei o)/nta ei)j 
e)ne/rgeian a)go/mena eu(ri/sketai: ai)/tion de\ o(/ti h( no/hsij 
e)ne/rgeia: w(/st' e)c e)nergei/aj h( du/namij, kai\ dia\ tou=to 
poiou=ntej gignw/skousin, u(/steron ga\r gene/sei h( e)ne/rgeia 
h( kat' a)riqmo/n.227  
 
 
This passage is not easy to translate; sentences often omit subjects or objects; the main 
terms such as diagra/mmata or e)ne/rgeia can be read in more than one way, and the 
logical links between the propositions which constitute the whole argument are not 
perspicuous. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the passage supports one possible 
interpretation of the previous passage’s claim, that ‘existing matter-like’ means ‘existing 
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in potentiality.’ I will deal with this interpretation later.
228
 For now it is enough to point 
out that this passage embodies a constructivist aspect of Aristotle’s view on mathematics, 
and that such features are rarely compatible with naïve realism.
 229
  
 The Greek, ‘diagra/mmata’, in the first sentence, can be translated either 
‘geometrical propositions’, ‘geometrical figures’ or ‘geometrical constructions’. Only the 
third option, though, makes sense of the next sentence (ei) d' h)=n divrhme/na, 
fanera\ a)\n h)=n: nu=n d' e)nupa/rxei duna/mei). The subject of this clause is omitted, 
but it is reasonable to take ‘diagra/mmata’ as its subejct. However, it makes sense 
neither to say that ‘geometrical propositions had been divided (h)=n divrhme/na)’; nor 
‘geometrical figures are in there in potentiality’ since, in the given two examples, the 
proofs begin with fully actualized geometrical figures, i.e., a triangle and semicircle.  
 ‘e)nergei/#’ in the first sentence could also mean either ‘act (or activity)’ or 
‘actuality’. Either way, though, sustains the same inference that mathematical objects are 
mentally constructed. If we translate the term as ‘act’, the first sentence can be rendered, 
‘geometrical constructions are discovered by act[s] because they (mathematicians) 
discover them by dividing.
230
 The act in question, then, is that of dividing, that is, we 
discover geometrical constructions by dividing geometrical figures. For instance, in the 
second proof, the geometrical construction is obtained by dividing a semicircle by 
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straight lines. But in the last sentence Aristotle identifies ‘e)ne/rgeia’ with thought 
(h( no/hsij e)ne/rgeia). This suggests that the dividing takes the form not of the physical 
drawing of lines with pen and paper, but rather consists in a purely mental activity. In fact, 
what a geometer talks about is not the physical drawing as such, for this never rigorously 
satisfies the definitions of geometry; and it is furthermore quite possible to do geometry 
without actual drawing. Aristotle shows his agreement with this by saying: 
 
Geometers do not suppose falsehoods, as some people have asserted, 
saying that you should not use falsehoods but that geometers speak falsely 
when they say that a line which is not a foot long is a foot long or that a 
drawn line which is not straight is straight. But geometers do not conclude 
anything from there being this line which he himself has described, but 
what is shown through them.  
 
ou)d' o( gewme/trhj yeudh= u(poti/qetai, w(/sper tine\j e)/fasan, 
le/gontej w(j ou) dei= t%= yeu/dei xrh=sqai, to\n de\ gewme/trhn 
yeu/desqai le/gonta podiai/an th\n ou) podiai/an h)\ eu)qei=an th\n 
gegramme/nhn ou)k eu)qei=an ou)=san. o( de\ gewme/trhj ou)de\n 
sumperai/netai t%= th/nde ei)=nai grammh\n h(\n au)to\j e)/fqegktai, 




This passage has perplexed commentators who adhere to the naïve realistic interpretation. 
But once we accept that Aristotle takes mathematical objects to be mental, the message of 
the whole paragraph is so clear as not to require further commentary: Do not confuse a 
mathematical object with its physical representation. 
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 If, in the preceding contentious passage, we translate ‘e)ne/rgeia’ as ‘actuality,232 
the implication is even more obvious. Since geometrical constructions are found in 
actuality (ta\ diagra/mmata e)nergei/#), and the actuality is thought, it follows that 
geometrical constructions are found in thought. Thus, on either translation, the conclusion 
of the passage will be that geometrical constructions exist in thought. This inference is 
assured by Aristotle’s own statement: 
 
But of what is already a combined whole, for instance, of this circle, or of 
any of sensible or intelligible particulars—I mean by intelligible circles 
mathematical circles and by sensible circle circles of bronze or wood—
there is no definition; but these are known by thought or perception. 
 
tou= de\ suno/lou h)/dh, oi(=on ku/klou toudi\ kai\ tw=n kaq' e(/kasta/ 
tinoj h)\ ai)sqhtou= h)\ nohtou= le/gw de\ nohtou\j me\n oi(=on tou\j 
maqhmatikou/j, ai)sqhtou\j de\ oi(=on tou\j xalkou=j kai\ tou\j 
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culi/nouj tou/twn de\ ou)k e)/stin o(rismo/j, a)lla\ meta\ noh/sewj 
h)\ ai)sqh/sewj gnwri/zontai.233  
 
 
Aristotle, here, clearly distinguishes the mathematical circle from the perceptible; while 
the former is intelligible (ku/loj nohtou=), 234  the latter is perceptible (ku/loj 
ai)sqhtou=). This is in accord with the preceding conclusion that the geometrical 
constructions exist in thought. 
 Further, if those geometrical constructions are constructed by thought, we can 
also argue that geometrical figures in general are able to be constructed by thought. The 
principle of constructing a geometrical construction and a figure is just the same, i.e., 
combining straight lines and circles. In the second example of geometrical construction, 
in fact, two triangles must be posited, suggesting that Aristotle supposes these to be 
available by way of mental activity.  
 If one were unaware of this idealistic aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy of 
mathematics, the following paragraph, noted earlier, would hardly appear Aristotelian: 
 
 
Again, if it is not as they say, what sort of thing must the mathematician be 
supposed to deal with? Clearly not with the things in this world; for none 
of these is the sort of thing which the mathematical sciences investigate. 
  
ei) d' au)= mh\ e)/stin w(j le/gousi, peri\ poi=a qete/on 
pragmateu/esqai to\n maqhmatiko/n; ou) ga\r dh\ peri\ ta\ deu=ro: 
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 ‘Intelligible’ is the translation of the Greek ‘nohtou=’, which was given as thinking (no/hij) in 
the previous passage. 
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tou/twn ga\r ou)qe/n e)stin oi(=on ai( maqhmatikai\ zhtou=si tw=n 




But if it is allowed that Aristotle grants that mathematical objects are constructed by the 
mind, it makes perfect sense for him to say that the objects of mathematics are not in this 
world. 
 
 6. Three Issues concerning the Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of 
Mathematics 
 
It now seems that there as many passages of Aristotle rebutting a naive realistic view of 
mathematics as there are articulating it. As a naïve realist Aristotle maintains that: 
 
 (1) Mathematical objects do not exist separated from sensible substances.  
and 
 (2) Mathematical objects are obtained from sensible by abstraction.  
 
From (1) and (2), as I have shown, we can further infer 
 
 (3) Mathematics studies certain aspects or properties of sensible objects. 
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But we also have noted the idealistic aspect of his concept of mathematics, that is, he also 
argues that: 
 
 (4) Mathematical objects are not in sensible objects 
 (5) Mathematical objects exist only as matter. 
 (6) The actuality of a geometrical construction is a kind of thought.  
and  
(7) Geometrical objects are constructed in thought. 
 
 All the claims, (1) thorough (7), are taken directly from Aristotle’s text. But 
those two groups of claims (1)-(3) and (4)-(7), hardly seem compatible with each other. 
For example, we have seen that (1) and (2) imply that (3) the objects of mathematics are 
properties of sensible objects. (3) is also consistent with idea that the objects of applied 
mathematics are certain properties of sensible things, e.g., the objects of astronomy are 
the mathematical properties of the movements of heavenly bodies in the sky. Yet it has 
been also shown that (4) implies that:  
 
 (8) Mathematical objects are not properties of sensible objects. 
 
(5), (6), and (7) also support (8). But (8) contradicts (3). This means that Aristotle’s 
mathematical text contains or implies propositions that are incompatible one another. We 
may call this the internal consistency problem. 
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 At this point, it seems legimate to throw doubt on whether Aristotle really had 
one unified theory of mathematics; I have proposed the hypothesis he has two different 
theories, one of which was developed later, based on the other, but ultimately diverging 
from it to the point that the two accounts became incompatible.
236
 If my hypothesis is 
right, there can be no interpretation which accommodates both groups of claims. Thus, 
instead of pronouncing on the unity of Aristotle’s mathematical theory in this sense, I will 
review the interpretations suggested by other commentators; if it turns out that none 
succeed in resolving the internal consistency problem, we will have a good reason to 
believe that Aristotle developed two different and incompatible theories. 
 It is appropriate at this stage, though, to clarify once again the problems which 
Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics involves. First, Aristotle explains that 
mathematical objects are something obtained from sensible objects by abstraction; but 
this raises the precision problem, since many geometrical figures are not instantiated in 
sensible objects. Secondly, we also have seen that Aristotle’s mathematical texts seem to 
contain two opposite positions, i.e., naïve realism and idealism. This throws doubt on the 
consistency of his philosophy of mathematics. Besides those two problems, there is one 
further issue to be considered in examining commentators’ interpretations. Any position 
on mathematics set out as an interpretation of Aristotle should be consistent with his 
scientific realism, i.e., mathematical objects as the objects of a science should exist mind-
independently just like the objects of other sciences. But the question whether 
mathematical entities exist can be asked in different senses insofar as different 
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metaphysics invoke different senses of being. For instance, there is a gap between 
Aristotle’s ontology and that of modern physicalism. Aristotle’s ontology is more 
generous: in his ontology, for instance, not only all catergories of beings in actuality
237
 
but also potential beings
238
 are regarded as something existent. Thus, the question of the 
reality of mathematical entities for Aristotle involves two different issues: One, whether 
mathematical objects fit into his own ontological framework as existents; the other, 
whether those objects can be seen as being existent from the other metaphysical 
perspectives (such as physicalism, for instance). I will deal with only the first; my 
concern is whether the truth of mathematics can be accounted for from within Aristotle’s 
own metaphysics. If so, this strengthens the appeal of his metaphysics. Thus, in seeking 
to show that Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics is congruent with his scientific 
realism, we will examine what place there is for mathematical objects in his ontology. 
 In order for any interpretation of Aristotle to be complete, we need to provide a 
solution to these three problems. This means that the three problems will serve as 
standards to be met in the evaluation of any purported unifying interpretation. In fact, 
commentators have struggled with these problems directly or indirectly. In the next 
chapter, I assess some interpretations of Aristotle’ theory of mathematics on the basis of 
whether they deal with these issues successfully. 
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Interpretations of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Geometry 
 
The last chapter identified three main issues to be considered in any interpretation 
of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics.  The first is the precision problem: Aristotle’s 
theory of abstraction implies that mathematical objects are obtained from sensible 
substances; but at the same time sensible particulars lack any properties that might satisfy 
the definitions of geometrical figures.  The second issue concerns the internal 
consistency of Aristotle’s views.  Despite Aristotle’s commitment to mathematical naïve 
realism, some passages in Aristotle’s texts imply rather some form of mathematical 
idealism.  Finally, the idealistic aspect of Aristotle’s views raised the question whether 
his theory of mathematics can be made compatible with his scientific realism.   
A number of commentators have offered interpretations aiming to resolve these 
problems. While these interpretations vary, depending on the aspects of Aristotle’s view 
to which they attend, Mueller distinguishes three principal lines of interpretation 
summarized as follows: (M1) “Mathematical objects are physical objects which the 
mathematician studies by leaving out of account their mathematically irrelevant 
properties.” (M2) “Mathematical objects are embodied in pure extension underlying 
physical objects.” (M3) Mathematical objects exist only in the mind of the mathematician 
who reasons about triangles, angles, etc.
239
 Mueller identifies Lear’s view with (M1); he 
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Without taking issue with Mueller’s distinction between these three main 
positions, I do not think that his comments on each are quite right. While (M1) is the 
main tenet of mathematical naïve realism, as we will see, Lear himself clearly states that 
his own position is a kind of fictionalism, i.e., it holds that a mathematical object is 
constructed out of elements abstracted from sensible objects.  In fact, position (M1) is 
the one that receives support from only few modern commentators because of the first 
two issues mentioned above, namely, the precision problem and the internal consistency 
problem;
241
 whereas (M3) would seem to approximate well to the view that Hintikka 
develops and that, I will argue, deserves more attention than it receives.  
Since I have already examined the naïve realistic interpretation, I will pass over 




(M1’) The basic elements of geometrical figures, such as circles and 
straight lines, are abstracted from sensible objects, and all geometrical 
figures are constructed out of them.  
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 Apostle interprets Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics as naïve mathematical realism. He 
argues that, for Aristotle, mathematics is the science of quantities of sensible objects. See Apostle 
(1952) pp. 14 and 28. 
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In addition to this, I will consider another possible position, which is based on the 
assumption of (M2): 
  
  




The four positions under review in this chapter, then, will be (M1’), (M2), (M2’), and 
(M3). 
 Unlike the naive realistic interpretation, all of these interpretations admit that the 
existence of mathematical objects is mind-dependent in some way. This admission is 
unavoidable if we are to accommodate the idealistic aspect of Aristotle’s theory of 
mathematics. Keeping in mind the three issues raised above, let us begin by examining 
position (M1’).   
 
 1. Realistic Constructivism 
 
In his paper, ‘Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics’, Lear suggests a solution to the 
precision problem. Along with most modern Aristotelian scholars, Lear agrees that 
Aristotle’s abstraction is a conceptual procedure; it filters out predicates that happen to be 
true of an object under a ceratin aspect.
242
  For instance, if geometry studies a bronze 
isosceles triangle qua triangle, the qua-operator filters out ‘being brazen’ and ‘being 
isosceles’.  But, as we have seen, if geometry is the study of those properties of sensible 
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objects that remain after such conceptual filtration, the precision problem becomes 
unavoidable. Sensible objects cannot precisely instantiate forms of geometrical figures. 
While recognizing this problem,
243
 Lear argues that it is misconceived to suppose that a 
first claim, that geometrical objects are some properties of sensible particulars, needs to 
involve a second claim, that every geometrical figure has a physical instantiation. Rather, 
only the basic geometrical elements, out of which more complicated geometrical figures 
can be constructed, require physical instantiation.
244
  For example, to construct a triangle, 
we need only three straight lines; so if we can obtain some minimal form of straightness 
(i.e., a straight line) out of physical objects by abstraction, we can construct a triangle.  
How many elements will we need, then, in order to construct every geometrical 
figure?  In Euclidian geometry, all geometrical objects except points and curved lines 
can be made from straight lines, circles, and spheres. But since, in Aristotle’s view, points 
exist only as the extremities of lines
245
 and a curve is no more than a combination of a 
straight line and a circle, there is no need to posit points or curved lines apart from circles 
and straight lines.   
It turns out that the thesis that every geometrical figure has its physical 
counterpart is neither a philosophically plausible claim, nor one that Aristotle consistently 
holds.  As the previous chapter made clear, though, Aristotle does believe that there are 
perfect physical instantiations of circularity, straightness, and sphericity.  Thus, Lear 
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argues, we can abstract every basic element of geometry from physical objects, out of 
which all geometrical figures can be constructed. 
Lear’s interpretation has several merits over that of the naïve realists’. First, it 
can avoid the problem of precision.  Since each geometrical figure is constructed from 
the basic geometrical elements, there is no need for every geometrical figure to be 
instantiated i.e. in physical form individually.  But geometry can still be said to be a 
study of sensible physical objects; the basic geometrical elements out of which 
geometrical objects are made are acquired from sensible particulars through abstraction.  
Secondly, this interpretation provides a partial solution to the internal consistency 
problem.  We saw that Aristotle’s theory of geometry contains seemingly incompatible 
assertions.  For instance, on the one hand, Aristotle argues that geometrical figures are 
constructed and are not in sensible objects. On the other, he maintains that geometry is a 
study concerned with sensible objects, and that mathematical objects are properties of 
sensible objects obtained by means of abstraction. But even if we acknowledge 
Aristotle’s second claim, there is still a sense in which he can say that a geometrical 
figure is constructed, since it is constructed out of basic elements; the figure is not itself 
in a sensible, though its elements are. Nevertheless, geometry remains a study concerned 
with sensible objects because (i) it studies such properties of sensibles as circularity and 
straightness, and (ii) all geometrical figures are composed of these basic elements 
obtained from sensible things.   
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In addition, this interpretation also provides a possible explanation for Aristotle’s 
perplexing statement that mathematical objects exist only as matter.
246
  One meaning of 
‘matter’ in Aristotle’s work is the ‘parts of a whole’.  In Met., VII, dealing with the 
question of priority in formulae, he uses ‘matter’ to designate the parts into which the 
whole is divided. He says that:  
 
 
But the formula of a right angle is not divided into the formula of the acute, but 
[rather] the formula of the acute includes that of the right angle; for one who 
defines the acute uses the right; for acute is less than a right angle. The circle 
and the semicircle also hold the same relation; for the semicircle is defined by 
the circle and the finger by the whole body; for a finger is such a part of a man. 
Thus, all parts which are matter, into which a thing is divided as into matter, are 
posterior.  
 
o( de\ th=j o)rqh=j lo/goj ou) diairei=tai ei)j o)cei/aj lo/gon, a)ll' <o(> th=j 
o)cei/aj ei)j o)rqh/n: xrh=tai ga\r o( o(rizo/menoj th\n o)cei=an tv= o)rqv=: 
e)la/ttwn ga\r o)rqh=j h( o)cei=a. o(moi/wj de\ kai\ o( ku/kloj 
kai\ to\ h(miku/klion e)/xousin: to\ ga\r h(miku/klion t%= ku/kl% 
o(ri/zetai kai\ o( da/ktuloj t%= o(/l%: to\ ga\r toio/nde me/roj a)nqrw/pou 





This meaning of ‘part’ is found in another passage where Aristotle distinguishes five 
senses of parts,
248
 one of which is ‘the elements’ into which the whole is divided, or of 
which it consists.  In the case of the bronze sphere or the bronze cube, for instance, he 
takes both the bronze and the characteristic angles as parts, further applying the 
distinction between parts and the whole to formulae.  The elements in the formula which 
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explains a thing are regarded as parts of the whole formula.  In either meaning, the basic 
geometrical elements may be regarded as parts of geometrical figures.  For instance, a 
triangle consists of three straight lines; it is defined as being a plane figure contained by 
three straight lines.
249
  On this understanding, the basic geometrical elements may be 
understood as a kind of matter, in other words the constitutive matter of a geometrical 
figure.  Since what we can obtain from sensible objects by abstraction are only the basic 
elements of geometrical figures, it makes sense to say that mathematical objects exist 
only as matter. 
In spite of its advantages, Lear’s interpretation has two main problems.  The first 
is that it is not necessary to acquire the basic geometrical elements from sensible objects 
by abstraction in order to construct geometrical figures; if we can construct a figure, the 
basic element can be constructed as well.  The second is that the interpretation turns 
Aristotelian mathematical objects into fictional entities. To assimilate Aristotle’s position 
to fictionalism is problematic because: (i) fictionalism is not compatible with Aristotle’s 
scientific realism, and (ii) assuming fictionalism, there would be no way to account for 
the truth of mathematics given Aristotle’s own theory of truth.  Let us consider each 
problem in turn.  
Lear’s account of Aristotle’s theory of mathematics can be summarized in the 
following three theses:  
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(1) It is not possible to acquire every geometrical form from sensible objects by 
means of abstraction,  
(2) We can obtain the basic geometrical elements such as circles and straight lines 
through abstraction, 
and  
(3) It is possible to construct every geometrical figure from the basic elements.  
 
But if (3) is true, why can we not construct the basic elements as well?  Although the 
definition of triangle includes the concepts of straight line and figure, neither of those 
concepts contains the concept of triangle. Thus, if (3) is admitted and triangularity cannot 
be obtained from sensible objects by abstraction, it should be the case that the concept or 
form of a triangle is created by or imposed on the elements by our mind.  If our mind 
has such a capacity, then there is no reason to believe that we cannot also create the 
concepts of basic geometrical elements such as ‘line’, ‘circle’, and ‘point’, as well.  For 
instance, a straight line is defined as a line which lies evenly with the points on itself.
250
  
Thus, if we know the concepts of line and point, we can also have the concept of a 
straight line.  But since ‘line’ and ‘point’ are respectively defined as ‘breadthless length’ 
and ‘that which has no part,’ the concept of a ‘triangle’ only requires us to know the 
concepts of ‘breadth,’ ‘length,’ and ‘part.’  If this is so, Lear’s effort to accommodate 
Aristotle’s naïve realism in his interpretation by showing that there exist perfect physical 
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instantiations of the basic geometrical elements, out of which every geometrical figure 
can be constructed, is pointless; that fact does not make any difference.  
The second objection is more crucial.  Lear argues that a geometrical figure is 
constructed from the elements abstracted from sensible objects. However, if a 
geometrical object like a triangle is constructed (or created at any rate), it is hard to see in 
what sense it exists. Although being has broader meaning in Aristotle’s metaphysics than 
in modern physicalists’, there seems to be no room for mentally constructed things in his 
ontology.  Suppose that we mentally imagine a pink elephant.  Suppose, further, that 
the appearance of that pink elephant is obtained from an actual elephant by abstraction 
and its color pink is also an actual color. Then, Lear would say that the elephant is 
composed of elements abstracted from actual sensible objects.  Should we then say that 
the pink elephant exists?  We can note here that most mythical animals, such as unicorns 
and chimeras, are composed of elements obtained from actual animals.  If we cannot say 
that the pink elephant or any mythical animal exists, then, a triangle cannot be said to 
exist either.  The pink elephant, the unicorn, the chimera and the triangle are all 
mentally constructed out of elements abstracted from the actual world.  Thus, Lear’s 
interpretation makes Aristotle’s mathematical objects fictional entities.  It is interesting 
that Lear himself recognizes this implication. 
 
 
There may be no purely geometrical objects, but they are a useful fiction, 
because they are an obvious abstraction from features of the physical 
world…talk of nonphysical mathematical objects is fiction, one that may 
138 
 






Lear even compares Aristotle’s position with Field’s fictionalism, and argues that they 
share the feature of not positing mathematical entities beyond physical objects.
252
   
However, there are good reasons to resist the fictionalist interpretation.  First of 
all, it is contradictory with Aristotle’s scientific realism.  We saw that, for Aristotle, 
knowledge is always of something existent; he agrees with Plato that the objects of every 
science should exist.  Indeed, it is one of main tenets of Aristotle’s philosophy of 
mathematics that mathematical objects exist.
253
  This point has been discussed 
sufficiently in the previous chapter.  Thus, if there is no knowledge of non-being, and 
mathematical objects are fictional entities, there can be no mathematical knowledge.  As 
Apostle points out, for Aristotle ‘sciences are concerned with what exists and not with 
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what does not exist’;
254
 so, if the objects of mathematics are fictions or non-beings, 
mathematics is not a science in the Aristotelian sense. But mathematics is Aristotle’s 
prime example of a science. 
Second, if mathematical objects are fictional, there is way no way to explain 
mathematical truth in a way that is consistent with Aristotle’s general concept of truth.  
The answer to the question of how mathematics can be true in Aristotle, if the objects of 
its study do not exist, will depend on what kind of theory of truth Aristotle is taken to 
hold.  But it is acknowledged that concerning the concept of truth, Aristotle is faithful to 
‘what is (to\ o)\n)’:  
 
 
This will be plain if we first define what truth and falsehood are: to say 
that what is is not, or what is not is, is false, while to say that what is that 
it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true; and therefore he who says that 
a thing is or thing is not, will say either what is true or what is false.  
     
dh=lon de\ prw=ton me\n o(risame/noij ti/ to\ a)lhqe\j kai\ yeu=doj. 
to\ me\n ga\r le/gein to\ o)\n mh\ ei)=nai h)\ to\ mh\ o)\n ei)=nai yeu=doj, 
to\ de\ to\ o)\n ei)=nai kai\ to\ mh\ o)\n mh\ ei)=nai a)lhqe/j, w(/ste 
kai\ o( le/gwn ei)=nai h)\ mh\ a)lhqeu/sei h)\ yeu/setai.255   
 
 
This paragraph embraces the basic idea of a correspondence theory of truth, i.e., that truth 
is a certain relation between a saying (le/gein) and reality (to\ o)\n).  But, since ‘ei)=nai’ 
is multiply ambiguous in Greek, in particular between existential, verdical and 
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predicative senses, ‘to\ o)\n’ could be variously translated into ‘that which exists’, ‘that 
which is the case’, or ‘is so-and-so’.  So the significance of to\ o)\n remains elusive. 
Nevertheless, in the Categories where Aristotle talks of “things” underlying an 
affirmative or negative statement, we find what on the part of to\ o)\n is responsible for the 
truth of some statement.
256
 He says:  
 
 
For affirmation is an affirmative statement and a negation a negative 
statement, but none of the things underlying affirmation and negation is 
a statement. But these are also said to be opposed to one another as 
affirmation and negation, for in these cases, too, the way of opposition is 
the same. For in the way an affirmation is opposed to a negation, e.g., 
‘he is sitting’—he is not sitting’, so are opposed also the actual things 
underlying each, his sitting—his not sitting.   
  
h( me\n ga\r kata/fasij lo/goj e)sti\ katafatiko\j 
kai\ h( a)po/fasij lo/goj a)pofatiko/j, tw=n de\ u(po\ th\n 
kata/fasin h)\ a)po/fasin ou)de/n e)sti lo/goj. le/getai 
de\ kai\ tau=ta a)ntikei=sqai a)llh/loij w(j kata/fasij 
kai\ a)po/fasij: kai\ ga\r e)pi\ tou/twn o( tro/poj th=j a)ntiqe/sewj 
o( au)to/j: w(j ga/r pote h( kata/fasij pro\j th\n a)po/fasin 
a)nti/keitai, oi(=on to\ ka/qhtai ou) ka/qhtai, ou(/tw kai\ to\ u(f' 
e(ka/teron pra=gma a)nti/keitai, to\ kaqh=sqai mh\ kaqh=sqai.257 
 
 
Since what underlies the statement “he is sitting” is the fact that he is sitting, it can be 
said that, for Aristotle, truth is the correspondence between a statement and a fact.  
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Although truth is a relation between two terms, a statement and a fact, actual facts are 
prior to statements’ being true: 
 
For if there is a man, the statement wherein we say that there is a man is 
true, and, conversely, if the statement wherein we say that there is a man 
is true, there is a man.  But the true statement is in no way the cause of 
the actual thing’s existence, whereas the actual thing seems in some way 
the cause of the statement’s being true; for the statement is called true or 
false by virtue of the actual thing’s existing.  
ei) ga\r e)/stin a)/nqrwpoj, a)lhqh\j o( lo/goj %(= le/gomen o(/ti e)/stin 
a)/nqrwpoj: kai\ a)ntistre/fei ge, ei) ga\r a)lhqh\j o( lo/goj %(= 
le/gomen o(/ti e)/stin a)/nqrwpoj, e)/stin a)/nqrwpoj: e)/sti de\ o( me\n 
a)lhqh\j lo/goj ou)damw=j ai)/tioj tou= ei)=nai to\ pra=gma, 
to\ me/ntoi pra=gma fai/netai/ pwj ai)/tion tou= ei)=nai a)lhqh= to\n 
lo/gon: t%= ga\r ei)=nai to\ pra=gma h)\ mh\ a)lhqh\j o( lo/goj 
h)\ yeudh\j le/getai.258 
 
 
Thus, Aristotle maintains that “statements are true according to how the actual things are 
(o(moi/wj oi( lo/goi a)lhqei=j w(/sper ta\ pra/gmata).”259  On the basis of this 
concept of truth, it seems obvious that if mathematical objects do not exist or are fictional, 
mathematics cannot be true at all.
260
  If triangles do not exist, for instance, there cannot 
                                                           
258
 Ibid., 12, 14b14-22. 
259
 Int., 9, 19a.33. 
260
 Aristotle’s position on the truth values of statements of non-being is not clear. He seems to 
argue that there is no true statement of non-being, when he says that “But it might especially very 
well seem that such a thing occurs in the case of contraries said in combination, for ‘Socrates is 
well’ being contrary to ‘Socrates is sick’. But not even with these is it always for one to be true 
and the other false. For if Socrates exists one will be true and one false, but if he does not exist, 
both will be false; neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ will be true if Socrates himself 
does not exist all. As for possession and privation, if he does not exist at all, neither is true, but if 
he does, not always one or the other is true.  For ‘Socrates has sight’ is opposed to ‘Socrates is 
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be any actual facts about triangles; and if there are no such facts, no statement about 
triangles can be true since there is no fact to correspond to it.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
blind’ as possession to privation; and if he exists it is not necessary for one or the other to be true 
or false (when he has not yet grown to have it both are false), while if Socrates does not exist at 
all, then both are again false, both ‘he has sight’ and ‘he is blind’ (ou) mh\n a)lla\ ma/lista 
do/ceien a)\n to\ toiou=to sumbai/nein e)pi\ tw=n kata\ sumplokh\n e)nanti/wn legome/nwn, 
to\ ga\r u(giai/nein Swkra/th t%= nosei=n Swkra/th e)nanti/on e)sti/n, a)ll' ou)d' 
e)pi\ tou/twn a)nagkai=on a)ei\ qa/teron me\n a)lhqe\j qa/teron de\ yeu=doj ei)=nai: o)/ntoj 
me\n ga\r Swkra/touj e)/stai to\ me\n a)lhqe\j to\ de\ yeu=doj, mh\ o)/ntoj de\ a)mfo/tera 
yeudh=: ou)/te ga\r to\ nosei=n Swkra/th ou)/te to\ u(giai/nein a)lhqe\j au)tou= mh\ o)/ntoj 
o(/lwj tou= Swkra/touj. e)pi\ de\ th=j sterh/sewj kai\ th=j e(/cewj mh\ o)/ntoj ge o(/lwj 
ou)de/teron a)lhqe/j, o)/ntoj de\ ou)k a)ei\ qa/teron a)lhqe/j: to\ ga\r o)/yin e)/xein Swkra/th 
t%= tuflo\n ei)=nai Swkra/th a)nti/keitai w(j ste/rhsij kai\ e(/cij, kai\ o)/ntoj ge ou)k 
a)nagkai=on qa/teron a)lhqe\j ei)=nai h)\ yeu=doj, o(/te ga\r mh/pw pe/fuken e)/xein, 
a)mfo/tera yeudh=, mh\ o)/ntoj de\ o(/lwj tou= Swkra/touj kai\ ou(/tw yeudh= a)mfo/tera, 
kai\ to\ o)/yin au)to\n e)/xein kai\ to\ tuflo\n ei)=nai(Cat. 10, 13b12-27)).”  
 At the same time, Aristotle accepts that there can be true statements of non-being:, “But 
with an affirmation and negation, whether he exists or not, one will always be false and the other 
true. For ‘Socrates is sick’ and ‘Socrates is not sick’: If he exists it is clear that one or the other of 
them will be true or false, and similarly if he does not exist; if he does not exist ‘he is sick’ is 
false but ‘he is not sick’ true. Thus it would be distinctive of these alone that one of two is always 
true or false, so far as affirmation and negation are opposed (e)pi\ de/ ge th=j katafa/sewj 
kai\ th=j a)pofa/sewj a)ei/, e)a/n te v)= e)a/n te mh\ v)=, to\ me\n e(/teron e)/stai yeu=doj 
to\ de\ e(/teron a)lhqe/j: to\ ga\r nosei=n Swkra/th kai\ to\ mh\ nosei=n Swkra/th, o)/ntoj te 
au)tou= fanero\n o(/ti to\ e(/teron au)tw=n a)lhqe\j h)\ yeu=doj, kai\ mh\ o)/ntoj o(moi/wj: 
to\ me\n ga\r nosei=n mh\ o)/ntoj yeu=doj, to\ de\ mh\ nosei=n a)lhqe/j. w(/ste e)pi\ mo/nwn 
tou/twn i)/dion a)\n ei)/h to\ a)ei\ qa/teron au)tw=n a)lhqe\j h)\ yeu=doj ei)=nai, o(/sa w(j 
kata/fasij kai\ a)po/fasij a)nti/keitai (Ibid., 13b27-35)).” Since the exclusive middle is 
posited as an axiom in Aristotle’s logical system, for any proposition, Pa, if Pa is not true, not-Pa 
must be true. Thus, if a sentence ‘a is P’ is false, its contradictory, ‘a is not P’ must be true even if 
a does not exist. 
 Although, in a sense, there can be a true statement of non-being, it is noteworthy that 
Aristotle never allows true affirmative statements of non-being; only negative statements are 
taken as examples of true statements of non-being. Thus, a possible interpretation would be that 
for Aristotle if a does not exist, any affirmative statement of a is false, and a negative statement 
can be true only when its contradictory is false. 
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These considerations, in effect, render inappropriate Lear’s comparison of 
Aristotle’s view to Field’s fictionalism.  Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics starts out 
from a quite different motivation from that of the fictionalists.  Aristotle’ problem was 
how to account for the truth of mathematics without positing Platonic entities within his 
metaphysics.  In contrast, Field’s strategy is to avoid any ontological commitment to 
mathematical objects, by denying that mathematics is true.
261
  Field insists that there is 
no need to have a model for mathematics since the universal applicability of mathematics 
can be explained without mathematics’ being true.  Thus, to assimilate Aristotle’s view 
to Field’s fictionalism amounts to saying that Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics does 
not show that mathematics is true after all.  This is exactly the opposite of Aristotle’s 
position.   
Field argues that the utility of mathematics can be explained in terms of 
‘conservativeness.’ For Field, mathematics is conservative in the sense that “any 
inference from nominalistic premises to a nominalistic conclusion that can be made with 
the help of mathematics could be made (usually more long-windedly) without it.”
262
  
Thus, fictionalism can be seen as a reductionists’ program which attempts to reduce 
mathematical facts to physical facts, which is why fictionalism argues against the 
existence of mathematical objects.  However, Aristotle not only accepts the existence of 
mathematical objects, but also maintains that some mathematical objects are neither 
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sensible substances nor some of their properties.  In that sense, it could be said that 
Aristotle admits that there exist mathematical facts irreducible to physical ones.   
So far, three objections to Lear’s fictionalistic interpretation have been 
considered: First, it is not compatible with Aristotle’s scientific realism. In particular, 
Lear’s fictionalism is contrary to Aristotle’s commitment to the existence of 
mathematical objects.  Secondly, if mathematical objects are fictional entities, there is 
no way to explain how mathematics can be true in Aristotle’s metaphysics.  Thirdly, 
Lear’s comparison of Aristotle’s view to Field’s fictionalism is not appropriate for: (i) 
while the former aims to prove the truth of mathematics, the latter denies it, and (ii) Field 
argues that there is no mathematical fact beyond physical facts, whereas Aristotle rather 
argues that  mathematical objects are not properties of sensibles; they are not in 
sensibles.   
Unfortunately, Lear does not properly tackle the first objection; indeed, given his 
position, there seems to be no way for him to handle the conflict between his fictionalistic 
interpretation and Aristotle’s commitment to mathematical realism.  Lear does not seem 
to have considered the second problem associated with the third objection, either.  We 
saw that Aristotle’s view of geometry has two opposing tendencies: naïve realism and 
idealism.  Many commentators on Aristotle’s view of geometry tend to focus on one of 
these tendencies at the expense of the other, leading to tendentious readings that ignore 
large portions of the text at odds with their interpretations.
263
  Lear is one such.  In 
arguing for the existence of perfect physical instantiations of mathematical objects, he 
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passes over the passages in which Aristotle denies the immanency of mathematical 
objects in sensible objects; at the same time, maintaining the fictionality of mathematicals 
in Aristotle, he ignores places where Aristotle explicitly states his mathematical realism. 
Against the second objection, Lear argues that the fictionality of mathematical 
objects does not harm the truth of mathematics.  He recognizes that, unlike fictionalism, 
Aristotle’s theory aims at explaining the truth of mathematics: 
 
 
The great virtue of Aristotle’s account is that Aristotle also takes great 
pains to explain how mathematics can be true. A conservative extension 
of physical theory needs not merely to be consistent; it can be true. 
Aristotle tries to show how geometry and arithmetic can be thought of as 
true, even though the existence of separated mathematical objects, 






But how can a theory of fictional entities be true for Aristotle?  Lear attempts to 
reconcile Aristotle’s realism with his fictionalistic interpretation as follows: 
 
 
The key to explain the truth of a mathematical statement lies in 
explaining how it can be useful. Aristotle considered the truth of 
geometry to be useful because there are clear paths which lead one from 
the physical world to the world of geometrical objects. There may be no 
purely geometrical objects, but they are a useful fiction, because they are 
an obvious abstraction from features of the physical world…Thus, to 
explain the usefulness and applicability of mathematics we have to 
follow Aristotle and appeal far more strongly to the existence of a bridge 
between the physical world and the world of mathematical objects than 
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265






Lear seems to argue here that mathematics is true because it is useful; he maintains that 
we can explain its truth by considering how it is useful.  Further, he argues that 
mathematics is applicable to the physical world because there is a bridge between the 
physical world and mathematics.  But what is this bridge, and how does its existence 
account for the truth of mathematics?  For Lear: 
 
 
The important point is that direct links between geometrical practice and 
the physical world are maintained. Even in the case where the geometer 
constructs a figure in thought, one which perhaps has never been 
physically instantiated, that figure is constructed from elements which 
are direct abstractions from the physical world. Otherwise it will remain 







Lear’s stresses the ‘direct links’ between geometrical practice and the physical world that 
arise because geometrical figures are constructed out of elements obtained from sensible 
objects.  To evaluate this argument, we can again consider the example of the pink 
elephant.  We might say that there is a direct link between the pink elephant and the 
physical world; the description of its appearance is the description of an actual elephant.  
So, if there is a theory of a pink elephant, a part of the theory will seem to hold good of 
the actual world too.  Mutatis mutandis, it might be argued that there is such a direct link 
                                                           
266
 Ibid., p. 181. 
147 
 
between geometry and the physical world; geometry can be applied to the actual world to 
the extent that it deals with the actual properties of sensible objects.   
But even if that were true, the geometrical knowledge that might be applicable to 
the actual world will be very limited; all theorems about geometrical objects other than 
circles, straight lines, spheres and points, would have nothing to do with the physical 
world; e.g., since there is no physical instantiation of a triangle, theorems about triangles 
would not true of the physical world.  In this regard, a triangle would be better likened 
to a unicorn or chimera than to a pink elephant; while the pink elephant has the same 
shape as an actual elephant, there is no physical object whose shape is precisely the same 
as that of a triangle in geometry.  Thus, the link between the physical world and 
geometrical objects is as weak as that between physical objects and a unicorn; every 
element of unicorns is obtained from physical objects by abstraction.   
Moreover, whether or not there is such link between geometry and the physical 
world, it remains true that for Aristotle mathematical objects besides the basic 
geometrical elements do not exist in the actual world.  And if they do not exist, there is 
no mathematical fact which could correspond to statements concerning the mathematical 
objects.  For Aristotle, as we have seen, for a sentence, ‘a is P,’ to be true, it is necessary 
that there exist a and P in the actual world.  Thus, for Aristotle, if triangles do not exist, 
a theorem concerning triangles can be no more true than any description of a unicorn; e.g., 
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‘A triangle has the sum of two right angles’ would be no more true than ‘A unicorn has 
one horn’; and, as we have seen, statements like the latter must be false for Aristotle.
267
    
Let us now consider Lear’s response to the third objection.  As Lear is well 
aware, Field denies the truth of mathematics whereas Aristotle does not.  But Lear 
argues that this difference is caused by Field’s mistaken view that mathematics can be 
true only if the objects of mathematics exist.  In Lear’s view, mathematics can be true 




Field agrees with Aristotle that there are no separated mathematical 
objects, but thinks that for that reason alone mathematics is not true.  
From an Aristotelian perspective, Field looks overly committed to the 
assumptions of referential semantics: in particular, to the assumption that 
the way to explain mathematical truth via the existence of mathematical 
object. One can understand how mathematics can be true, Aristotle 






Here again Lear appeals to his claim that mathematical truth consists in its applicability.  
But this claim is not Aristotle’s—in fact, it is not even Aristotelian.  To be sure, 
Aristotle treats the applicability of mathematics as important.  But he mentions it only to 
dispute mathematical Platonism, not to explain the truth of mathematics: If we posit 
mathematicals separated from sensible objects, there is no way to explain how the science 
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of mathematics is applicable to the sensible world.
269
  For Aristotle, mathematics is 
applicable to the physical world because it is true of the physical world, not the other way 
around. And we saw that because of the precision problem, he has trouble explaining just 
how mathematics is true of the physical world.  But he nowhere attempts to establish the 
truth of mathematics on the basis of its applicability.  The idea that mathematics is true 
because it is applicable, does not correspond with Aristotle’s theory of truth in general; 
Aristotle never mentions applicability as a necessary condition for the truth of a statement 
about an object, a, whereas, the existence of a is an essential prerequisite for its truth.  
Thus, although Lear criticizes Field for overly committing to “the assumption that the 
way to explain mathematical truth is via the existence of mathematical objects,” for 
Aristotle, the existence of mathematical objects is a necessary condition for a 
mathematical statements’ being true. And it is one of the main claims Aristotle makes 
about mathematical objects that they exist.       
In recent years, there has been a tendency to interpret Aristotle as adopting a kind 
of fictionalism.
270
  Thus, fictionalists argue that Aristotle’s geometricals are fictional 
entities. For these interpreters, though, the fictionality of mathematical objects does not 
undermine the truth of mathematics in Aristotle.
271
  Putting aside the question of the 
philosophical plausibility of mathematical fictionalism in its own right, a convincing 
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fictionalist interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of mathematics must address 
aforementioned problems, namely: (i) whether such an interpretation is compatible with 
Aristotle’s scientific realism, and (ii) whether fictionalism can provide an account of the 
truth of mathematics consistent with Aristotle’s theory of truth.  Although the detail of 
various fictionalists interpretations of Aristotle’s own theory of mathematics vary, all 
fictionalists endorse the claim that, in Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics, the 
existence of mathematical objects is not necessary in order to explain mathematical 
truth.
272
 I have argued that such a conception of truth is not Aristotle’s, and is not 
consistent with Aristotle’s philosophy. 
 
2. Idealistic Constructivism 
 
The position we will examine in this section is that mathematical objects are constructed 
by imposing mathematical forms on pure extension obtained from physical objects by 
abstraction.  This interpretation is distinguished from Lear’s in that, while Lear argues 
that “not only the spatial ‘matter’ of geometrical constructions and theorems is supplied 
by the sensible, physical realm, but also at least the basic elements of the ‘formal’ aspect 
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of these constructions and theorems,”
273
 on the view of this second position, only the 
matter of geometrical objects is acquired from sensible objects by abstraction. 
The two positions diverge in their interpretations of the statement that 
mathematical objects exist as matter (ta\ maqhmatika\ e)/sti u(likw=j). As we have 
seen, Lear interprets the ‘matter’ in the phrase as meaning the parts of which the whole is 
composed, namely, the elements of geometrical figures.  But this alternative position 
reads the statement to mean that only the matter of mathematical objects (h( u(/lh tw=n 
maqhmatiw=n) exists in sensible objects. The interpretation is developed by spelling out 
what the matter of mathematical objects is.   
Aristotle certainly accepts the existence of the matter of mathematical objects, 
since he asks a question which would make no sense if he did not: 
 
In general one might raise the question, to which science it belongs to 
discuss difficulties concerning the matter of the objects of mathematics. 
Not to natural science because the whole business of the natural science is 
with the things that have in themselves a principle of movement and rest. 
 
o(/lwj d' a)porh/seie/ tij a)\n poi/aj e)sti\n e)pisth/mhj 
to\ diaporh=sai peri\ th=j tw=n maqhmatikw=n u(/lhj. ou)/te ga\r th=j 
fusikh=j, dia\ to\ peri\ ta\ e)/xonta e)n au(toi=j a)rxh\n kinh/sewj 
kai\ sta/sewj th\n tou= fusikou= pa=san ei)=nai pragmatei/an, 
ou)de\ mh\n th=j skopou/shj.274  
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In this passage, he assumes the existence of the matter of mathematical objects, and also 
argues that the matter does not have in itself a principle of movement and rest.  This is 
consistent with his thesis that mathematical objects are not changeable.
275
   
A few reasons have been suggested for the necessity of positing mathematical 
matter in Aristotle’s metaphysics. First of all, a mathematical figure is not a pure form;
276
  
for Aristotle, the only pure form is God, as defined in Met. III, 9.
277
 If a figure does not 
exist as a pure form, there must be the matter in which the form of the figure is 
embodied.
278
 Aristotle says, “There is some matter in everything which is not an essence 
and a bare form but a ‘this.”
279
 Secondly, the matter of geometrical figures is required for 
individuating the qualitatively identical figures. In the practice of geometry, a geometrical 
figure is treated as an individual, e.g., a geometer deals with this or that triangle rather 
than triangularity itself. And it is common in geometry to treat two or more exactly 
congruent figures, e.g., two semicircles in a circle; the form of the two semicircles is the 
                                                           
275
 Met. III, 2, 997b13-25; 5, 1002a32-b10, etc.  
276
 For this point, see Gaukroger (1980) p188; Hussey (1982) p.130.  
277
 A part of the human soul, nou=j, is also matterless.  But that does not mean that the whole 
human soul is independent of sensible matter. 
278
 According to Ross, in Met., VII, 10, Aristotle lists four kinds of entities as candidates for 
substance: (i) the pure form, (ii) the intelligible individual, (iii) the material universal, and (iv) the 
sensible individual. Of these, Ross argues, only (i) does not contain matter; he further identifies 
(ii) with a mathematical object. See Ross (1924) Vol. I, p.c.  
279
 Met. VII, 11, 1036b35-37a2.  Mueller says, “However, some of the things Aristotle says 
about geometric objects suggest an analysis in terms of form and matter, and, because of the 
intuitive similarity between geometric objects and ordinary things, such an analysis has a certain 
plausibility. For, if ordinary things can be thought of as compounds of theoretically separable but 
actually inseparable properties and qualityless matter, why shouldn’t geometric objects be 




same but the semicircles are not identical with each other, i.e., they are numerically 
different. The fact that two exactly congruent figures can exist provides the second 
ground for assuming the matter of mathematical objects. Since their form is exactly the 
same, if the matter of the figures did not exist, there would be no way to individuate one 
from the other.
280
   
The third reason is related to his thesis of the inseparability of mathematical 
objects. If there is any thesis Aristotle consistently maintains in his philosophy of 
mathematics, it is that mathematical objects cannot exist by themselves, i.e., they are not 
substances.  Thus, for Aristotle, “number and shape are always properties, or properties, 
of something”
281
; and there must be something of which geometrical objects exist as the 
properties, namely, some substratum of mathematical properties; and that is the matter of 
geometrical figures. 
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It seems clear that Aristotle identifies the matter of geometrical figures with 
intelligible matter.
282
 He says: 
 
 
But matter is unknowable in itself. And some matter is sensible and some 
intelligible; sensible [matter], for instance bronze and wood and all 
changeable matter, and intelligible matter, that which is present in sensible 
things not qua sensible, e.g., mathematical objects.  
 
h( d' u(/lh a)/gnwstoj kaq' au(th/n. u(/lh de\ h( me\n ai)sqhth/ e)stin 
h( de\ nohth/, ai)sqhth\ me\n oi(=on xalko\j kai\ cu/lon kai\ o(/sh 
kinhth\ u(/lh, nohth\ de\ h( e)n toi=j ai)sqhtoi=j u(pa/rxousa mh\ v(= 








Concerning mathematical matter, we have so far confirmed two claims as being 
Aristotle’s own on a textual basis: (i) that Aristotle accepts the existence of mathematical 
matter as distinguished from sensible matter, and (ii) that Aristotle identifies the 
mathematical matter with intelligible matter (u(/lh nohth/).285  What is not clear from 
the text is first, why mathematical matter must be something other than sensible matter, 
and secondly, what intelligible matter is—in the text it only figures as the matter of 
geometrical figures.   
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In response to the first question, an account we can find in the previous two 
passages (1059b14-18; 1036a8-12) is that, while mathematical objects are unchangeable, 
sensible matter such as bronze or wood is subject to change; so that sensible matter 
cannot be the matter of mathematical objects.  However, for Aristotle, geometry is the 
study of a sensible object not qua changeable but qua limited extension, such as line, 
figure or solid.  Thus, according to my analysis of abstraction, geometry studies only the 
kath’ hauta properties of a certain limited extension selected out of the necessary 
properties of a sensible object.  Since the process of abstraction filters out all properties 
other than those kath’ hauta properties, it does not matter whether the matter of 
mathematical figures is changeable or not.  Therefore, from the fact that mathematical 
objects are not changeable, it does not follow that their matter should also be 
unchangeable. We can recall Aristotle’s own example to illustrate the difference between 
mathematics and physics: While physics studies a nose qua snub, geometry studies it qua 
concave. Since the definition of concavity does not include its matter, which is sensible 
and undergoing change, the concavity itself can be seen as unchnageable. Moreover, if 
we can regard the concavity in a snub nose as a geometrical object, it seems that at least 
some geometrical figures are realized in sensible matter. 
To explain why the concept of mathematical matter is required apart from 
sensible matter, we need to take stock once more of the precision problem.  The 
precision problem occurs because some geometrical objects lack instantiations in the 
physical world.  But, as it has been argued, since all geometrical figures should have 
their matter, those geometrical objects should also have their matter of some kind.  Now, 
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since these figures are not actualized in any sensible objects, their matter cannot be 
sensible. Therefore, some geometrical figures’ matter must be something other than 
sensible matter. And we saw that Aristotle identifies such matter with  intelligible matter.  
In view of his distinction between intelligible and sensible matter, it seems to be a natural 
consequence that he also distinguishes intelligible figures from sensible and identifies 
only the former with geometrical figures.
286
 Aristotle says: 
 
But when we come to the concrete thing, e.g., this circle, i.e., one of 
individual circles, whether sensible or intelligible (I mean by intelligible 
circles the mathematical, and by sensible circles those of bronze and of 
wood), of these there is no definition, but they are known by thought or 
perception… 
 
tou= de\ suno/lou h)/dh, oi(=on ku/klou toudi\ kai\ tw=n kaq' e(/kasta/ 
tinoj h)\ ai)sqhtou= h)\ nohtou= le/gw de\ nohtou\j me\n oi(=on tou\j 
maqhmatikou/j, ai)sqhtou\j de\ oi(=on tou\j xalkou=j kai\ tou\j 
culi/noustou/twn de\ ou)k e)/stin o(rismo/j, a)lla\ meta\ noh/sewj 
h)\ ai)sqh/sewj gnwri/zontai...287 
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 See Gaukroger (1980) pp.187-188. A similar dichotomy can be found in Aristotle’s treatment 
of numbers, where he distinguishes arithmetical number from sensible numbers in several places.  
Among them, the following passage may be the most revealing: “Now where it is thought 
impossible to take away or to add, there the measure is exact. Hence that of number is most exact; 
for we posit the unit as indivisible at all; and in all other cases we imitate this sort of measure 
(o(/pou me\n ou)=n dokei= mh\ ei)=nai a)felei=n h)\ prosqei=nai, tou=to a)kribe\j to\ me/tron 
¨dio\ to\ tou= a)riqmou= a)kribe/staton: th\n ga\r mona/da tiqe/asi pa/ntv a)diai/reton: e)n 
de\ toi=j a)/lloij mimou=ntai to\ toiou=ton© (Met., X, 1, 1052b35-1053a2).” cf. Ibid., XIII, 8, 
1083b16; XIV, 5, 1092b22-25. I discuss Aristotle’s distinction between two different kinds of 
number in Appendix, 3.  
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 Ibid., VII, 10, 1036a2-6. 
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Aristotle explicitly here says that mathematical circles are intelligible circles, and their 
matter is intelligible.
288
  Nevertheless, such an identification appears to be in conflict 
with his assertion that there are perfect physical instantiations of some geometrical 
objects such as circles or straight lines.  Since these instantiations are embodied in 
sensible matter, they must be sensible objects.  One way of squaring these difficulties 
might be to say that the fact that some geometrical figures have perfect physical 
instantiations does not imply that their matter must be sensible; it is possible that, while 
some geometrical figures can be embodied only in intelligible matter, some can be 
embodied in both intelligible and sensible matter.  However, it would seem to be odd 
that some geometrical figures are actualized in both sensible and intelligible matter, but 
others only in intelligible matter; if they are ontologically the same kind of entities, we 
could expect that their matter would be the same.  
 In seeking to clarify this question of the matter of geometrical figures, let us 
suppose a physical bronze triangle fully meeting the geometrical definition of a triangle. 
In this case, clearly the matter of this triangle is sensible.  However, from the fact that 
the bronze triangular shape perfectly satisfies the definition of a triangle, it does not 
follow that the triangle in bronze is an object of mathematics. Geometry certainly studies 
triangles which meet the definition of triangles.  However, if a geometer can construct 
more complicated figures such as a figure with 100 sides, there is no need for him to 
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 Notice that, besides his identification of intelligible figures with geometrical figures, Aristotle 
also maintains that a geometrical figure is an individual, regardless of whether it is perceptible or 
intelligible (Ibid., 11, 1036b33-37a5). I have argued that this is one of the reasons why Aristotle’s 
theory requires the matter of mathematical objects.   
158 
 
obtain triangularity by abstraction from a sensible object.  It is merely coincidental that 
some physical objects perfectly satisfy the definitions of certain geometrical figures.  
However, insofar as their matter is sensible, they are sensible figures; as Aristotle 
maintains in the above passage, only intelligible figures qualify as mathematical objects. 
Thus, the triangles which geometry studies are intelligible triangles whose matter is 
intelligible, and intelligible triangles can be obtained in the same way that other more 
complex figures are obtained; namely, they are constructed by the mind’s imposing their 
forms on intelligible matter.  Thus, whether or not there are some physical objects which 
perfectly realize certain geometrical forms, the distinction between mathematical objects 
and sensible objects according to their matter is maintained. 
So much for the first question. Now let us consider the second question: What is 
intelligible matter?  One difficulty in explaining what intelligible matter is is that we do 
not have enough textual information on the theme; Aristotle mentions intelligible matter 
only three times throughout his entire corpus, and nowhere gives an explicit account of it.  
Nevertheless, a few things can be inferred from what has been discussed: First, 
intelligible matter must be present in sensible things; Aristotle says that it is “present in 
sensible objects, but not in so far as they are sensible (e)n toi=j ai)sqhtoi=j u(pa/rxousa 
mh\ v(= ai)sqhta).”289  Secondly, intelligible matter is obtained by abstraction from a 
sensible object; since it is in a sensible object, in order to be the matter of mathematical 
objects which are not sensible but intelligible, it must be separated from the sensible 
                                                           
289
 See Met., VII, 10, 1036a11. 
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elements of the sensible object to which it belongs; and we saw that Aristotle’s 
abstraction is the method of such separation.
290
  
Commentators generally agree that intelligible matter for Aristotle is pure 
extension.  This interpretation can be traced back to Alexander,
291
 and is supported by 
most modern commentators.
292
 Its initial plausibility is that the pure extension has the 
two characteristics of intelligible matter we just have identified: that it is in a sensible 
object and can be obtained from a sensible object by abstraction.   
In Categories, quantity appears as the second category of being which is said of or 
in a substance.  Aristotle divides it into two kinds:   
 
 
Thus some quantity is a plurality if it is numerable, and a magnitude if it is 
measurable. And a plurality is said to be potentially divisible into what is 
not continuous, while a magnitude [said to be divisible] to what is 
continuous. Of magnitudes, that which is continuous in one dimension is 
length; in two dimensions, breadth; in three dimensions, depth. Of these, 
multiplicity, when it is limited, is a number; length, a line; breadth, a 
surface; depth, is a body. 
 
plh=qoj me\n ou)=n poso/n ti e)a\n a)riqmhto\n v)=, me/geqoj de\ a)\n 
metrhto\n v)=. le/getai de\ plh=qoj me\n to\ diaireto\n duna/mei ei)j 
mh\ sunexh=, me/geqoj de\ to\ ei)j sunexh=: mege/qouj de\ to\ me\n e)f' 
e(\n sunexe\j mh=koj to\ d' e)pi\ du/o pla/toj to\ d' e)pi\ tri/a ba/qoj. 
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 Abstraction is a general method by which a science selects a certain group of properties for its 
investigation; but he uses expressions such as ‘ta\ e)c a)faire/sewj lego/mena’ or ‘ta\ e)n 
a)faire/sei lego/mena’ only for referring to mathematical objects.   
291
 On Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 510.3; 514. 
292
See Gaukroger (1982) pp. 318-320; White (1993) pp. 179-180; Hussey (1983) pp. 104-5; Lear 
(1982) pp. 181-182; Mueller (1987) p. 251; Barnes (1985) p. 117; Mueller (1970) pp. 163-167; 
Gaukroger (1980) pp. 187-189; Hussey (1992) pp. 122 and 130; Bostock (1994) pp. 284-285.    
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tou/twn de\ plh=qoj me\n to\ peperasme/non a)riqmo\j mh=koj 
de\ grammh\ pla/toj de\ e)pifa/neia ba/qoj de\ sw=ma.293  
 
 
According to this passage, there are two kinds of quantity: that which is continuous and 
that which is not so.  The former is again divided into three kinds: length, breadth, and 
depth; when these are limited, these quantities become in turn a line, a surface, and a 
body, respectively.  Thus continuous quantity is in a substance or predicated of a 
substance.
294
  In Categories, only the individual man or horse is called a substance in the 
strict sense.
295
  But, if A can be said to be in B because A is predicated of B, extension 
in one, two, and three dimensions also can be said to be in any sensible thing which is 
extended.  Thus, it can be said that the extension of a sensible object meets the first 
condition for intelligible matter, that of being in sensibles.
296
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 Met. V, 13, 1020a7-14 
294
 In fact, Aristotle maintains that every actual thing has magnitude. He says, “Since, as it seems, 
no actual thing exists in separation apart from sensible magnitudes, the objects of thought are 
included among the sensible forms; both are those that are spoken of as in abstraction and those 
which are states and affections of sensible objects (e)pei\ de\ ou)de\ pra=gma ou)qe\n e)/sti 
para\ ta\ mege/qh, w(j dokei=, ta\ ai)sqhta\ kexwrisme/non, e)n toi=j ei)/desi toi=j 
ai)sqhtoi=j ta\ nohta/ e)sti, ta/ te e)n a)faire/sei lego/mena kai\ o(/sa tw=n ai)sqhtw=n 
e(/ceij kai\ pa/qh)  (DA,III, 8, 432a3-6).” 
295
 Cat., 5, 2a11. 
296
 We also find similar accounts of magnitude in De Anima.  According to Aristotle, we 
perceive through sense faculties not just the special sensibles of each particular sensible object, 
such as color and sound, but also common sensibles such as motion, rest, magnitude, number, and 
figure (see DA., II, 6, 418a18-19; III, 1, 425a14-20). Among these, extension is identified with the 
continuous quantity, and a figure is sorted out as a species of magnitude (Ibid., III, 1. 425a17-18). 




Now, let us consider whether pure extension can be separated from a sensible 
object by abstraction.  Most commentators agree that pure extension is acquired by 
abstraction.  They also argue that the abstraction involved in that process takes place in 
two different stages.
297
 For instance, Gaukroger argues that: 
 
In the case of geometry, Aristotle employs two quite different kinds of 
abstraction. The first kind involves disregarding the matter of sensible 
objects so that we are left with properties like being triangular and being 
round…And whatever, most generally speaking, is round is something that 
we arrive at by the second kind of abstraction, in which we disregard the 
properties of sensible objects so that what has these properties becomes the 
object of investigation. What we are left with is a substratum of 
indeterminate extension characterized solely in terms of its spatial 
dimensions: length, breadth and depth. Such a substratum cannot be 
sensible since it has been deprived of the properties that would render it 
sensible; nor can it be something which is independent since it is simply an 






I agree generally with the basic idea that length, breadth and depth can be obtained from a 
sensible object by abstraction.  Aristotle’s abstraction allows to us separate any true 
predicate from the other predicates of the subject. Thus, we can obtain ‘having length’ 
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 See Gaukroger (1982) p. 139 and (1980) p. 188; Hussey (1983) pp. 104-5; Ross (1924) Vol. I, 
p. liv. Most commentators agree that intelligible matter can be abstracted from sensible objects, 
and that it may be understood as extension without sensible properties.  However, accounts of 
the nature of extension differ considerably in their detail. For instance, Gaukroger identifies it 
with length, breadth and depth (Gaukroger (1980) p. 188); Hussey identifies it with pure 
extension which does not have any property whatsoever like prime matter (Hussey (1992) pp. 122 
and 130), and White assumes it to be a line, a surface, and a body (White (1993) pp. 179-180). 
Some commentators identify prime matter with extension (see Sokolowski (1970) pp. 263-288; 
Sorabji (1986) pp. 1-22). 
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 Gaukroger (1980) p. 188. 
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from any sensible object, so long as it extends in at least one dimension.  However, 
Gaukroger’s description of the whole process of the mind’s acquiring pure extension of 
each dimension by abstraction remains unclear. In the passage quoted above, by 
‘abstraction’, Gaukroger describes retaining the property in question, extension, and 
disregarding all other irrelevant properties.  But since he does not provide his own 
account of Aristotelian abstraction, it is not easy to see exactly what he means by 
‘disregarding.’  There are two possible readings. (i) If we consider abstraction as a 
linguistic analysis which is a part of linguistic functional calculation selecting from all of 
the concepts which are true of the sensible object those which are intrinsically true of it 
only under a certain description, then, ‘disregarding’ could refer to the conceptual 
operation of ‘filtering out’
299
 the concepts which only happen to be true of the sensible 
object under that description. Alternatively, (ii) if abstraction is understood in the more 
traditional way as the process of acquiring a universal from particulars, ‘disregarding’ 
would involve a mental attitude toward a sensible thing such as ignoring or paying no 
attention to a certain aspect of it.
300
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 Lear (1982) p. 168. 
300
 According to the traditional interpretation, what we deal with during abstraction is not a thing 
itself outside the mind but a kind of representation of a thing, a fa/ntasma. So it would be more 
accurate to say that disregarding is a mental act performed on a fa/ntasma; namely, ignoring or 
paying no attention to a certain aspect of a fa/ntasma. Avicenna and Thomas both argue that an 
object’s intellectual form is separated from the fa/ntasma by abstraction. fa/ntasma is the end 
product of perception, which is involved in both perception and thinking. For the role of 
fa/ntasma in perception, see Nussbaum (1978) and Schofield (1978).  Aristotle maintains that 
thinking is not possible without fa/ntasma (DM., 450a 1; DA., 431a 15-20; 432a 8-12). 
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Reading (i), however, does not require there to be two different kinds of 
abstraction in order to obtain the concept of extension in each dimension from a sensible 
object.  In my analysis of Aristotle’s abstraction, we can acquire the concept of length 
from any sensible object which is extended in one dimension, i.e., from any sensible line.  
Recall that, in my view, A studies B qua C iff A investigates only kath’ hauta properties 
of C which also belong to B; abstraction determines which properties are kath’ hauta 
properties by removing all other irrelevant properties. Since A is a kath’ hauto property 
of B iff (i) A is a property of B and A appears in the definition of B, or (ii) A is a property 
of B and B appears in the definition of A, all of length, breadth, and depth are kath’ hauta 
properties of extension or the continuous on the grounds that their definitions refer to 
extension; for instance, length is defined as extension in one dimension, and ‘extension’ 
is a part of the definition of length insofar as the definition of length contains the concept 
of ‘extension.’  Since length is a kath’hauto property of extension, for any physical line, 
a, we can conceive of length only by conceiving of a qua extension. Likewise, a 
geometer can also obtain the concepts of breadth and depth from a sensible object by 
abstraction.  During the process of abstraction, all other irrelevant properties such as 
weight, hardness, shape, texture, temperature, etc., are removed, leaving only kath’ hauta 
properties of the continuous.  But this process of separating the concept of extension in 
each dimension from the other concepts does not require two different kinds of 
abstraction; abstraction is needed only once during the whole process.    
Since abstraction as a conceptual separation is required only once for acquiring 
the concept of extension from a sensible object, it is more likely that Gaukroger is 
164 
 
interpreting abstraction in the traditional way and using the term ‘disregarding’ in the 
sense of the reading (ii).  However, if ‘disregarding’ can be read as a kind of mental act 
such as ‘ignoring’ or ‘paying no attention,’ it is difficult to see how extension in each 
dimension can be obtained from a sensible object by ‘disregarding’ all other properties in 
order.  Suppose that there is a bronze circle, and, as the passage explains, attempt to 
‘disregard’ the matter of the bronze sphere, namely, all the properties of the matter such 
as ‘being brazen,’ ‘being brown,’ ‘being hard,’ etc., and then ‘disregard’ its shape, 
namely, being circular.  What remains after disregarding all these properties?  
According to Gaukroger, as the result of this ‘disregarding,’ we should be left with a 
substratum of indeterminate extension in one dimension, namely, breadth.  However, it 
seems to me that, if every sensible property such as shape and color is disregarded from a 
sensible object, very simply nothing will be left in its place.  We always perceive 
extension in each dimension along with other sensible properties.  For example, to 
perceive breadth is always to perceive a colored or shaped expanse, e.g., a red or 




Aristotle divides objects of perception into three kinds: special, common and 
incidental objects.
302
 While there is a special sense organ and sense for special objects, 
there is no such sense organ or sense for common objects,
303
 which are perceived by 
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 Cf. Gaukroger (1982) p. 320. 
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 DA., II, 6, 418a8-11. 
303
Aristotle denies the existence of a special sense organ and sense for common objects (DA, II, 6). 
He also, however, argues that there is a common sense for them (DA, III, 1,425a27). This seems 
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more than one sense; a special object is meanwhile perceived by its special sense.  
Incidental objects are distinguished from the first two in that they do not directly affect 
any sense faculty. For instance, when the son of Diares is perceived, sight perceives only 
whiteness and similarly other senses perceive certain other particular qualities;
304
 the son 
of Diares as such does not affect any specific sense. We see a white thing which happens 
to be the son of Diares and in this sense he is perceived only incidentally 
(kata\ sumbebhko/j).305 
 Aristotle identifies spatial magnitude or extension with one of common objects. 
Since extension is perceived in common by touch or sight, if there is no special object of 
sight or touch, it cannot be perceived at all.
306
 That is, we cannot perceive extension 
alone separately from all other sensible objects.  Thus, if we disregard all the sensible 
properties of objects, we will be left without any sense data of extension.  
If extension cannot be perceived, it follows it cannot be known. I argued that 
Aristotle uses the term ‘thinking’ in two different ways.
307
  In the narrow technical sense, 
thinking of a means receiving the (intelligible) form of a; and thinking in this sense is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
contradictory. Hamlyn argues that the two claims are compatible, understanding that, for Aristotle, 
every special sense organ is an organ of common sense as well as of its special sense. Since every 
sense organ has this common sensing power, it can be said that there is no special sense for 
common objects, while every sense organ remains receptive to objects in their common sense. 
See Hamlyn (1993) p.117. 
304
 DA., II, 6, 418a17-22. 
305
 For a discussion of the incidental objects of perception, see Hamlyn (1993) pp. 105-107 and 
Modrak (2000) pp. 223-224. 
306
 For Aristotle’s discussion of common objects and common sense, see DA, II, 6, 418a7-20; III, 
1, 425a14-2, 425b12. 
307




identified with knowing. But, for Aristotle, all objects of thinking (in this narrow sense) 
are included in the forms of perception; so that thinking of an object, a, presupposes the 
perception of a.
308
 Thus, if extension cannot be perceived, it seems it cannot be thought, 
either. But, since extension is perceptible only along with the perception of other sensible 
objects, if we disregard all the sensible properties of a sensible object, we will be unable 
to perceive its extension. Since thinking in this sense means knowing, without a 
perception of extension, there will be no knowledge of extension either.    
So far, we have seen what intelligible matter is and how it is acquired from 
sensible objects.  But matter which is itself indeterminate in each dimension cannot be 
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 Aristotle says, “Since, as it seems, no actual thing exists in separation apart from sensible 
magnitudes, the objects of thought are included among the sensible forms; both are those that are 
spoken of as in abstraction and those which are states and affections of sensible objects. And for 
this reason, without perceiving, one would not learn or understand anything, and when one 
contemplates it is necessary to contemplate some phantasma at the same time; for phantasmata 
are like sense-perceptions, except in that they are without matter (e)pei\ de\ ou)de\ pra=gma 
ou)qe\n e)/sti para\ ta\ mege/qh, w(j dokei=, ta\ ai)sqhta\ kexwrisme/non, e)n toi=j ei)/desi 
toi=j ai)sqhtoi=j ta\ nohta/ e)sti, ta/ te e)n a)faire/sei lego/mena kai\ o(/sa tw=n 
ai)sqhtw=n e(/ceij kai\ pa/qh. kai\ dia\ tou=to ou)/te mh\ ai)sqano/menoj mhqe\n ou)qe\n a)\n 
ma/qoi ou)de\ cunei/h, o(/tan te qewrv=, a)na/gkh a(/ma fa/ntasma/ ti qewrei=n: ta\ ga\r 
fanta/smata w(/sper ai)sqh/mata/ e)sti, plh\n a)/neu u(/lhj) (DA, III, 8, 432a3-10) .” 
For Aristotle, a phantasma is the end product of perception and provides us with all 
sensible information concerning the perceived object; namely, it is the sensible representation of a 
sensible object. Since the objects of thought, i.e., intelligible forms, are included in the forms of 
perception, to think is to grasp an intelligible form in phantasma; in that sense, phantasma is also 
regarded as the material of thinking by Aristotle. And, since the objects of thinking are included 
in the forms of perception, Aristotle argues that we cannot think of anything without its 
phantasma. 
 Traditionally, abstraction was understood as the separation of an intelligible form from 
phantasma by ignoring the form’s irrelevant aspects, i.e., its sensible properties. However, as I 




the object of geometry; geometry deals with extension that is limited, namely, with 
particular lines, figures, and solids.  Mueller argues that such geometrical objects are the 
results of the intellect’s imposing geometrical forms on abstracted extension: 
 
First, there are the basic objects: points, lines, planes, solids. The last three 
are conceived of as indeterminate extension and, therefore, as matter on 
which geometric properties are imposed. The imposition of these 
properties produces the ordinary geometric figures, straight or curved 
lines, triangles, cubes, etc. The definition of such a figure will include both 
the form, the properties imposed, and the matter; but in the definition this 






But, according to the second position, the mathematical forms which the intellect imposes 
on intelligible matter are not in sensible objects. At the same time, since Aristotle denies 
their independent existence, they cannot exist apart from sensible objects, either. If the 
forms do not exist either in sensibles or apart from sensibles, where does our mind obtain 
them from?   At this point, we should recall once more that for Aristotle the geometrical 
constructions (diagra/mmata) in geometrical proofs are constructed by thought. 
Aristotle says nothing explicit about the mental construction of geometrical objects.  But, 
if we accept that geometrical figures can be constructed in the same way as 
diagra/mmata, as I pointed out, it should be also possible to construct geometrical 
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 Further, since diagra/mmata are constructed by thought, geometrical objects 
should be constructed by thought as well.
311
   
One advantage of this position is that it avoids the precision problem.  If it is our 
mind which imposes a geometrical form on intelligible matter, the precision problem 
never occurs; we know the exact definition of each mathematical object.
312
  Since 
geometrical properties or forms are not obtained from sensible objects, it does not matter 
whether or not sensible objects perfectly instantiate geometrical properties.   
Proponents of the second position would also argue that this interpretation 
differentiates Aristotle from modern subjective constructivists.  Insofar as the concept of 
extension is acquired from external objects, mathematics is not purely subjective or a 
priori.  Since the matter of mathematicals is extension, Aristotle can justly say, in one 
sense, that mathematical objects exist as matter in sensible objects. But they are not in 
sensibles because their forms are not in sensibles.  Nevertheless, mathematics is a study 
of sensibles, in the sense that it investigates what properties the extension of sensibles can 
have.  In this sense, it might be said that the position not only solves the precision 
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 As Ackrill points out, the construction of diagrams in Euclidean geometry plays an important 
role in proving theorems, e.g., Elements, I, 47; and many ‘propositions’ in Elements are solutions 
to construction problems, e.g., Elements, I, 1, 2, and 3. See Ackrill (1963) p.111.  
311
 The mind’s constitutive function in the practice of mathematics can be found elsewhere, too, 
in particular with respect to arithmetic. In my view, for Aristotle, numbers are fictional entities to 
an extent that they can be described as mind-dependent. For the fictionality of numbers, see 
Appendix, 3. 
312
 See Mueller (1970) p. 168. 
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problem, but also is distinguished from idealism.
313
 Because of such advantages, this 
view is most popular among modern commentators of Aristotle.
314
 
However, we should be aware that this interpretation obtains all these explanatory 
advantages only at the expense of sacrificing Aristotle’s mathematical naïve realism. 
Such an incompatibility with naïve realism, however, might well be permissible.  We 
saw that there are several passages suggesting that Aristotle is himself apprised of the 
problems of mathematical naïve realism.  Indeed, some of his claims about 
mathematical objects are not compatible with naïve mathematical realism. Thus, as 
entertained in Chapter 3, it is possible that Aristotle developed two incompatible views of 
mathematics one after another.  If this is the case, no interpretation will be able to 
accommodate the opposite sides of his view.
315
  In that sense, the internal inconsistency 
problem might be passed over in favor of evaluating different interpretations of 
Aristotle’s view; it will be understandable that some commentators do not take naïve 
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 Commentators argue that Aristotle’s view preserves a link between mathematics and the 
sensible world, relying on the fact that the matter of mathematical objects is abstracted from 
sensible objects. For example, Mueller argues, “Aristotle’s account of geometric objects would 
seem, then, to be something like the following. In his reasoning the geometer deals directly with 
the particular geometric objects which I have been describing. These objects, though not real in 
the sense in which sensible substances are, are intimately connected with sensible reality and in a 
certain sense underlie it (Mueller (1970) p. 171).” Similarly, Hussey says, “but, as with 
mathematics, there is a matterlike residue of structure which, though exemplified only in the 
actual world, cannot be wholly reduced to it either ontologically or epistemologically (Hussey, p. 
133).”  
314
 Some of those who endorse this interpretation are: Hussey (1992); Gaukroger (1980) pp. 187-
197; Mueller (1970); White (1993); Gaukroger (1982) pp. 312-322.  
315
 But notice that my analysis of abstraction is compatible with both the naïve realistic 
interpretation and the second position; in my account, it is also possible to obtain extension in 
each dimension by abstraction. Thus, properly understood, Aristotle’s theory of abstraction is 
applicable to both his earlier mathematical naïve realism and later fictionalistic theory.  
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mathematical realism into consideration in characterizing Aristotle’s philosophy of 
number.  In this regard, the fact that the second position cannot accommodate the naïve 
realistic aspect of Aristotle’s theory of mathematics is no reason to renounce it. 
The real issue is whether a view describing geometrical objects as mental 
constructions can be made compatible with Aristotle’s scientific realism.  Although the 
matter of geometrical objects is obtained from the actual world, mathematical objects are 
still something constructed by the intellect, insofar as their forms are so constructed. 
Thus, a geometrical object as the composite of intelligible matter and the form remains a 
fictional entity.  Since the form of a geometrical object is essentially constructed, the 
definition of a geometrical object is not a description of a real object; rather, it is a 
meaning-postulation for a term.  For instance, the definition of triangle only determines 
the meaning of the term ‘triangle’; there is no such thing as something triangular in the 
geometrical sense. But, if geometry is to be an Aristotelian science, a definition of a 
geometrical object must be the description of the essence of a real being.   
One could respond here that the fact that mathematical forms are created by our 
mind does not make geometry mind-dependent; the concept of extension constrains the 
way we define geometrical objects and formulate geometrical axioms. If we had a 
different concept of extension, that is, if we received a different concept from sensibles, 
we would have a different geometry.  For instance, some theorems in Euclidean 
geometry hold true only in Euclidean space.
 316
 On this topic, White says: 
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The question that is not answered in Aristotle’s texts, so far as I can see, is 
to what degree these material, potential data, supplied by the 
sensible/physical realm, constrain the constructions and theorems that may 
be actually obtained by the no/hsij of geometer… As Hussey aptly notes, 
‘there is a matterlike residue of [mathematical] structure which, though 
exemplified only in the actual world, cannot be wholly reduced to it either 
ontologically or epistemologically’ (Hussey, p. 132). But unanswered 
questions remain as to how and in what degree this ‘matterlike residue of 
structure’ constrains ‘theoretical’ mathematics. From the perspective of 
mathematical hindsight, we may be inclined to think of this constraint as 
substantial. For example, the fact that space or extension may be assumed to 
be Euclidean or ‘flat’ (as opposed to elliptical or hyperbolic) constrains the 
following fact: it is triangles that are Euclidean, in the sense of satisfying 
the theorem that the sum of their interior angles is equal the sum of two 
right angles, that are constructible ‘in’ that space/extension by geometers. 
And Sir Thomas Heath notes that Euclid’s postulates, such as the postulate 
licensing the construction of a circle of any circle and any radius that we 
previously mentioned, may be regarded as ‘helping to complete delineation 





But this response is not without its own difficulties. First, as White himself recognizes, it 
is an anachronism to attribute to Aristotle the idea that our concept of space constrains 
geometry.
318
  Although the debate on Euclid’s Fifth (or parallel) Postulate, which led to 
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 See White (1993) pp. 180-181. Aristotle argues that there are only three kinds of limited 
magnitude: a line, a surface, and a body: “A magnitude [divisible] in one way is a line, two ways 
a surface, and three ways a body. And beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the 
three [dimensions] are all [dimensions], and ‘in three ways’ means ‘all ways.’ For, as 
Pythagoreans say, the whole [universe] and all things are is determined by the number three, since 
end and middle and beginning give the number of the whole and their number is the triad 
(Mege/qouj de\ to\ me\n e)f' e(\n grammh/, to\ d' e)pi\ du/o e)pi/pedon, to\ d' e)pi\ tri/a sw=ma: 
kai\ para\ tau=ta ou)k e)/stin a)/llo me/geqoj dia\ to\ ta\ tri/a pa/nta ei)=nai kai\ to\ tri\j 
pa/ntv. Kaqa/per ga/r fasi kai\ oi( Puqago/reioi, to\ pa=n kai\ ta\ pa/nta toi=j trisi\n 
w(/ristai: teleuth\ ga\r kai\ me/son kai\ a)rxh\ to\n a)riqmo\n e)/xei to\n tou= panto/j, 
tau=ta de\ to\n th=j tria/doj) (DC, I, 1, 268a7-13).” Since geometry also deals with these three 
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the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, is as old as Euclid’s Elements, it is only in the 
19th century that the first non-Euclidean geometry emerges.  Secondly, in order that the 
concept of extension abstracted from the sensible world constrain Euclidean geometry, 
that extension should be Euclidean space, that is, it should be perfectly flat.  It is 
questionable, however, how the concept of flat space can be acquired from a sensible 
object by abstraction.  We saw that a concept or predicate, P, can be obtained from an 
object, a, by abstraction only if it is true that a is P; this was the reason why abstraction 
could not provide a solution for the precision problem—some concepts are true of a 
geometrical figure but are not predicated of any sensible object. While Aristotle talks 
about sensible objects which are perfectly circular or straight, he never mentions a 
perfectly flat object in any passage,
319
 and it is also a physical fact that there is no 
sensible thing which is perfectly even.
320
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dimensions of space alone, this might be taken as textual evidence for Aristotle’s belief that the 
concept of space constrains geometry in a certain way. But the reason why Aristotle believed that 
there were only three kinds of magnitudes is irrelevant to the issue we are discussing. It is highly 
questionable whether he considered how spatial extension could play any predeterminative role in 
the formation of our geometrical concepts. For the three dimensionality of magnitude, also see 
Ibid., 7. 274b19-20. 
319
 Gaukroger argues on the basis of DA, III, 6, 430b20 that, for Aristotle, all spatial geometrical 
magnitudes, including two-dimensional planes, are generated from lines and points (see 
Gaukroger (1980) p.189). If he is correct, Aristotle would believe that a flat surface is constructed 
out of lines and points, rather than being abstracted from the sensible world; this would give 
Aristotle one way of getting round the precision problem. But more generally Aristotle thinks that 
points are posterior in being to lines, lines to planes, and planes to solids. Nevertheless, that does 
not mean that Euclidean flat space does not need to be constructed from such elements as points, 
or lines; two-dimensionality which can be obtained from any plane by abstraction is not the same 
as Euclidean flat space; and further not every extension in two dimensions is perfectly even. 
320
 The idea of abstracting pure extension from a sensible object is not Aristotle’s own.  The 
closest idea is be found in the following passage: “Just as the mathematician makes a study of 
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 In fact, with regard to the issue of compatibility with scientific realism, the 
second position is no better than Lear’s view; it is exposed to all the criticism confronting 
Lear’s constructivist interpretation.  We saw that, from the fact that a geometrical figure 
is composed of elements which are obtained from sensible objects, it does not follow that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
things resulting from abstraction, for after having removed all sensibles such as weight and 
lightness, hardness and its opposite, heat and cold, and the other sensible opposites, he leaves 
only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three 
dimensions, and the properties of them qua quantitative and continuous, and does not consider 
them in any other respect, and examines their relative positions to others and things which belong 
to these things, and commensurability and incommensurability of others, and the ratios of others; 
but nevertheless we hold that there is one and the same science of all these things, i.e., geometry 
(kaqa/per d' o( maqhmatiko\j peri\ ta\ e)c a)faire/sewj th\n qewri/an poiei=tai 
(perielw\n ga\r pa/nta ta\ ai)sqhta\ qewrei=, oi(=on ba/roj kai\ koufo/thta kai\ 
sklhro/thta kai\ tou)nanti/on, e)/ti de\ kai\ qermo/thta kai\ yuxro/thta kai\ ta\j 
a)/llaj ai)sqhta\j e)nantiw/seij, mo/non de\ katalei/pei to\ poso\n kai\ sunexe/j, tw=n 
me\n e)f' e(\n tw=n d' e)pi\ du/o tw=n d' e)pi\ tri/a, kai\ ta\ pa/qh ta\ tou/twn h(=? posa/ 
e)sti  kai\ sunexh=, kai\ ou) kaq' e(/tero/n ti qewrei=, kai\ tw=n me\n ta\j pro\j a)/llhla 
qe/seij skopei= kai\ ta\ tau/taij u(pa/rxonta, tw=n de\ ta\j summetri/j kai\ a)summetri/j, 
tw=n de\ tou\j lo/goj, a)ll' o(/mwj mi/an pa/ntwn kai\ th\n au)th\n ti/qemen e)pisth/mhn th\n 
gewmetrikh/n) (Met.., XI, 3, 1061a28-35).” 
 This passage might be regarded as describing the separation of pure extension from 
sensibles by abstraction.  But, in fact, the passage rather supports a naïve realistic interpretation 
of Aristotle. The phrase ‘to\ poso\n kai\ sunexe/j, tw=n me\n e)f' e(\n tw=n d' e)pi\ du/o tw=n d' 
e)pi\ tri/a,’ may refer to either ‘length, breadth, and depth’ or ‘line, figure, and body.’ But the fact 
that they have position, and some properties such as commensurability and incommensurability 
sustaining inter-relationships with each other, indicates that Aristotle is not talking about pure 
extension but rather particular limited extension. Further, not only ‘to\ poso\n kai\ sunexe/j, 
tw=n me\n e)f' e(\n tw=n d' e)pi\ du/o tw=n d' e)pi\ tri/a,’ but also ‘ta\ pa/qh ta\ tou/twn h(=? posa/ 
e)sti  kai\ sunexh=’ are left over as the result of abstraction. According to my analysis of ‘qua,’ 
‘ta\ pa/qh ta\ tou/twn h(=? posa/ e)sti  kai\ sunexh=’ signifies the kath’ hauta properties of 
extension, which also belong to these particular limited extensions. For instance, if geometry 
studies a ruler qua extension, geometry removes all sensible properties from that ruler to leave 
only the line of the ruler, proceeding to investigate the kath’ hauta properties of extension among 
the properties of the line, i.e., its measurability or ratio to other lines, etc.  
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it is more real than an imaginary entity, e.g., a triangle is as fictional as a pink elephant is. 
Likewise, the fact that the matter of mathematical objects is acquired by abstraction from 
sensible objects does not make them more real than other fictional things.  If a 
geometrical figure is real or has a link to the sensible world due to the fact that its matter, 
i.e., two-dimensional extension, is acquired from the sensible world, any two-dimensional 
picture should be as real as a geometrical figure; the matter of the picture and that of the 
geometrical figure would be the same.  In the same vein, there would be no difference 
between a dragon in a tale and a geometrical cone in terms of reality; the matter of both is 
three-dimensional extension acquired from the sensible world.  
 
 3. Mathematical Objects as Potential Beings 
 
In the previous two sections, we examined two fictionalistic interpretations of Aristotle’s 
view of mathematics. Although both positions resolved the precision problem, they did so 
at the cost of violating Aristotle’s scientific realism: For Aristotle, if mathematical entities 
are fictional, mathematics is not a science at all.  Further, if mathematical statements are 
not descriptions of real entities, there can be no mathematical truth, given that for 
Aristotle, truth is a correspondence between what is said (to\ le/gein) and what is (to\ o)\n). 
Thus, as these sections have established, in order for any interpretation of Aristotle’s 
philosophy of mathematics to be consistent with his own view of science and truth, it 
must show that mathematical objects can be thought of as being, as having some kind of 
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existence in his ontology.   
 It remains difficult, though, to identify mathematical objects with something 
existent in these ontological terms. Aristotle claims, on the one hand, that mathematical 
objects are not separated from sensible objects; but on the other hand, also claims that 
mathematical objects are not in sensible objects. The first claim seems to suggest that 
mathematical objects either are sensible substances or properties thereof. In denying the 
substancehood of mathematical objects, though, Aristotle’s anti-mathematical Platonism 
only leaves a possible status for mathematical objects as properties of sensible objects. 
However, the second claim would also seem to rule out this possibility. If mathematical 
objects are neither sensible substances nor the properties of these substances, without yet 
being separated from sensible objects, mathematical objects would seem to have no place 
in the actual sensible world at all.  
 
 3.1. The Matter of Mathematical Objects as Potentiality 
 
Nervertheless, Aristotle does leave room for mathematical objects in his ontology in his 
remark that there are many senses of being. Aristotle generally parses his frequent 
comment that being has many senses in terms of four main meanings: (i) ‘being’ signifies 
one of the ten ontological categories, such as substance, quality, quantity, etc,
321
 (ii) 
being has two different modes: potentiality and actuality or being potentially and being 
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 (iii) ‘being’ means being true,
323
 and (iv) being means being accidentally or 
accidental being.
324
  However, as far as the ontological question goes of what kind of 
entities mathematical objects can be in Aristotle’s ontology, the meanings of being at (iii) 
and (iv) can be excluded; for Aristotle, being as being true is in the province of logic; and 
an accidental being would not fall under the purview of a science.
325
  This leaves the 
senses of ‘being’ (i) and (ii) as the sole candidates for answering how Aristotle classes 
mathematical objects. Since such objects are neither actual sensible entities, nor entities 
apart from sensible objects, it seems plausible to class them as a kind of potential being, 
regardless of whether they are substances or properties of substances. Such a 
demonstration—showing that mathematical objects are a sort of potential being—seems 
the only way to avoid the issue of incompatibility between Aristotle’s philosophy of 
mathematics and his scientific realism.  
 Although the idea that mathematical beings are potential beings is not explicit in 
the text, certain passages lend it textual warrant.  One such is the passage that forms the 
starting-point of all the fictionalistic interpretations. Confirming that mathematical 
objects exist, Aristotle says:  
 
Thus, then, geometers speak correctly, and they talk about existing things, 
and they do exist; for being has two forms—it exists not only in actuality 
but also as matter. 
 
                                                           
322
 Phys., III, 6., 206a1 4-15; Met., IX, 1, 1045ba32-35; VI, 2, 1026b2. 
323
 Met., VI, 2, 1026a34-35. 
324
 Ibid., 1026b1-2; Ross (1924) Vol. I, p. xvii. 
325
 Ibid., 1026b3-4. 
177 
 
w(/ste dia\ tou=to o)rqw=j oi( gewme/trai le/gousi, kai\ peri\ o)/ntwn 
diale/gontai, kai\ o)/nta e)sti/n: ditto\n ga\r to\ o)/n, to\ me\n 
e)ntelexei/# to\ d' u(likw=j.326   
 
 
Aristotle’s intention would seem clear: Although mathematical objects do not exist in 
actuality, they can be said to exist on the strength of the existence of another way of being, 
being as matter, i.e., mathematical objects exist as matter.  However, as suggested in the 
previous chapter, it is not clear what Aristotle means by ‘matter’ in the passage. We 
examined two different views: Lear interprets ‘matter’ as basic geometrical elements such 
as straight lines, circles, etc., whereas many other commentators have understood it as 
intelligible matter, pure extension.  Both these views, however, share the problematic 
feature that their interpretations of ‘matter’ end up making geometrical objects fictional 
entities. It may also be possible, though, to interpret ‘matter’ as ‘potentiality’ or ‘potential 
being’.
327
  Two considerations support this assimilation of matter to potentiality.  First, 
in the above passage, Aristotle contrasts the term ‘matter’ with actuality, invoking ‘being 
matter’ as another form of being.  Typically, Aristotle’s discussion of different senses of 
being pairs ‘being in potentiality’ and ‘being in actuality’, making this passage 
exceptional insofar as Aristotle would seem to frame an explicit contrast between matter 
and actuality. Secondly, Aristotle frequently uses the two terms ‘matter’ and ‘potentiality’ 
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  For Aristotle, every change is the actualization of something 
potential, or a transition from something potential to something actual, e.g., a transition 
from being visible to seeing, or from a baby—a potential man—to a man.  In this sense, 
it can be said that potentiality is the starting point of a change and actuality its end state.  
The relationship between a substance (or substance-like thing like an artifact) and its 
matter can also be understood in terms of the actualization of potentiality, in that “it is 
because some matter is a suitable starting point for the production of something, by the 
exercise of a capacity, that matter stands to that result as the potential to actual.”
329
 In 
this respect, the matter of geometrical object might be taken to constitute a kind of 
potentiality in serving as the starting point for constructing a geometrical figure.   
 
 3.2. Aristotle’s Homonymous Uses of ‘Potentiality’  
 
Aristotle’s ontology is more generous than that of modern physicalists, in that it regards 
not only actual beings but also potential beings as real entities.  So in order to show that 
mathematical objects are real entities for Aristotle, it should be sufficient to show that 
they are beings in potentiality. Given that mathematical objects exist as matter, and that 
matter sometimes means potentiality for Aristotle, the existence of mathematical objects 
seems to have been shown. 
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 One problem with this approach lies with Aristotle’s tendency to use the term 
‘potentiality’ homonymously. If ‘potentiality’ has various senses, we first need to check 
the sense in which Aristotle takes it as a mode of existence other than actual existence.  
Next, we need to examine whether this is the sense of potentiality designated as being 
coextensive with matter.  Only when potentiality in the sense of matter is confirmed as 
something existent in Aristotle’s ontology, can we agree that the fact of mathematical 
objects’ existing as matter entails the existence of mathematical objects.  
 We can begin by considering the primary sense of potentiality, an important task 
in the light of Aristotle’s assertion that all potentialities are so called in reference to one 
primary kind.
330
 Aristotle defines this primary potentiality as “a principle of change in 
something else or in the thing itself qua something else (h( a)rxh\ kinh/sewj 
h)\ metabolh=j h( e)n e(te/r% h)\ v(= e(/teron).”331  According to this definition, the notion 
of potentiality is introduced to provide an account of how change in general is possible.
332
  
 Aristotle argues that the introduction of a concept of potentiality is necessary to 
avoid the difficulties involved in Megarian actualism.  According to Aristotle’s report, 
the Megarian school maintains that ‘a thing can act only when it is acting, and when it is 
not acting it cannot act’;
333
 for instance, a builder can build only when he is building. 
Commentators label this thesis actualism in that it accepts only what is actual as being 
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 For Aristotle, this actualism is fraught with difficulties.  Centrally, it cannot 
explain how a thing is changed: If something can happen only when it is happening, what 
is not happening cannot happen; hence it never will happen.
335
  Then, Aristotle puts it, 
“that which stands always stands, and that which sits will always sit since if it is sitting it 
will not get up (a)ei\ ga\r to/ te e(sthko\j e(sth/cetai kai\ to\ kaqh/menon 
kaqedei=tai: ou) ga\r a)nasth/setai a)\n kaqe/zhtai: a)du/naton ga\r e)/stai 
a)nasth=nai o(/ ge mh\ du/natai a)nasth=nai).”336  To avoid this absurdity, Aristotle 
argues, it is necessary to accept the existence of a certain inactive power or capacity 
(du/namij) which stands as a cause of any changes; it is inactive in the sense that it 
remains inactive until it is actualized.
337
 For instance, a builder can build even if he is not 
building on the basis of his capacity to build; and water can be boiled on the basis of its 
having a capacity of being boiled in certain circumstances. Because it is inactive until 
actualized, this power or capacity is also contrasted with actuality and translated as 
‘potentiality’.
338
  Potentiality in this sense is understood as a causal power or a 
dispositional property standing in contrast with an active property; it is exercised “unless 
something prevents and hinders it (a)\n mh/ ti kwlu/v)”.339 
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 Previously, mathematical matter was interpreted either as the basic elements of 
geometrical figures or as pure extension. While my reading of Aristotle’s text comes 
down on the side of the latter interpretation, mathematical matter for either interpretation 
hardly meets a description of potentiality in its primary sense.  When we say that the 
matter of geometrical figures, i.e., their pure extension, is in a sensible object, this cannot 
mean that it exists in the object as a causal power or a dispositional property towards the 
realization of certain geometrical figures in the actual world.  
 
 3.3. Potentiality as Another Mode of Existence 
 
Nevertheless, Aristotle does seem to leave available another important sense of du/namij 
not reduced to its primary meaning.
340
  Although Aristotle’s prime example of the 
relation of potentiality and actuality is that of a capacity and its exercise, e.g., sight and 
seeing, he also applies the distinction to other kinds of beings as well.  For instance, 
Aristotle understands a boy as a potential human being and a man as a complete human 
being.  That is, for Aristotle, not only inactive causal power but also an incomplete 
substance is an example of a potential being.
341
   
 Commentators draw different implications from the fact that this division of 
potentiality and actuality is applied cross-categorically, generally dividing into two main 
approaches: unitarian and dualistic.  The unitary interpretation denies that there is a new 
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meaning of du/namij at issue here.342 According to this interpretation, in describing the 
actualization of substance, Aristotle simply introduces a different kind of causal power.  
For instance, Ross finds a special kind of causal power governing the internal 
development of substances in Aristotle.
343
  By contrast, dualists argue that ‘du/namij’ 
cannot name a certain type of causal power.  On this view, Aristotle, especially in Met., 
IX, 6, 1048a37-1048b6, distinguishes two ways of being: being potentially and being 
actually. Since the application of a dichotomy between actuality and potentiality, they 
argue, is not confined to any one category, it is likewise impermissible to seek to restrict 
du/namij to only one of Aristotle’s ten categories or to a certain kind of being, i.e., to 
internal causal power.  In their view, thus, capacity or the inactive causal power cannot 
be identified with du/namij itself, but rather it is causal power in a potential mode, just as 
incomplete substances are substances in potential mode. Inactive causal power and 
incomplete substances are two different kinds of potential beings.    
 If the unitarians are right, it becomes impossible to assimilate mathematical 
objects to potentialities or beings in potentiality.  But what if the dualists are right?  
The dualist interpretation could provide room for geometrical objects in Aristotle’s 
ontological space. If the matter of mathematical objects can be seen as potentiality in the 
sense of another mode of being, mathematical objects could be said to exist in that sense.  
The question, though, is whether the antecedent is true.   
 When we compare pure extension with any incomplete substance widely taken as 
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an example of another mode of being, evident differences, though, between the 
mathematical objects’ matter and such incomplete substances force themselves on our 
attention. One is that pure extension lacks the internal capacity or causal power to change 
itself or another thing into its actuality (supposing that geometrical objects have any 
actuality); for instance, while a boy by himself will become a man “unless something 
prevents and hinders it,” pure extension will remain shapeless until our intellect imposes 
thereon a certain geometrical form.   
 Since pure extension lacks the internal causal power to actualize itself into a 
geometrical object, its causal relationship with geometrical objects is not obvious.  In 
contrast, a strong causal relationship obtains between an incomplete substance and its 
actuality.  For instance, the incomplete form of a man immanent in a boy realizes itself 
if nothing hinders its realization, and in the process of its realization, arranges or 
organizes all the matter, such as bones and flesh, in such a way that its form is fully 
realized. In this sense, the incomplete form of a man in a boy can be seen as the efficient 
cause which develops the boy into a man.
344
  The incomplete form in a boy also 
provides a man with its formal cause in that, once the incomplete form is fully realized, it 
becomes the form of a man. And the complete form of a man is the final cause of a 
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 the boy exists for the sake of being a man, and a boy becomes a man when his 
incomplete form is fully actualized.
346
  Finally, a boy also provides the material cause of 
a man in the sense that the form of a man is realized on the body of a boy.
347
  In these 
terms, it might be said that a boy contributes to every cause of the existence of a man. 
While a boy is the cause of a man, it also holds good that a man is the cause of a boy; the 
potential form of a man in a boy is contributed by a man, which plays the role of every 




 The second difference between pure extension and incomplete substances is even 
more important. One important Aristotelian thesis of the relationship between actuality 
and potentiality is that actuality is prior to potentiality.  Aristotle argues that actuality is 
prior to potentiality in all of definition, time, and being.
349
  It is prior in definition: Any 
account of ‘being capable to be F’ always involves the account of ‘being F’ since ‘being 
capable to be F’ cannot be defined without reference to ‘being F.’ Actuality is prior in 
time; e. g., a man produces a boy, and an oak tree produces an acorn. Finally, actuality is 
                                                           
345
 For Aristotle, in the case of a natural object, efficient, formal, and final causes usually 
coincide. For the coincidence of the three causes, see Phys., II, 7, 198a25-30; 8, 199a31-33; DA., 
II, 4, 415b9-15; GA., 1, 715a7-11.  
346
 Witt argues that the teleological relationship between a potential being and its actuality is an 
indication that “Aristotle constructs a developmental, hierarchical, and intrinsically normative 
concept of being.” See Witt (2003) p. 3. 
347
 Aristotle regards the body as matter of man (DA., II, 1, 412a15-22; Met., VII, 11, 1037a6, etc.).  
348
 Phys., III, 2, 202a11-12; Met., XII,3, 1070a28; Pol., I, 6, 1255b1-2, etc. 
349
 For Aristotle’s remarks on the priority of actuality to potentiality in time, see Met., IX, 8, 
1049b23-26; 1049b19-23.  Potentiality is, however, prior to actuality in time in some sense; e.g., 
a boy becomes a man.  Priority in time is the only kind of priority which Aristotle assigns to 
potentiality over actuality. For this priority, see DA., II, 3, V, 11, 414b28-32; Met., 1019a6-10. 
185 
 
prior in being. For Aristotle, A is prior to B in being if and only if B cannot exist without 
there being A, not the other way around.  In this sense, potentiality is ontologically 
dependent on actuality, e. g., a boy can exist only if its father existed before.  This thesis 
of the threefold priority of actuality to potentiality is called ‘Aristotelian actualism.’
350
  
However, Aristotelian actualism would not seem to pertain in any obvious way to 
geometrical objects.  While Aristotle’s actualism suggests that actuality should be prior 
to its potentiality in being, the matter of geometrical objects, pure extension, exists as a 
property of sensible objects regardless of whether geometrical figures exist or not.  But 
it is obvious that geometrical figures cannot exist without pure extension (if they can be 
said to exist in any sense), in particular if we accept the view that geometrical figures are 
constructed by the intellect; the intellect constructs a new geometrical figure by imposing 
its form on pure extension. Thus, if pure extension is the potentiality of a geometrical 
figure, the potentiality of a geometrical figure ontologically should precede its actuality. 
But if we want to posit Aristotelian actualism as a general principle applying to any kind 
of potentiality and actuality, supposing that Aristotle is consistent in his actualism, the 
ontological priority of pure extension to geometrical figures could be a ground for 
doubting that the matter of geometrical objects, i.e., pure extension, is legitimately a kind 
of Aristotelian potentiality.  
 However, in Aristotle, not every kind of potentiality has the capacity to changes 
itself or other things into its actuality, nor is posterior to its actuality in being.  Aristotle 
extends the scheme of potentiality-actuality to the relationship between an artifact and its 
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matter.  He explains that:  
 
It seems that what we are talking about is not ‘this’ but ‘of that’ (e.g. a 
casket is not wood but of wood, and wood is not earth but of earth, and 
again perhaps earth, if it is in the same way, is not something else than ‘of 
that’), ‘that’ which is always absolutely in potentiality is what is posterior, 
e.g., a casket is not earthen nor earth, but wooden; for wood is potentially 
a casket and is the matter of a casket, wood in general for casket in general, 
and this particular wood for this particular casket. 
 
e)/oike de\ o(\ le/gomen ei)=nai ou) to/de a)ll' e)kei/ninonoi(=on 
to\ kibw/tion ou) cu/lon a)lla\ cu/linon, ou)de\ to\ cu/lon gh= 
a)lla\ gh/i+non, pa/lin h( gh= ei) ou(/twj mh\ a)/llo a)lla\ e)kei/ninon 
a)ei\ e)kei=no duna/mei a(plw=j to\ u(/stero/n e)stin. oi(=on to\ kibw/tion 
ou) gh/i+non ou)de\ gh= a)lla\ cu/linon: tou=to ga\r duna/mei kibw/tion 
kai\ u(/lh kibwti/ou au(/th, a(plw=j me\n tou= a(plw=j 
toudi\ de\ todi\ to\ cu/lon.351   
 
 
Although Aristotle distinguishes artificial production from natural generation,
352
 the 
production of an artifact is also regarded as a sort of change in that it is a transition from 
something to another thing, e.g., from unformed bronze to a bronze statue or from the 
materials of a house to a house. Thus, in Aristotle’s view, the matter of an artifact stands 
as the potentiality of the actual artifact.
353
  
However, the matter of artifacts differs from the two other kinds of potentiality 
we considered above: potentiality as an inactive causal power and potentiality as a way of 
existence. One distinguishable feature of artifacts is that their potentiality is ontologically 
prior to their actuality. Consider any artifact. It is obvious that, for instance, before the 
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 Met., IX, 7.1049a19-24. 
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 Ibid., VII, 7. 
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 See Makin (2006), p. 158  
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first airplane existed, its material previously existed; the existence of the airplane was 
dependent on its material, but not vice versa. It might be argued that a form of an artifact 
‘exists’ prior to its instantiation in the mind of the artisan. But there would be two 
responses to this objection. First, while most artifacts were not even conceived by any 
artisan before they were invented, it is reasonable to say that artifacts’ matter existed 
before the artifacts were specifically conceived, e.g., the material of airplanes existed 
before the invention of airplanes. Second, a form of an artifact in the mind of an artisan 
can be said to exist only potentially in the sense that it is not yet physically actualized.  
If we take an artifact’s form in the mind of the artisan as a kind of potential being, we run 
into the same problem that the potentiality of an artifact is prior to its actuality.
354
 
Another difference from other kinds of potentiality is that the artifacts’ potentiality is not 
endowed with the capacity in itself whose exercise yields its actuality. While a boy has 
the immanent causal power to change himself into a man should nothing external prevent, 
the material of a house never becomes a house by itself—it requires an external agent to 
exercise such a building capacity.  Since the material of artifacts lacks this kind of inner 
causal power, no causal relationship connects artifacts and their matter, either.  For 
instance, the efficient cause of a house does not lie in the material of the house, but in the 
artisan who builds the house; the final cause of a house is this artisan’s end or goal, and 
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 Hintikka, however, argues that the form in the mind of the artisan is mentally actualized when 
the artisan thinks of it and the mental actualization does not ontologically differ from physical 
actualization for Aristotle. I examine Hintikka’s view on mental actualization and its ontological 
implications in Chapter Four, §4, aiming to show that mental actualization is ontologically 
different from physical actualization. 
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the formal cause of a house its form in the artisan’s mind. 
355
 Likewise, houses do not 
make a contribution to there being the material of a house; the material of a house pre-
exists the house.  Except for the fact that the matter of a house provides the material 
cause of the house, there is no causal connectivity between artifacts and their material.  
 In this regard, the matter of a mathematical object is more analogous to the 
matter of artifacts than to the potentiality of a natural thing. We distinguished the matter 
of geometrical figures from other kinds of potentialities on the grounds that (i) it is prior 
to geometrical objects in being, (ii) absent the inherent causal power to actualize itself, 
this matter does not have a causal relationship with geometrical objects except insofar as 
it provides their material cause. Since the forms of geometrical objects are externally 
imposed on pure extension by the intellect in constructing figures, the only causal 
contribution of pure extension is to provide geometrical figures with their matter.  
Notice that the matter of arifacts shares these characteristics with that of 
mathematical objects; yet Aristotle is willing to regard this first matter as a kind of 
potentiality.  Thus, if the matter of an artifact is regarded as a kind of potentiality by 
Aristotle, the differences between the matter of mathematical objects and other modes of 
potentiality should not, then, be construed as a sufficient basis on which to disqualify the 
matter of geometrical objects as a sort of potentiality.  If the matter of artifacts is their 
potentiality, we could plausibly say that the matter of geometrical figures is their 
potentiality as well.  
                                                           
355
 While there is a teleological relationship between the potentiality and actuality of a natural 
substance, i.e., a boy exists for the sake of being a man, such a relationship does not obviously 
hold between an artifact and its matter—or at least, it is not intrinsic. 
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 But this does not get us anywhere. Even if we grant that pure extension could be 
the potentiality of geometrical objects, just as the matter of artifacts constitutes their 
potential being, the question of whether mathematical objects can be seen as possessing a 
sort of existence in Aristotle’s ontology remains undecided. This is because potentiality 
has several distinct senses and we have not yet determined the sense in which the matter 
of an artifact is its potentiality.  
 While Aristotle says that being potentially is another meaning of being,
356
 he 
declines to define the term ‘potentiality’, only suggesting that it may be grasped by 
analogy.
357
  For instance, it could be case that Aristotle calls the matter of artifacts 
‘potentiality,’ not thereby meaning another mode of existence of artifacts, but only using 
the term to indicate the starting-point of  a certain transition, namely the production of 
an artifact.  There are good grounds for accepting this latter position.  Let us, first, 
consider following sentences: 
 
 (1) A boy is actualized into a man. 
 (2) A capacity of seeing (sight) is actualized into seeing. 
 
While these assertions are intuitively attractive, there seems something deficient in: 
 
 (3) Timber is actualized into a ship. 
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Rather, we seem to have to say: 
 
 (4) The form of a ship in the mind of the shipbuilder is actualized into the ship 
he builds. 
 
In other words, the relationship between the matter of an artifact as potentiality and its 
actuality is different form that between an incomplete substance and its actuality, or that 
between capacity and its actuality, namely, unlike that holding between ‘a boy’ and ‘a 
man’ or between ‘sight’ and ‘seeing,’ ‘timber’ and ‘a ship’ is not related by the 
relationship of ‘being actualized into.’ In fact, what is actualized as an artifact is not the 
matter or something in the matter but rather its form in the artisan’s mind by the medium 
of its matter. Thus, if an artifact has any potentiality whose relation to its actuality can be 
likened to the relation of an incomplete substance to its complete development, or to the 
relationship of a capacity and its exercise, it should be the form of the artifact in the mind 
of the artisan rather than its matter. So, we can say, at least, that the matter of an artifact is 
not called potentiality in the same sense that applies to an incomplete substance or a 
capacity.  
 Secondly, it is not clear whether even actual artifacts can be regarded as real 
entities in Aristotle’s metaphysics. If they are something existent, they must belong to one 
of Aristotle’s categories; this category should be substance since a particular artifact is 
what is neither said of any subject nor is in any subject; rather, it takes the place of a 
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subject in a sentence.
358
  Nevertheless, in several places in the Metaphysics, we see 
Aristotle question the substantial status of artifacts.
359
 And there are good reasons to 
think that, for Aristotle, artifacts are not substances. First of all, while every substance has 
its own form, it is questionable whether artifacts do so in any proper sense. In Physics, II, 
1, Aristotle draws a distinction between artifacts and living things by appealing to 
differences between them: living things have the principle of change in themselves, but 
the principle of change for artifacts exists in something else than themselves (e)n 
a)/ll%).360 Importantly, Aristotle identifies this internal principle of change with nature 
and nature with the form specified in the definition of the thing.
361
  As mentioned earlier, 
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 For Aristotle’s criterion of substance in Categories, see Cat., 5. In Met., VII, Aristotle 
suggests other criteria of substances as well: separateness, thisness and priority (Ibid., 3, 1029a27-
33; 13, 1038b23-9). Further, he identifies forms with substances in that they satisfy these criteria. 
Even if we apply these criteria to artifacts, artifacts remain disqualified as substances insofar as 
they lack proper forms.  
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 Met., III, 4, 999b17-20; VIII, 3, 1043b18-23; XI, 2, 1060b23-28; XII, 3, 1070a13-18, etc. 
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 Phys., II, 1, 192b13-32.  
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 Ibid., 193a28-31; 193b6. It is controversial whether the internal principle of change includes 
the principle of generation or whether they are two distinct principles. Katayama argues that the 
principle of generation is not an instance of the internal principle of change on the grounds that 
nothing generates itself (Katayama (1999) p. 110). But Aristotle on more than one occasion 
identifies the principle of generation with nature (fu/sij) (Met., XII, 3, 1070a6-7). That is, ‘the 
internal principle’ and ‘the principle of generation’ have the same reference, namely, nature. 
 Making a distinction between the internal principle of change and that of generation, 
Katayama also maintains that only the principle of generation can be considered to be a criterion 
of substantiality (Katayama (1999) p. 110); by having an internal principle of generation, it is 
possible for living things to perpetuate their own species (Ibid., p. 104-105). He points out that 
mules and spontaneous organisms, according to Aristotle, are not substances in spite of their 
having the internal principle of change (Ibid., p. 104). Living things are considered substances not 
because they have the principle of change in themselves but because they can perpetuate their 
own species (Ibid., p. 104). Likewise, artifacts are not substantial insofar as they lack the 
principle of generation in themselves. In the case of artifacts, the principle of generation is art 
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for Aristotle, in the case of living things, “the form (to\ ei)=doj), the mover (to\ kinh=san), 
and that for the sake of which (to\ ou(= e(/neka) often coincide.”362 The form of a living 
thing is its moving cause: For instance, it is the soul of a boy which in the process of a 
boy’s growing  arranges or organizes all his matter in such a way that the soul of the 
body can fully function.  Once the soul is fully actualized, it changes and moves the 
body so as to maintain its full functioning.  In these terms, the soul is the principle of 
change in an animal (which Aristotle also understands as its form).  Since, for Aristotle, 
living things are substances most of all (ma/lista ou)si/a),363 whose internal principles 
are identified with their forms, the forms of artifacts, e.g., the shape of a bronze sphere, 
should be distinguished from the forms of substances. Namely, artifacts do not have 
proper forms or have forms only by analogy.
364
 Since the forms of artifacts differ from 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(te/xnh), which exists externally in something else, i.e. in the mind of artisans (Met., XII, 3, 
1070a7). Thus, the existence of an artifact is dependent upon the existence of an artisan; in 
contrast, living things are ontologically dependent only on their own species. 
362
 Phys., II, 7, 198a25-30. For the coincidence of efficient, formal, and final causes of living 
things, see Chapter Four, §3, 3.3, n.345. 
363
 There are several passages that explicitly or implicitly support the view that all living things 
are substances in the highest sense: Cat., 5, 2a35-2b6; Met., VII, 7, 1032a18-19; 8, 1034a3-4; 17, 
1041b28-31; VIII, 3, 1043b22-23; XII, 3, 1070a17-19, etc. 
364
 Another reason to doubt the existence of forms of artifacts is that the forms of artifacts are 
created by the intellect, whereas the forms of substances are not generated but rather eternal. Thus, 
strictly speaking, we might say there is no form of an artifact. 
 Aristotle does not explicitly deny the existence of forms of artifacts. But he agrees with 
Plato that artifacts do not have their Forms, if there are Platonic Forms at all. He says, for 
instance, “Now in some cases the ‘this’ does not exist apart from the composite substance, for 
instance, the form of house does not so exist if not the art of [building] exists (nor is there 
generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in another way that "house" and "health" and 
everything made by art do or do not exist without its matter); but in the case of natural objects, 
they really do so. And so Plato did not say so wrongly that there are as many Forms as there are 
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those of substances (or they do not have forms at all in a strict sense), it can be inferred 
that they are not substances.
365
 And if they are neither substances nor properties of a 
substance, it is difficult to see how we can find a place for them in Aristotle’s ontology.  
‘House,’ for example, does not refer to a substance, but to a heap of material unified in 
such a way that it functions as a shelter for human beings. If it is accepted that actual 
                                                                                                                                                                             
kinds of natural things, if there are Forms at all (e)pi\ me\n ou)=n tinw=n to\ to/de ti ou)k e)/sti 
para\ th\n sunqeth\n ou)si/an, oi(=on oi)ki/aj to\ ei)=doj, ei) mh\ h( te/xnh ¨ou)d' e)/sti ge/nesij 
kai\ fqora\ tou/twn, a)ll' a)/llon tro/pon ei)si\ kai\ ou)k ei)si\n oi)ki/a te h( a)/neu u(/lhj 
kai\ u(gi/eia kai\ pa=n to\ kata\ te/xnhn©, a)ll' ei)/per, e)pi\ tw=n fu/sei: dio\ dh\ ou) kakw=j 
Pla/twn e)/fh o(/ti ei)/dh e)/stin o(po/sa fu/sei, ei)/per e)/stin ei)/dh) (Met,. XII, 3,1070a13-
19).” We do not know the exact rationale for Plato’s denial of the existence of Forms of artifacts. 
But, as the passage suggests, forms of natural things are not subject to generation and destruction, 
while the Forms or forms of artifacts, should there be any such, are conceived by artisans at a 
certain time. Since both Aristotelian forms and Platonic Forms are eternal, this difference could 
underlie the denial of the existence of Forms and forms of artifacts. Aristotle at certain points 
talks about forms of artifacts but in a different sense from that in which natural things exist. 
365
 Scholars have suggested three different reasons for the denial of the substancehood of artifacts 
on the basis of differences between living things and artifacts: (i) Artifacts do not have the 
internal principle of change of living things (Sellars (1967) pp. 78, and 119-124; Lewis (1994) pp. 
263-265) (ii) the form of an artifact does not possess function which the form or soul of a body 
has (Gill (1989) pp. 161, 213, 221, and 242; Irwin (1988) pp. 571-572), and (iii) the relation 
between the matter of artifacts and their forms lacks the intrinsic unity of the soul and the body 
(Gerson (1984); Halper (1989); Kosman (1987); Ferejohn (1994); Block (1978)). I take (i) to be 
one reason to deny the existence of forms of artifacts. Katayama, however, argues that (i), (ii), 
and (iii) are not strong enough to deprive artifacts of the status of substance. He points out that 
those views are based on the assumption that living things are substances most of all. But, he 
argues, this is dubious because there is no evidence that Aristotle considers mules and 
spontaneously generated organisms as anyhow substances (see Katayama (1999) pp. 18-23). For 
the argument against the substantiality of mules, see also Rorty (1973) pp, 393-420). I will not 
further discuss each of (i), (ii) and (iii) in detail (for a brief survey of these three views, see 
Katayama (1999) pp. 122-124); even if artifacts are substances and their matter a kind of 
existence, as we will see, there are other good Aristotelian reasons to deny that the matter of a 
geometrical figure is a kind of existence—i.e., there is no actuality of geometrical figures.   
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artifacts are not real units of existence, a fortiori their potentialities cannot be seen as 
some kind of existent. 
 If the matter of artifacts is a kind of potentiality but not in the sense of existence, 
it would be a wasted effort to try to show that the matter of a geometrical figure is its 
potentiality on the basis of similarities between the matter of geometrical objects and that 
of artifacts. But what if artifacts can be seen as substance at least with some 
qualification? If artifacts are substances, there could be a possibility that the matter of 
artifacts is their potentiality qua another mode of the existence of artifacts.  Even if we 
accept the matter of artifacts as a kind of existence, however, this would not by itself 
guarantee that the matter of a geometrical figure is also another mode of existence. It 
should be noted that Aristotle regards matter as potentiality because every change is a 
transition from some potentiality to some actuality, and the matter of an artifact is 
changed into an actual artifact. This is what allows Aristotle to calls the matter of an 
artifact ‘potentiality’, in spite of his own actualism. Unlike artifacts, however, many 
geometrical objects do not have actual physical instantiations; if there is no actuality of 
some geometrical objects, there can be no change or transition from their matter to their 
actuality. Then, whatever their matter is, there is no basis for saying that their matter is 
the potentiality of actual geometrical objects.  More generally, it is questionable how 
something can be only in potentiality without the presence of a corresponding actuality. If 
we consider Aristotle’s emphasis on the priority of actuality in existence, it is not likely 
that he could accept that something can exist not in actuality but only in potentiality. 
Aristotle’s ontology would not seem to countenance the existence of potential beings 
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independently from actual beings.  Thus, insofar as Aristotle maintains his actualism, 
there cannot be something which exists only in potentiality. This implies that insofar as 
some geometrical figures do not exist in actuality, they cannot exist in potentiality, either. 
  
 3.4. Infinity-Potentiality without Actuality 
 
However, Aristotle does seem to hold out the prospect of something which is in 
potentiality and is never actualized. He says, “Some things exist only actually, some 
potentially, some potentially and actually—some as substances, some quantities, others in 
the other categories ( )/Esti de\ to\ me\n e)nergei/# mo/non to\ de\ duna/mei 
to\ de\ duna/mei kai\ e)nergei/#, to\ me\n o)\n to\ de\ poso\n to\ de\ tw=n loipw=n).”366 
We should again begin by clarifying the sense he uses the term ‘potentially’ here.  We 
may then proceed to determine whether the term, ‘potentiality’, in this sense, means a 
certain kind of existence. 
 Aristotle’s account of infinity sheds light on this matter; the infinite is an example 
of a potentiality that is not actualized.  For Aristotle, the infinite is not in actuality. He 
says, “it is clear that the infinite cannot exist actually (o(/ti ou)k e)/stin e)nergei/# ei)=nai 
to\ a)/peiron, dh=lon).” 367   First, there cannot be actual infinite extension. 368  In 
Aristotelian cosmology, the universe is finite in its size, and outside the universe nothing 
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extended can exist; Aristotle denies the existence of any empty space which exists by 
itself independently of all bodies.
369
 Secondly, Aristotle further denies the existence of an 
infinite number. He does so on two grounds: (i) he presupposes that a number is 
something countable. But since infinite number is not countable, ex hypothesi there is no 
infinite number.
370
 (ii) Aristotle also argues that the infinity cannot exist separately in 
itself, since it does not exist as a substance but only as a property of a certain kind of 
quantity, such as extension or number.
371
  But since there is no infinite number or 
extension in the actual world, the infinite cannot exist in actuality, either.
372
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 Aristotle’s account of infinity raises a couple of problems with regard to time and 
mathematics. The first is that, according to Aristotle, there is no beginning of time (for Aristotle’s 
rejection of a beginning or an end of time, see Phys., IV, 13, 222b6-7; VIII, 1, 251a8-252a5); 
since there is no beginning of time, there must be an infinite span of time. Whatever time unit we 
use to measure time’s span, i.e., whether we count it by year or day, we must attribute an infinite 
number to its temporal extent. Thus, it might be argued that an infinite number exists as a 
quantitative property of time. Aristotle nowhere deals with this problem, but would have to avail 
himself of one or both of two possible responses: (i) The future will exist and the past existed, but 
only the present exists. Thus, an infinite span of time does not exist actually. (ii) Time is a kind of 
number and numbers as mathematical objects are fictional entities, in the sense that their 
existence depends on our mental operations such as counting. For Aristotle, “it is impossible for 
there to be time unless there is soul, if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count 
(Phys., IV, 14, 223a25-26).”  Since time is fictional, the infinity which is its property should also 
be fictional. (For the fictionality of numbers, see Appendix). The second problem is that the 
concept of infinity is current in the geometry of Aristotle’s day. For instance, Elements I, Def. 23, 
Post 5, Prop. 29 speaks of lines being extended infinitely. But Aristotle believes that such infinite 
lines might be replaced with finite line sections without harming the practice of geometry. He 
says, “This account does not deprive the mathematicians of their study, by disproving that there is 
actually the infinite such that it is untraversable in the direction of increase; for, as a matter of fact, 
they do not need the infinite (for they do not use it), but they need only that there should a finite 
line of any length they wish. It is possible to have divided another magnitude of any size 
whatever in the same ratio as the largest quantity. Hence, for the purpose of proof, it will make no 
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It is clear that in a sense [the infinite] is and in a sense it is not. ‘To be’, 
then, means either ‘to be in potentiality’ or ‘to be in actuality’; and the 
infinite is, on the one hand, in addition and, on the other hand, in division. 
It has been stated that that magnitude is not actually infinite. But it is 
infinite in division; for it is not hard to refute indivisible lines. Then, it 
remains for the infinite to be in potentiality.  And we must not take ‘being 
in potentiality’ in the same way as that in which, if it is possible for this to 
be a statue, it will be a statue in actuality; something will be infinite in 
actuality not in this sense.   'To be' has many senses, just as the day is, 
and the contest is, i.e., one thing after another always occurs; so too with 
the infinite. (In these cases too there is ‘in potentiality’ and ‘in actuality’; 
for there are the Olympic games, both in the sense that the contest is able 
to occur and in the sense that it is occurring.) 
 
dh=lon o(/ti pw\j me\n e)/stin pw\j d' ou)/. le/getai dh\ to\ ei)=nai to\ me\n 
duna/mei to\ de\ e)ntelexei/#, kai\ to\ a)/peiron e)/sti me\n prosqe/sei 
e)/sti de\ kai\ diaire/sei. to\ de\ me/geqoj o(/ti me\n kat' e)ne/rgeian 
ou)k e)/stin a)/peiron, ei)/rhtai, diaire/sei d' e)sti/n: ou) ga\r 
xalepo\n a)nelei=n ta\j a)to/mouj gramma/j: lei/petai ou)=n 
duna/mei ei)=nai to\ a)/peiron. ou) dei= de\ to\ duna/mei o)\n lamba/nein, 
w(/sper ei) dunato\n tou=t' a)ndria/nta ei)=nai, w(j kai\ e)/stai tou=t' 
a)ndria/j, ou(/tw kai\ a)/peiron o(\ e)/stai e)nergei/#: a)ll' 
e)pei\ pollaxw=j to\ ei)=nai, w(/sper h( h(me/ra e)/sti kai\ o( a)gw\n t%= 
a)ei\ a)/llo kai\ a)/llo gi/gnesqai, ou(/tw kai\ to\ a)/peiron ¨kai\ ga\r 
e)pi\ tou/twn e)/sti kai\ duna/mei kai\ e)nergei/#:  )Olu/mpia ga\r 
                                                                                                                                                                             
difference to them that [the infinite] is among existent magnitudes (ou)k a)fairei=tai d' o( 
lo/goj ou)de\ tou\j maqhmatikou\j th\n qewri/an, a)nairw=n ou(/twj ei)=nai a)/peiron w(/ste 
e)nergei/# ei)=nai e)pi\ th\n au)/chsin a)dieci/thton: ou)de\ ga\r nu=n de/ontai tou= a)pei/rou 
¨ou) ga\r xrw=ntai©, a)lla\ mo/non ei)=nai o(/shn a)\n bou/lwntai peperasme/nhn: t%= de\ 
megi/st% mege/qei to\n au)to\n e)/sti tetmh=sqai lo/gon o(phlikonou=n me/geqoj e(/teron. 
w(/ste pro\j me\n to\ dei=cai e)kei/noij ou)de\n dioi/sei to\ [d'] ei)=nai e)n toi=j ou)=sin 
mege/qesin) (Phys., III, 7, 207b28-35) .” For Hussey’s discussion of Aristotle’s finitism, see 
Hussey (1983), pp. xx-xxvi; 93-96; 178-179.  
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Aristotle maintains that it is not possible to produce an infinite magnitude by addition, on 
the ground that that there can be no actual infinite magnitude. This inference is possible 
because he also grants elsewhere that the size of universe is fixed;
374
 were the universe 
continually to expand, there could at least be a potential infinity in some sense.  
Although Aristotle denies the possibility of a potential infinity in respect of continual 
addition, he does argue that a potential infinity can be generated by repeatedly dividing a 
certain magnitude. A series of magnitudes can be produced by dividing a magnitude e.g. a 
finite line ad infinitum (given that Aristotle rejects the existence of the indivisible line).
375
 
The series is potentially infinite in that the process which increases the number of its 
members can be continued endlessly.  Nevertheless, the series is only potentially infinite 
because its size is always only finite at the moment of any dividing operation, meaning 
that the actualization of the potentiality of the infinite remains a mere possibility.
376
  
 This potentiality is different from the potentialities which we examined 
previously. We considered three different meanings of potentiality: (i) potentiality as 
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inactive causal power, (ii) potentiality as another mode of existence, and (iii) potentiality 
as the matter of substances or substance-like things, i.e., artifacts.  Whatever their 
differences, these modes of potentiality are alike in that each has its corresponding 
actuality, bound in strong or weak causal relationships to its potential; further, it is true of 
all that these potentialities “are some kind of origins, and are so called in reference to one 
primary kind, which is a starting point of change in something else or in the thing itself 
qua something else (a)rxai/ tine/j ei)si, kai\ pro\j prw/thn mi/an le/gontai, h(/ e)stin 
a)rxh\ metabolh=j e)n a)/ll% h)\ v(= a)/llo).”377  However, the infinite as potentiality 
neither has its actuality nor exists in any causal relationship with its actuality.  Moreover, 
since there can be no actuality of the infinite, the sense in which it is in potentiality 
cannot be the primary sense of the term. A potentiality is regarded as a starting point of 
some change when the change is understood as the actualization of that potentiality. But 
since there is no actuality of the potentiality of the infinite, the potentiality of the infinite 
is not in this way a starting point of change. Aristotle phrases this point in the following 
way. 
 
…what is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible 
for it to be actualized, e.g., I mean by ‘capable of building’ that which can 
build, and by ‘capable of seeing’ that which can see, and by ‘visible’ that 
which can be seen. 
 
ga\r e)nde/xesqai e)nergh=sai dunato/n e)sti to\ prw/twj dunato/n, 
oi(=on le/gw oi)kodomiko\n to\ duna/menon oi)kodomei=n, kai\ o(ratiko\n 
to\ o(ra=n, kai\ o(rato\n to\ dunato\n o(ra=sqai.378  
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 Met., IX, 1, 1046a9-11. 
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  Thus, it can be concluded that, while Aristotle has a concept of potentiality which 
does not entail the existence of its corresponding actuality, this type of potentiality is 
quite different from other kinds of potentiality. Then, even if other kinds of potentialities 
can be seen as involving a mode of existence, the non-actualizable potentiality of the 
infinite does not need to be some kind of existent.  Rather, considering Aristotle’s 
emphasis on the priority of actuality to potentiality in existence, it is very unlikely that 
Aristotle will view non-actualizable potentiality as an existent entity.    
 Aristotle’s texts endorse this inference. We must remember that ‘being 
potentially’ has many senses for Aristotle, not all of them necessarily entailing ‘existence’. 
While ‘being potentially’ on the one hand may denote a mode of existence, on the other, 
it may also signify a kind of non-existence:  
 
The term 'actuality', which we connect with 'reality', has been extended 
primarily from changes to other things; for actuality in the primary sense is 
thought to be identical with change. Hence people do not assign change to 
non-existent things, though they do assign some other predicates. For 
instance, they say that non-existent things are conceivable and desirable, but 
not that they are changed; and this is because, while they do not actually 
exist, they will exist actually [if they were changed]. For of non-existent 
things some exist potentially; but they do not exist, because they do not 
exist in actuality. 
 
 e)lh/luqe d' h( e)ne/rgeia tou)/noma, h( pro\j th\n e)ntele/xeian 
suntiqeme/nh, kai\ e)pi\ ta\ a)/lla e)k tw=n kinh/sewn ma/lista: 
dokei= ga\r h( e)ne/rgeia ma/lista h( ki/nhsij ei)=nai, dio\ kai\ toi=j 
mh\ ou)=sin ou)k a)podido/asi to\ kinei=sqai, a)/llaj de/ tinaj 
kathgori/aj, oi(=on dianohta\ kai\ e)piqumhta\ ei)=nai ta\ mh\ o)/nta, 
kinou/mena de\ ou)/, tou=to de\ o(/ti ou)k o)/nta e)nergei/# e)/sontai 
e)nergei/#. tw=n ga\r mh\ o)/ntwn e)/nia duna/mei e)sti/n: ou)k e)/sti de/, 
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o(/ti ou)k e)ntelexei/# e)sti/n.379 
 
 
 Let us consider this argument in greater detail. At first glance, it does not appear 
to be valid.  Aristotle’s claims may be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Actuality is identical with change. 
2. Non-beings do not change.
380
 
3. Some potentialities are not actualized. 
4. Those non-actualizable potentialities do not exist. 
 
Aristotle begins the argument with identifying actuality with change.
381
  But he takes 
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 Ibid., 1047a30-47b2. Aristotle argues the same point also in Phys., V, 1, 225a20-27, Met., 
XIV, 2, 1089a27-30. I translate ‘e)ntele/xeian’ as ‘reality’ to distinguish it from ‘e)ne/rgeia.’ 
But in Aristotle’s works both terms equally mean ‘actuality,’ and are typically used usually 
without distinction. For an account of Aristotle’s usage of these terms, see Chapter Three, §5, n. 
206. 
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 Also see Phys., V, 1, 225a20-29. 
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 “The actuality of that which potentially is, qua such, is change, e.g., the actuality of that 
which is alterable, qua alterable, is alteration; of that which is increasable and its opposite, 
decreasable (for there is no common term for both), it is increase and decrease; of what can come 
to be and pass away, it is coming to be and passing away; of what can be carried along, it is 
locomotion. And so it is, thus, clear that this is change; for when that which is buildable is in 
actuality, insofar as we call it such, it is being built, and this is the act of building; and similarly 
with learning and healing and rolling and jumping and maturing and growing old (h( tou= 
duna/mei o)/ntoj e)ntele/xeia, v(= toiou=ton, ki/nhsi/j e)stin, oi(=on tou= me\n a)lloiwtou=, v(= 
a)lloiwto/n, a)lloi/wsij, tou= de\ au)chtou= kai\ tou= a)ntikeime/nou fqitou= ¨ou)de\n ga\r 
o)/noma koino\n e)p' a)mfoi=n© au)/chsij kai\ fqi/sij, tou= de\ genhtou= kai\ fqartou= 
ge/nesij kai\ fqora/, tou= de\ forhtou= fora/. o(/ti de\ tou=to e)/stin h( ki/nhsij, e)nteu=qen 
dh=lon. o(/tan ga\r to\ oi)kodomhto/n, v(= toiou=ton au)to\ le/gomen ei)=nai, e)ntelexei/# v)=, 
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this as a ground for establishing the general claim that changing is not a property of non-
beings.  However, to use 1 as the premise for 2, we should also assume: 
 
 5.  Anything actual is something existent.   
 
For Aristotle, there is no doubt about the existence of actual beings; “actuality means 
existence of the thing (e)/sti e)nergeia to\ u(pa/rxein to\ pra=gma).”382 A more critical 
question is whether there are some kinds of beings other than actual beings.  Since 
actuality is identified with change, from 3 we can infer that: 
 
 6. Some potentialities do not change.   
 
From 6 and 2, however, 4 does not follow; from the fact that any non-being does not 
change and something, say a, does not change, it does not follow that a is a non-being; 
the prime mover would be a counterexample here, in that the prime mover does not 
change but exists in actuality; indeed it is pure actuality. 
 To evaluate the original argument fairly, though, we must again consider 
Aristotle’s motivation for introducing the concept of potentiality. He invented the concept 
to explain how change is possible in the face of Megarian actualism: in order to explain 
                                                                                                                                                                             
oi)kodomei=tai, kai\ e)/stin tou=to oi)kodo/mhsij: o(moi/wj de\ kai\ ma/qhsij 
kai\ i)a/treusij kai\ ku/lisij kai\ a(/lsij kai\ a(/drunsij kai\ gh/ransij) (Phys., III, 1, 
201a10-19).”  
382
 Met., IX, 6, 1048a39-31. 
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how A becomes B when A is not B, it is necessary to assume the existence of the 
potentiality for B. For A to be changed into B, there must exist something which 
actualizes itself into B if nothing prevents or hinders it; that thing is the potentiality of B; 
B comes to exist when its potentiality is actualized. Thus, if there is no actualization of B 
from A, there is no reason to posit such a thing as the potentiality of being B. And since 
the potentiality of B will not be actualized, it will not change—in that change is the 
actualization of some potentiality. But it is assumed that non-changing is a common 
feature of non-beings.  If there is no reason to posit the potentiality of B, and it shares in 
a common feature of non-beings, namely, non-changing,
383
 it seems to be fair to claim 
that, stricto sensu, it does not exist.   
 Leaving to one side the validity of Aristotle’s argument against the existence of 
non-actualizable potentiality, it should by now be clear that he does not accept such a 
potentiality as something existent in his ontology.  This consideration is germane to a 
discussion of the ontological status of mathematical objects because they too (if they can 
be called potential in any sense) represent a potentiality which may never be actualized. 
Since non-actualizable potentiality in general is a kind of non-being for Aristotle, it can 
be concluded that the potentiality of geometrical objects does not exist, insofar as they are 
merely potential and will not be actualized.  
 
 4. The Mental Actualization of Mathematical Objects 
                                                           
383
 One might wonder whether non-beings can have any properties at all. This kind of assertion, 
though, could be construed as a negative claim made of a potentiality, that is, as simply meaning 




 Hintikka, at this point, proposes a solution. Hintikka argues that Aristotle allows 
not only for physical actualization but also for mental or immaterial actualization; and 
geometrical objects can be actualized not in physical matter but in the intellect.  His 
thesis that there can be an actuality of each geometrical object in thought is very 
important to our discussion, since the apparent failure of some geometrical objects 
actually to exist lies at the origin of every problem in Aristotle’s philosophy of 
mathematics.  
 We can at once note that Aristotle in fact mentions the actualization of a 
geometrical construction in one of the passages we have already examined:  
 
The geometrical constructions are discovered in actuality because they 
(mathematicians) discover [them] by dividing [the given figures]. If they 
had been already divided, they would have been obvious; but as it is they 
are in there potentially. Why is the triangle two right angles? It is because 
the angles around one point are equal to two right angles. Thus, if the line 
parallel to the side had been drawn up, the reason would have been clear 
immediately on seeing [it]. Why is there universally a right angle in the 
semi-circle? Because if three lines are equal, the two which are the base 
and the one set upright from the centre, it is clear on seeing it to one who 
knows that.  Thus, it is evident that the things in potentiality are 
discovered by being brought into actuality; the reason is that thinking is 
the actuality, so that the potentiality is from actuality, and because of this 
they know by constructing, for the individual actuality is posterior in 
generation.  
 
eu(ri/sketai de\ kai\ ta\ diagra/mmata e)nergei/#: diairou=ntej ga\r 
eu(ri/skousin. ei) d' h)=n divrhme/na, fanera\ a)\n h)=n: nu=n d' 
e)nupa/rxei duna/mei. dia\ ti/ du/o o)rqai\ to\ tri/gwnon; o(/ti 
ai(    peri\ mi/an stigmh\n gwni/ai i)/sai du/o o)rqai=j. ei) ou)=n 
a)nh=kto h( para\ th\n pleura/n, i)do/nti a)\n h)=n eu)qu\j dh=lon dia\ ti/. e)n 
h(mikukli/% o)rqh\ kaqo/lou dia\ ti/; e)a\n i)/sai trei=j, h(/ te ba/sij 
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du/o kai\ h( e)k me/sou e)pistaqei=sa o)rqh/, i)do/nti dh=lon t%= e)kei=no 
ei)do/ti. w(/ste fanero\n o(/ti ta\ duna/mei o)/nta ei)j e)ne/rgeian 
a)go/mena eu(ri/sketai: ai)/tion de\ o(/ti h( no/hsij e)ne/rgeia: w(/st' e)c 
e)nergei/aj h( du/namij, kai\ dia\ tou=to poiou=ntej gignw/skousin 
¨u(/steron ga\r gene/sei h( e)ne/rgeia h( kat' a)riqmo/n©.384 
 
 
Clearly, Aristotle says here that a potential geometrical construction is ‘actualized.’  I 
argued earlier that if geometrical constructions can be mentally constructed, so can 
geometrical figures.  By the same logic, if a potential geometrical construction can be in 
some way actualized, a geometrical figure should be able to be actualized in the same 
way. One problem, though, emerges in that, although the matter of geometrical objects, 
pure extension, is obtained from physical world by means of abstraction, this does not 
guarantee the reality of a geometrical object.  As we have argued before,
385
 insofar as 
there is no ontological or causal relationship between mathematical forms constructed by 
the intellect and actual beings in the external world, a geometrical object actualized only 
in the mind will remain a fictional entity, with the result that geometry will lose its 
objective reality. 
 Hintikka, however, argues that there is little difference for Aristotle between 
actualization in physical matter and actualization in the intellect.
386
  He develops this 
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 Met., X, 1, 1051a21-33 
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 See Chapter Four, §2. 
386
 Hintikka (1996) p. 208. 
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argument on the basis of Aristotle’s claim of an identity between the thinking intellect 
and the objects of thinking.
387
   
 
the intellect is in a way potentially the objects of thought, but it is 
actually nothing before it thinks; potentially in the same way as characters 
are said to be on a tablet on which nothing is actually written; this is what 
happens in the case of the intellect. And it is itself an object of thought, 
just as its objects are. For, in the case of those things which have no matter, 
that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for 
contemplative knowledge and that which is known in that way are the 
same…In those things which have matter each of the objects of thought is 
present potentially. Hence, intellect will not be present in them (for 
intellect is a potentiality of such things without their matter), but what can 
be thought will be present in that kind of thing. 
 
...duna/mei pw/j e)sti ta\ nohta\ o( nou=j, a)ll' e)ntelexei/# ou)de/n, 
pri\n a)\n nov=: duna/mei d' ou(/twj w(/sper e)n grammatei/% %(= mhqe\n 
e)nupa/rxei e)ntelexei/# gegramme/non: o(/per sumbai/nei e)pi\ tou= 
nou=. kai\ au)to\j de\ nohto/j e)stin w(/sper ta\ nohta/. e)pi\ me\n ga\r 
tw=n a)/neu u(/lhj to\ au)to/ e)sti to\ noou=n kai\ to\ noou/menon: h( ga\r 
e)pisth/mh h( qewrhtikh\ kai\ to\ ou(/twj e)pisthto\n to\ au)to/ e)stin 
… e)n de\ toi=j e)/xousin u(/lhn duna/mei e(/kaston e)/sti tw=n nohtw=n. 
w(/st' e)kei/noij me\n ou)x u(pa/rcei nou=j ¨a)/neu ga\r u(/lhj du/namij 
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 The identity between the subject of thinking and the objects of thinking is asserted also at 
Met., XII, 7, 1072b20. He says, “And intellect thinks itself through participation in the object of 
thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, 
so that the intellect and the object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving 
the object thought, i.e. the substance, is the intellect. And it is actuality which it possesses [this 
object] (au(to\n de\ noei= o( nou=j kata\ meta/lhyin tou= nohtou=: nohto\j ga\r gi/gnetai 
qigga/nwn kai\ now=n, w(/ste tau)to\n nou=j kai\ nohto/n. to\ ga\r dektiko\n tou= nohtou= 
kai\ th=j ou)si/aj nou=j, e)nergei= de\ e)/xwn).” 
388
 DA., III, 4, 429b30-430a10. 
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Hinitkka argues as follows: Since, when the intellect thinks something, say, x, it becomes 
x, thinking x entails the actualization of x. That is to say, x is actualized in the mind of 
the thinker, when the thinker thinks x. For this reason, the conceivability of x implies the 
actualizability of x.
389
 What differentiates actualization in the mind from actualization 
outside is only the fact that they take hold in different matter; the matter in which the 
form of a house is actualized in the mind of a builder evidently differs from the physical 
material out of which the house may be built.  However, the kind of matter in which the 
form is actualized is not important for actualization (mental or physical), nor is it 
necessary that a form actualizable in mind should also be actualizable in physical matter; 
some forms can be actualized in both media, others just in one.
390
 Thus, mental 
actualization is as good as any other actualization.
391
 
 Hintikka further claims that his own view provides solutions for the problems 
posed by Aristotle’s actualism. We have considered three exceptional cases to Aristotle’s 
actualism: artificial products, infinity, and geometrical objects. In those cases, either 
potentiality is prior to actuality in existence or something is only in potentiality without 
being actualized.  But according to Hintikka, a form of an artifact in its producer’s mind 
can be seen as the actuality of the artifact, since being thought in the intellect is identical 
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 Hintikka (1996) pp. 208 and 209-211.  
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 Hintikka, however, does not identify in what matter a form is actualized in the intellect.  This 
is problematic because there is no clear textual evidence that Aristotle assumes such mental or 
immaterial matter.  One candidate for this immaterial matter would be the intellect itself. The 
intellect is potentially whatever it thinks; and we saw a conceptual connection between 
potentiality and matter. The matter of x is potentially x because it will be x by virtue of receiving 
the form of x. See DA., III, 4, 430a10.   
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with being actualized for Aristotle. If we grant Hintikka’s claim, even the first instance of 
an artifact can have its actuality prior to its potentiality. Similarly, every potentiality can 
have its actuality i.e. in mind. In the case of infinity, for instance, insofar as we can 
conceive of it, infinity is actualized.
392
 No potentiality goes without its actuality. 
Actualism may be consistently applied to geometrical figures as well. With regard to 
geometrical figures, a problem concerning Aristotle’s actualism was such figures existed 
only in potentiality and in a restricted sense. But since we can construct a geometrical 
figure in the intellect, it will thereby exist in actuality as well.  
 However, there are significant differences between mental actualization and 
physical actualization.  First, the former is mind-dependent and, in that sense, lacks the 
objectivity of the latter.  In the light of Aristotle’s metaphysical objectivism, it is not 
likely that they will have the same ontological status. Secondly, on Hintikka’s view, a 
form of an artifact in the mind of an artisan should be regarded as its actuality.  
However, Aristotle identifies this form with its potentiality, not its actuality; the form is 
rather actualized by being embodied in some physical matter.
393
  This indicates that he 
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 Hintikka assumes that for Aristotle infinity is conceivable although it is never physically 
actualized. But his assumption is dubious. There are several passages which suggest that any 
infinite set of magnitudes or numbers is never fully present even in our thought (see Phys., III, 4, 
203b22-25; 7, 207b10-15). In that sense, we may say that the infinite is not in fact mentally 
actualized.    
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 “Since some such principle are present in soulless things, and others in things possessed of 
soul, and in soul and in the rational part of the soul, it is clear that also in the case of potentialities 
some will be non-rational and some will be accompanied by reason.  This is why all arts and all 
productive knowledge are potentialities; for they are origins of changes in something else or in 
the things itself qua something else ( )Epei\ d' ai( me\n e)n toi=j a)yu/xoij e)nupa/rxousin 
a)rxai\ toiau=tai, ai( d' e)n toi=j e)myu/xoij kai\ e)n yuxv= kai\ th=j yuxh=j e)n t%= lo/gon 
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does not treat the mental actualization equivalently to physical, even if he does call a 
certain mental process ‘actualization.’ 
 Given the differences between the two actualizations, it would be legitimate to 
ask whether something actualized in the mind can have ontologically the same degree of 
reality of existence as something physically actualized in the external world. Problems 
immediately arise should we admit something actualized in the mind as being existent.  
First, such a classification would blur Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality and 
mere possibility.
394
 Conceivability is usually understood as possibility in the broadest 
sense; anything can be conceived unless it involves a logical contradiction. So, if thinking 
is actualization, every possibility will be taken as an actualizable potentiality. And if 
being actualized in the intellect implied being in existence, anything conceivable should 
be able to exist. But this would be the last claim that Aristotle’s metaphysics can 
accommodate; if anything conceivable can exist, not only mathematical objects but also 
all other fictional entities, Platonic Forms, all kinds of possibilia, etc., should exist in his 
                                                                                                                                                                             
e)/xonti, dh=lon o(/ti kai\ tw=n duna/mewn ai( me\n e)/sontai a)/logoi ai( de\ meta\ lo/gou: 
dio\ pa=sai ai( te/xnai kai\ ai( poihtikai\ e)pisth=mai duna/meij ei)si/n: a)rxai\ ga\r 
metablhtikai/ ei)sin e)n a)/ll% h)\ v(= a)/llo) (Met., IX, 1, 1046a36-b4).” 
394
 In fact, Hintikka claims that there is no clear distinction for Aristotle between logical and 
natural possibility (Hintikka (1973) p.107). Some commentators agree: Among the dualists, Menn 
and Charlton identify this new meaning of dunamis with possibility. See Menn (1994) and 
Charlton (1989). Sorabji also argues that Aristotle does not distinguish between logical possibility 
and physical possibility. See Sorabji (1969) pp. 127-135. Some textual evidence supports this 
interpretation.  The concept of ‘dunamis,’ which Aristotle analyzes in Prior Analytics, I, 13, 
corresponds to logical possibility. Nevertheless, this apparently narrow specification cannot be 
taken to imply that Aristotle fails to distinguish between various different kinds of possibility. 
Rather, it might be the case that Aristotle uses terminology homonymously.  For a more general 
discussion of the relationship between potentiality and possibility, see Freeland (1986) and 
Knuuttila (1933) Ch. 1.  
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ontology, insofar as they can be conceived. This contradicts Aristotle’s anti-Platonism 
and his metaphysical objectivism in general.    
 Nevertheless, a long tradition of interpretation seems to support the view that 
there is no ontological difference between mental actualization and physical actualization, 
including physical. These commentators set out two different ways in which things can 
exist in Aristotle’s metaphysics: material and immaterial existence; further, the latter is 
obtained through mental actualization. 
 This line of interpretation has a heritage extending back to the Ancient Greek 
commentators, who were the first to concern themselves with the meaning of Aristotle’s 
claim of the identity between thinking and the objects of thinking.  Aristotle maintains 
in several places that the intellect, the subject of thinking, is potentially the objects of 
thinking; and when the intellect is in its actuality, i.e. when it thinks an object, it becomes 
identical with the object.
395
  But how can the intellect become its objects?  Obviously, 
this cannot mean that when the intellect thinks of a rock, it becomes physically the rock 
as such.  Then, what are the objects of thinking? 
 
 
In the soul, that which can perceive and that which can know are 
potentially these things, the one the object of knowledge, the other the 
object of perception. And they must be either the things themselves or 
their forms. Not the things themselves; for it is not the stone which is the 
soul, but its form. 
 
th=j de\ yuxh=j to\ ai)sqhtiko\n kai\ to\ e)pisthmoniko\n duna/mei 
tau)ta/ e)sti, to\ me\n <to\> e)pisthto\n to\ de\ <to\> ai)sqhto/n. 
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 DA., III, 6, 429b30-7, 430a10; 7,  431b7-8,  432a3; Met., XII, 7, 1072b20-23. 
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a)na/gkh d' h)\ au)ta\ h)\ ta\ ei)/dh ei)=nai. au)ta\ me\n dh\ ou)/: ou) ga\r 




This is one of several places where Aristotle identifies the objects of perception and 
thought with forms of things.
397
 Now since the forms of things are the objects of thinking, 
to think of A means for the intellect to become identical with the form of A.  How does 
the intellect become such a form? The explanation Aristotle gives in De Anima is that the 
intellect receives the form from the thing to which the form belongs.  Likening the 
process of perception to wax’s reception of the imprint of a ring, he says: 
 
 
And in general, with regard to all perception, it is necessary to understand 
that a sense is that which is receptive of sensible forms without the matter, 
as wax receives the imprint of the ring without the iron or gold, and it 
takes the imprint of bronze or gold, but not qua gold or bronze. Similarly 
in each case the sense is also affected by that which has color or flavor or 
sound, but by it not insofar as it is what each of them is spoken of as being, 
but in so far as it is of a certain kind and in accordance with its formula. 
 
Kaqo/lou de\ peri\ pa/shj ai)sqh/sewj dei= labei=n o(/ti h( me\n 
ai)/sqhsi/j e)sti to\ dektiko\n tw=n ai)sqhtw=n ei)dw=n a)/neu th=j 
u(/lhj, oi(=on o( khro\j tou= daktuli/ou a)/neu tou= sidh/rou kai\ tou= 
xrusou= de/xetai to\ shmei=on, lamba/nei de\ to\ xrusou=n 
h)\ to\ xalkou=n shmei=on, a)ll' ou)x v(= xruso\j h)\ xalko/j: o(moi/wj 
de\ kai\ h( ai)/sqhsij e(ka/stou u(po\ tou= e)/xontoj xrw=ma h)\ xumo\n 
h)\ yo/fon pa/sxei, a)ll' ou)x v(= e(/kaston e)kei/nwn le/getai, a)ll' v(= 
toiondi/, kai\ kata\ to\n lo/gon.398  
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 Although Aristotle talks about, here, the objects of knowledge and perception, knowing is a 
kind of thinking, and ‘thinking’ and ‘knowing’ are often used interchangeably in De Anima, III.  
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Intellect receives the forms of its objects in the same way:
399
   
 
 
the intellect is in a way potentially the objects of thought, but it is 
actually nothing before it thinks; potentially in the same way as characters 
is said to be on a tablet on which nothing is actually written. 
 
…duna/mei pw/j e)sti ta\ nohta\ o( nou=j, a)ll' e)ntelexei/# ou)de/n, 
pri\n a)\n nov=: duna/mei d' ou(/twj w(/sper e)n grammatei/% %(= mhqe\n 




Those two passages are meant to explain that the objects of perception and thought are 
forms, not things themselves. That is to say, when we perceive or think an object, we 
receive only the form of the object without its matter, in the same way that wax receives 
the impression of a certain matter without receiving the matter itself.    
 A difficulty in explaining thinking in terms of the reception of forms is that the 
recipient of forms undergoes no physical change.
401
  In the case of thinking (insofar as it 
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 There are parallels between Aristotle’s account of thinking and his account of perception. 
Thinking and perceiving have common features in that (i) both are the process of receiving forms 
of their objects and (ii) when they are in actuality, i.e. when the intellect thinks or the sense 
perceives, they become identical with their objects. For similarities between thought and 
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 DA., III, 4, 429b30-430a2. 
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 In the case of perception, this is controversial. For instance, when we see a green object, our 
eyes do not turn green in the way the physical object is colored. Further, if the reception of a color 
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contrary colors like black and white at the same time; two contraries cannot be in the same place 
at the same time for Aristotle. However, some commentators argue that Aristotle is speaking only 
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is the reception of forms), no physical organ of receptivity corresponds to the intellect; if 
the intellect is not physical, there is no way for the intellect to undergo physical 
change.
402
  In that sense, it can be said that the cognitive reception of a form differs from 
its physical reception, in that recipient of the form is not physically affected by the form. 
But if a form is transmitted from an object to a cognitive agent, there must be a matter in 
which the form is actualized; it is a basic tenet of Aristotle’s hylo-morphism that a form 
cannot exist by itself; it is always with its matter.  And since when the matter receives 
the form, the form will act on the matter, this matter must be affected by the form. But if 
there is no physical change accompanying the reception of a cognitive form, it is hard to 
see what the matter is in which the form is actualized—especially given that the form was 
originally embodied in physical matter.   
 The above passage provides no satisfactory answer to the question of how a 
received cognitive form is actualized in the intellect or sense.  Although Aristotle says 
that the reception of form takes place without matter, this assertion does not explicate the 
unique feature of the cognitive mode of receiving forms; not only the intellect but also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of a physiological change in the sense organ in his claim that perception is the reception of form 
without matter. For instance, Sorabji thinks that the eye-jelly takes on perceived objects’ color 
(see Sorabji (1993) and (1992)).  In fact, the text is not clear on this matter. Aristotle on the one 
hand maintains that the intellect and sense are not affected by their object, but on the other hand 
seeks to distinguish the way in which the sense and intellect are unaffected. He says “that the 
faculties of perception and intellect are not alike in their unaffectedness is clear from [the 
reference to] the sense-organs and the sense…for the faculty of perception is not independent of 
the body, whereas the intellect is separable…(…o(/ti d' ou)x o(moi/a h( a)pa/qeia tou= 
ai)sqhtikou= kai\ tou= nohtikou=, fanero\n e)pi\ tw=n ai)sqhthri/wn kai\ th=j 
ai)sqh/sewj… to\ me\n ga\r ai)sqhtiko\n ou)k a)/neu sw/matoj, o( de\ xwristo/j…(DA., III,  
4, 429a29-b5)).”  
402
 See Ibid., 429a13; 429a29.  
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physical matter receive only forms without the matter of forms. What we are missing is 
the explanation of how a form in some physical matter can be transferred to, and 
actualized in, the intellect without involving another physical matter. The example of wax 
receiving the imprint of the ring without iron or gold only illustrates that a form in some 
physical medium is transferred to another physical medium its original matter.   
 There have been attempts to explain the cognitive reception of forms based on 
the language of the passage quoted above (DA., III, 12, 424a17-24). Notably, Alexander 
of Aphrodisias started commentary on this topic off into a new direction. Seeing that 
‘th=j u(/lhj’ in the first sentence of the passage, ‘h( me\n ai)/sqhsi/j e)sti to\ dektiko\n 
tw=n ai)sqhtw=n ei)dw=n a)/neu th=j u(/lhj,’ can be read to mean either the matter of 
sensible forms, or the matter of the subject of perception, i.e. the matter of sense organs, 
Alexander adopted the second reading, to interpret Aristotle as saying that the subject of 
perception receives forms without its matter
403
 That is, in a manner different from the 
physical reception of forms, the sense receives sensible forms without its matter.
404
 This 
interpretation provides an answer to the question of what the matter is in which a form is 
actualized: there is no such matter in the sense because the sense receives forms without 
its matter.  Since the sense as the recipient of sensible forms does not have physical 
matter, the subject of perceiving will avoid having to undergo physical change.  The 
explanatory merit of Alexander’s view led to its attracting a host of followers through late 
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 Although there were variations among the detail of their interpretations, 
they had in common a focus on the cognitive subject’s immaterial reception of forms. 
 What they did not deal with, though, was the question of the ontological status of 
the forms actualized in the sense or intellect. If the intellect receives a form, the form 
must exist in the intellect.  However, for Aristotle, a form cannot exist by itself apart 
from its matter. If the intellect does not have any matter for receiving a form, how, then, a 
form can exist in the intellect?  The medieval era began to answer these questions by 
formulating an account of the ontology of immaterially received forms.  For instance, 
according to Thomas, there are two different modes of existence: natural and intentional 
existence; the sensible forms exist in sensible objects as natural existents and in the 
intellect or sense as intentional existents.
406
  The difference between the two modes of 
existence lies in the way their forms are actualized; while the forms of natural existence 
are actualized in physical matter, those of intentional existence are actualized 
immaterially or without matter.  This postulate of things having two modes of existence 
further explains the identity of the subject of cognition and its objects. The subject and 
the object are different in natural existence but the same in intentional existence.
407
 
 I will not now raise the new issue whether the traditional interpretation 
developed from the ancient through the medieval period correctly represents Aristotle’s 
original position. My interest rather lies with whether that line of interpretation generally 
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supports Hintikka’s view.  If so, this would provide grounds for considering Hintikka 
afresh.  
On preliminary consideration, Aquinas’ interpretation seems to accord with 
Hintikka’s view, which can be summarized in two claims: 
 
 (1) Actualization in the mind is as good as actualization in any other matter.  
 (2) Anything thinkable is actualizable. 
 
Since Aristotle regards being in actuality as a sufficient condition of being in existence, 
from (1) and (2), we can infer that  
 
 (3) Anything thinkable exists when it is thought. 
 
For Hintikka, the implication of (3) with regard to the ontological status of mathematical 
objects is obvious: Since mathematical objects are thinkable, 
  
 (4) Mathematical objects exist. 
 
Thomas would agree with (1), (2), and (3). However, if by ‘thinking’ Hintikka merely 
means ‘conceiving’, Thomas would not necessarily agree that (4) follows directly from 
(1), (2), and (3). Hintikka and the longstanding ancient-medieval tradition would construe 
‘thinking’ (noei=n) in the relevant Aristotelian texts in different ways.  While Hintikka 
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regards anything logically possible as something thinkable, Thomas understands 
‘thinking’ more narrowly, i.e., he reads ‘thinking (noei=n)’ as meaning ‘having a form of 
knowledge (e)pisth/m).’  Since they use the term differently, the range of the objects of 
thinking will in turn differ between them. As we will see, while, for Hintikka, a 
mathematical object can be an object of thought even if it does not exist in the external 
world, for Thomas, a mathematical object is thinkable only when it does so exist.  
 Which reading, then, better squares with Aristotle’s own view? Let us consider 
what Aristotle means by ‘thinking’ in posititng identity between thought and its objects; 
this is the claim on whose ground both Hintikka and Thomas infer the existent 
ontological status of the objects of thought. ‘noei=n’ is a verb derived from the noun, 
‘nou=j (intellect).’ Thus, literally ‘noei=n’ means the exercise or functioning of ‘nou=j.’408  
In a broad sense, ‘noei=n’ can mean any intellectual grasp of a universal aspect of a thing 
or a state of affairs, in contrast with perception, which mostly concerns itself with 
particulars.
409
 More specifically, ‘thinking’ denotes grasping or intuiting the non-
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 “Then, that part of the soul which called intellect (and I speak of as intellect that by which the 
soul thinks and supposes) is actually none of existing things before it thinks (o( a)/ra 
kalou/menoj th=j yuxh=j nou=j ¨le/gw de\ nou=n %(= dianoei=tai kai\ u(polamba/nei h( 
yuxh/© ou)qe/n e)stin e)nergei/# tw=n o)/ntwn pri\n noei=n (DA., III, 429a22-24) ).” 
409
 “For instance, if we saw the glass to be perforated and the light passing through it, it would 
also be evident why it burns; when we see in each case separately, we will think at the same time 
that it is so in every case (oi(=on ei) th\n u(/alon tetruphme/n e(wrw=men kai\ to\ fw=j dio/n, 
dhlon a)\n h)=n kai\ dia\ ti/ kai/ei, tw= o(ran me)n xwri\j e)f’e(ka/sthj, noh=sai d’a(/ma o(/ti 
e)pi\ pasw=n ou(/twj) (Post. An., I, 31, 88a15-17)).”  
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demonstrable first principles (a)rxh/) from which demonstrations begin. 410   While 
Aristotle uses the terminology, ‘noei=n’ in a few different senses, ‘noei=n X’ is always 
distinguishable from the mere ‘conceiving of X’ throughout his work, in that it denotes a 
means of acquiring information of X, which the perception of X alone cannot cover; in 
that sense, noei=n X is to have a kind of knowledge of X.411 Putting it more generally, for 
Aristotle, ‘noei=n’ is, along with perception, an epistemic route to access to the external 
world, in particular, its formal structure. 
 Such a distinction between noei=n and mere conceiving is maintained through De 
Anima, III, in which the identity between thought and its objects is claimed. noei=n X is 
there described as receiving the form of X; since noei=n X is nothing but grasping the 
form of x, noei=n  X again can be  understood as having a certain kind of knowledge of 
X.  In fact, we see, throughout De Anima, III, ‘thought (no/hsij)’ and ‘knowledge 
(e)pi`sth/m)’ are used interchangeably without sharp distinction.412   
 Given that the reception of a certain kind of forms, i.e., intelligible forms, of 
things in the external world is thus an essential part of the process of thinking, the range 
of the objects of noei=n cannot be broader than the totality of all existing things in the 
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external world. Aristotle confirms this by saying that “thinking and understanding are 
thought to be like a form of perceiving for in both of these the soul judges and recognizes 
some existing thing (dokei= de\ kai\ to\ noei=n kai\ to\ fronei=n w(/sper ai)sqa/nesqai/ 
ti ei)=nai e)n a)mfote/roij ga\r tou/toij kri/nei ti h( yuxh\ kai\ gnwri/zei tw=n 
o)/ntwn).”413 Thus, when he says that the intellect thinks all things,414 by all things he 
means all existing things, not all logically conceivable things or all possible postulates.
415
  
In this sense, we can say that Hintikka’s identification of thinkability with logical 
possibility is a mistake arising from a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s usage of the term, 
‘noei=n’.416 
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 DA., III, 3, 427a19-21. 
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 “…the soul is in a way all existing things; for [existing things] are either objects of perception 
or objects of thought (…h( yuxh\ ta\ o)/nta pw/j e)sti pa/nta: h)\ ga\r ai)sqhta\ ta\ o)/nta h)\ 
nohta/ (Ibid., 8, 431b21-22)). 
416
 One might object that Aristotle uses ‘noei=n’ in a much broader sense even within De Anima, 
III. For instance, Aristotle says that “Nor again is thinking, which can be right or wrong; right 
thinking [includes] understanding, knowledge, and true belief, wrong the opposite of these (a)ll' 
ou)de\ to\ noei=n, e)n %(= e)sti to\ o)rqw=j kai\ to\ mh\ o)rqw=j, to\ me\n o)rqw=j fro/nhsij kai\ 
e)pisth/mh kai\ do/ca a)lhqh/j, to\ de\ mh\ o)rqw=j ta)nanti/a tou/twn) (Ibid., 427b8-11).” In 
this passage, however, Aristotle divides thinking into two sorts: right thinking and wrong 
thinking. We might identify the former, right thinking, with the type of thinking so far we have 
discussed, namely, thinking as the receiving or actualization of a form including knowledge of 
that form and its object. But since wrong thinking includes false belief, it might be said that there 
is room for non-beings or fictional entities in thinking in an Aristotelian sense; Aristotle 
elsewhere maintains that a statement predicated of a non-being is always false (see Cat., 10, 
13b11-35).  However, thinking in the second sense has nothing to do with actualization in the 
intellect. Mental actualization is the reception of form without matter, whilst the intellect cannot 
receive a form from any fictional entity.  
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 Since the forms actualized in the intellect are not created but only received 
therein,
417
 for a form, F, to be actualized in the intellect, there must be already something 
which actualizes or embodies F outside the intellect. Thus, even if it is accepted that 
anything thinkable can be actualizable, and being in actuality in the intellect can be seen 
as a way of existence, the claim that anything conceived by the intellect can be said to 
exist cannot be properly Aristotelian. For Aristotle, thinking is distinguished from mere 
conceiving; and something can be actualized in the intellect only if that thing is already 
actualized in the external world.  Therefore if there is no actuality of mathematical 
objects outside the intellect, they cannot be actualized in the intellect, either.
418
 Moreover, 
what is merely potential cannot be said in Aristotle’s metaphysics to exist. 
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Fictionalism in Aristotle’s Theory of *umber 
 
1. umber as a Property of Plural Things 
 
Whereas realism proved untenable for Aristotle in the case of geometry, most 
commentators have thought the philosopher can hold to a consistent realistic theory of 
number. One of Aristotle’s main claims about number is that a number is a property of 
plural things. This has led commentators to try to show that Aristotle holds a plausible 
realistic view of number, since on their view the idea that a number is a property of plural 
things may be adequately defended. 
 In my view, however, this is highly misleading: First, it presumes an incorrect 
relationship of priority between the branches of mathematics for Aristotle, given that 
Aristotle founded arithmetic on the basis of geometry. Secondly, it comes into conflict 
with Aristotle’s claim that mathematical objects do not exist in actuality; we do not have 
any ground for believing that he confines this claim only to geometrical objects. More 
importantly, Aristotle distinguishes arithmetical number from sensible number; while the 
latter is composed of sensible unities such as cows or men, the former is composed of the 
units which are “absolutely indivisible (pa/ntv a)diai/retoj).” Further, he argues that 
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the unity of arithmetical number “is most exact and in all other cases we imitates this 
measure (a)kribestaton......e)n de\ toi=j a)/lloij mimou=ntai to\ toiou=ton).”419  
Differently from most modern mathematicians, Aristotle does not seem to think 
that there is any fundamental difference between geometry and arithmetic;
420
 for 
Aristotle, both sciences are the study of quantity: the former continuous quantity, the 
latter discrete.
421
 Thus, as he does geometrical objects, he explains arithmetical objects, 
or numbers, in terms of abstraction: Arithmetic is a science which studies sensible objects 
qua indivisible
422
 For instance, while the geometer studies a man qua a solid or figure, 
the arithmetician studies a man qua man; a man qua man is indivisible in the sense that 
any divided corpse would no longer be a man. 
We have seen before, that when X studies a qua F, X studies the kath’hauta 
properties of F which belong to a, and ignores other properties of a. Namely, X studies 
the properties which belong to a by virtue of a’s being F. Now, since arithmetic studies 
things qua ‘indivisible’, it must study those properties of things which belong to them by 
virtue of those things’ being indivisibile. But since the subject of arithmetic is number, 
properties of number are by that token held to be properties of things qua indivisibles. 
But what properties of indivisible things could these numerical properties be? To answer 
this question, first, we should consider Aristotle’s definition of number. 
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Aristotle defines number in several ways: as a ‘plurality of unities (e(/na 
plei/w),’423 as ‘the plurality of measures (to\ plh=qoj me/trwn)’ 424 or as ‘the plurality 
of indivisibles (to\ plh=qoj a)diaire/twn).’425 The concepts of unity (e(/n), measure 
(me/tron) and indivisible (a)diaire/toj) are closely connected with each other. 426 
Aristotle distinguishes different senses of unity: the whole, the individual, and the 
universal. All these, he says, are unities because they are indivisible in some respect—
some in terms of quantity, and others in concept or formula.
427
 Now, in this broad sense 
of unity, a measure may also figure as a unity, in that it is indivisible according to 
quantity: When we use ‘a foot’ as the measure of length, a foot is indivisible in respect of 
the length it captures.
428
 Likewise, when we count the number of men in a group, ‘a man’ 
is the measure by which the quantity of the group is known; i.e., to know the quantity of a 
group of men is to know how many men there are in the group. Thus, in fact, the three 
definitions of number all describe essentially the same idea. 
According to Aristotle’s definitions of number, number is a number of unities; 
and these unities are always certain measures such as a man, a foot, a red flower, etc.
429
 
But since the unities of a number are plural things conceived of as indivisible; Aristotle 
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also claims that number is a property of plural things. This implies that the existence of 
number depends on the existence of indivisible things, since there can be ‘plurality’ only 
when there are plural things. Thus, Aristotle says that number is derivative, and argues 
that the substantive usage of number derives from its adjectival usage.
430
  However, his 
idea that number is a property of a group of things needs to be able to confront some 
serious objections.. 
 
2. Aristotle’s ominalism and the Truth of Arithmetic 
 
First of all, there seems to be a crucial difference between numerical and other properties: 
Numerical properties are not distributive. For example, consider: 
 
(1) Solon, Socrates, Plato are wise. 
and 
(2) Solon is wise. 
 
We can derive (2) from (1). However, in the case of 
 
(3) Solon, Socrates, and Plato are three. 
and 
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 Phys., III, 7, 207b8-10. This is sharply in contrast with the Platonic view; for Plato, number is 
self-subsistent and causally prior to sensible things. 
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(4) Solon is three. 
 
(3) does not imply (4). From this non-distributivity of numerical properties, Frege infers 
that number is not a property of physical objects.
431
 Equally, though, many other 
properties besides numerical are also non-distributive. For instance, even if a team is 
well-organized, it does not follow that each member of the team will be well-organized. 
Thus, the non-distributivity of numerical properties only shows that numbers are used as 
adjectives not of singular but of plural terms.
432
  
So far, we have seen that: (i) a number is a property of plural unities; (ii) 
numerical properties are not distributive; i.e., the subject of a numerical adjective is 
plural.
433
 Keeping these points in mind, we can now move to formulate Aristotle’s 
concept of number.
434
 To begin with, let us assume that variables x, y, and z range over 
sensible substances, and F, G, H stand for distributive or non-distributive properties. In 
addition, for a non-distributive property, let us introduce a sign for plural terms as 
distinguished from singular terms: [x] stands for a group of x’s, and G[x] means that a 
group of x’s is G.
435
 Since we accept that a number is a property of plural unities, ‘two 
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Fx’s’ can be expressed as 2[x: x is F]. Here, F is a property which satisfies one of the 
conditions of unity mentioned above; e.g., ‘being a tree’ can be an instance of F, but 
‘being water’ cannot, because x qua water yields no concept of the indivisible unity of 
x.
436
 Now, given the first-order predicate calculus with non-identity, it is a simple matter 
to express ‘there are exactly two Fx’s’: 
 
 2[x: x is F] iff x y z(Fx&Fy&x≠y&(Fz→z=xVz=y)) 
 
More generally, we can formulate n[x: x is F] as follows: 
 
 n[x: x is F] iff x1… xn y(Fx1&…Fxn&x1≠x2&x1≠x3&…& 
x1≠xn&x2≠x3&…x2≠xn&…&xn-1≠xn&(Fy→(y=x1 V…V y=xn)))  
 
One problem with this formula is that it forces us to accept non-identity in the 
absence of any principle of differentiation for x and y qua F. Although x and y are the 
same kind of unity in virtue of their being F, this property does not differentiate x from y; 
namely, we have no ground for saying that Fx≠Fy given that the two terms are the same 
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qua F. But it should be noted that variables x, y, and z range over sensible substances; and, 
for Aristotle, the numerical difference of substances is given primitively.
437
 Further, in 
his ontology, beings belonging to the other categories are ontologically dependent on 
substances, so that F is always a property of a particular substance. Moreover, by virtue 
of F’s being a property of an individuated substance, Fx is also individuated. Similarly, 
F[x] can be differentiated from F[y], not by the fact that [x] is F and [y] is F, but because 
[x] is different from [y]; and [x] and [y] are different because the members of [x] and 
members of [y] are different. 
However, is to know that x y z(x≠y&(z=xVz=y)) really to know that there are 
two things? Do we not rather only know that x is different from y?
438
 Putting it another 
way, can the concept of number be simply reduced to concepts of unity and difference? 
Aristotle’s definition of number seems to support such a reduction. One of his definitions 
of number is that number is the plurality of unities,
439
 and to know that there are plural 
unities, we only have to know that there are unities which are distinct from each other.  
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But another difficulty follows: In the formula, variables range over individual 
substances, but we ascribe number not only to groups of substances, but also to other 
categories of beings, including plural references. For instance: 
 
(1) There are two cows. 
(2) There are two dogs. 
(3) There are two colors. 
(4) There are two pairs of shoes. 
 
If we accept all these sentences are meaningful, and the sentences (1) through (4) are true, 
then, the sentences below must also be true: 
 
(5) The number of cows = the number of dogs. 
(6) The number of cows = the number of colors. 
(7) The number of cows = the number of pairs of shoes 
 
But it is not easy to find a commonly shared property among two cows, two dogs, two 
colors and two pairs of shoes. Suppose that [x] and [y] are two groups of unities and that 
y and x are heterogeneous. It seems obvious that, although a non-distributive property of 
a group of things cannot be ascribed to each member of the group, nevertheless, the non-
distributive properties a group can have is determined by what properties each member of 
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the group has in some sense individually.
440
 Therefore, if a number is a non-distributive 
attribute of a group of unities, and x is entirely heterogeneous with y, then [x] and [y] 
should have different non-distributive properties; e.g., it is unlikely that there is a 
common property between a group of trees and a group of colors.  The following 
passage of Aristotle speaks to just this problem: 
 
 
The measure must always be some one and the same thing applying to all 
cases, e.g. if the things are horses, the measure is horse, and if they are 
men, man. If they are a man, a horse, and a god, the measure is probably 
living things, and the number of them will be a number of living things. If 
the things are man and white and walking, there will be scarcely a 
number of these, because they all can belong to numerically one and the 
same thing; nevertheless, the number of these will be a number of classes, 
or some other equivalent term. 
 
 dei= de\ a)ei\ to\ au)to/ ti u(pa/rxein pa=si to\ me/tron, oi(=on ei) 
i(/ppoi, to\ me/tron i(/ppoj, kai\ ei) a)/nqrwpoi, a)/nqrwpoj. ei) d' 
a)/nqrwpoj kai\ i(/ppoj kai\ qeo/j, z%=on i)/swj, kai\ o( a)riqmo\j 
au)tw=n e)/stai z%=a. ei) d' a)/nqrwpoj kai\ leuko\n kai\ badi/zon, 
h(/kista me\n a)riqmo\j tou/twn dia\ to\ tau)t%= pa/nta u(pa/rxein 
kai\ e(ni\ kata\ a)riqmo/n, o(/mwj de\ genw=n e)/stai o( a)riqmo\j 




The idea is that, insofar as we find a common measure for a group of things, we can 
number the group of things. This idea may be applied to explain the truth of the sentences 
above: In the case of (5), we may say that what is the measure or unit is neither cow nor 
dog, but animal or living thing, so that the same number, namely, the number of animals, 
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can be predicated of each of the groups. And the number is a common formal aspect of 
both groups of unities, and unities play the role of that matter which receives number as 
its form.
442
 That is, both the group of dogs and the group of cows share a certain formal 
property which satisfies the formula:  
  
 x y z(Fx&Fy&x≠y&(Fz→z=xVz=y)) 
 
And, in the case of (6), color and cow could be thought of as unities in the sense that both 
are indivisible in some respect; and we might even suppose that both (2) and (3) satisfy 
the formula above, even allowing the variables, x, y, and z to range over beings in all 
categories.   
However, in the case of (7), there is some difficulties in explaining how (4) 
satisfies such a formula; since, in (4), the unity is ‘pair of shoes’, if x, y, and z are 
arguments for unities, variables should range over plural terms. More importantly, in the 
case of (4), what number can be assigned to the group of shoes depends entirely on the 
way in which we carve them out: two pairs of shoes may equally be picked out according 
to a different measure of unity as four shoes. Thus, even if we expand the scope of 
variables that may be substituted for plural terms, whether the proper logical form of (4) 
is  
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x y z(Fx&Fy&x≠y&(Fz→z=xVz=y))  
or  
x1 x2∃x3∃x4 x5((Fx1&Fx2&Fx3&Fx4& x1≠x2& x1≠x3&x1≠x4&x2≠x3 
&x2≠x4&x3≠x4&(Fx5→(x5=x1Vzx5=x2Vx5=x3Vx5=x4)))  
would seem to depend on our conceptualization. 
A possible realist interpretation would be that, for Aristotle, only a substance is a 
unity in its own right; it has its own essence whereby its other properties are causally 
unified; other senses of unity are just analogous or derivative, so that the number of 
substances counts as the only genuine number. But we can accept this proposal only at 
the expense of abandoning explaining the truth of sentences which describe other 
categories of beings in terms of number, such as (3), (4), (6) and (7). In addition, we 
should remember that, for Aristotle, mathematical objects exist as matter (u)likw=j) in 
sensibles.
443
 But it seems that the number of sensible unities does not exist as matter, but, 
rather, number is a certain form of those unities. Furthermore, although for Aristotle the 





3. Sensible umber and Arithmetical umber 
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In this case, it seems that Aristotle has to confront a dilemma: If unity is so universal as to 
be applicable to anything numerable, then his thesis that a number is a property of plural 
unities cannot be maintained; since there is no such attribute common to every 
equinumerous group. On the other hand, however, if the usage of ‘unity’ is restricted to 
substances, we cannot explain the obvious truth of some numerical statements. At this 
point, Aristotle seizes the first horn of the dilemma. His strategy to preserve the 
objectivity of arithmetic is to make a distinction between two kinds of numbers: 




…the number of the sheep and of the dogs is the same number if each 
[number] is equal, but the ten is not the same [ten] nor are there ten of 
the same [kind]…For a thing is called the same [kind] if it does not differ 
by the differentia [of that kind], …Therefore it is the same number (for 
their number does not differ by the  differentia of number), but it is not 
the same ten; for the things of which it is said differ; one is of dogs, and 
the other of horses. 
 
…a)riqmo\j me\n o( au)to\j o( tw=n proba/twn kai\ tw=n kunw=n, ei) 
i)/soj e(ka/teroj, deka\j de\ ou)x h( au)th\ ou)de\ de/ka 
ta\ au)ta/, ...tau)to\ ga\r le/getai ou(= mh\ diafe/rei 
diafor#=...kai\ a)riqmo\j dh\ o( au)to/j ¨ou) ga\r diafe/rei a)riqmou= 
diafor#= o( a)riqmo\j au)tw=n©, deka\j d' ou)x h( au)th/: e)f' w(=n ga\r 




This passage is somewhat puzzling in apparently offering two contradictory assertions: (i) 
The number of ten dogs and the number of ten sheep is the same number, and yet (ii) they 
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are not the same ten or decad. To take the latter claim first, Aristotle appears to posit that, 
if two groups of unities are qualitatively different, then their numbers are also different. 
Nevertheless, he maintains that two qualitatively different groups can have the same 
number. This seemingly contradictory claim is based on his distinction between two 
different kinds of numbers: the number which we count and the number we count with. 
He says that: 
 
 
Time then is a kind of number. But number is in two ways (for we call 
number both what is counted or countable and that by which we count). 
Time, then, is what is counted, not that by which we count. That by which 
we count is different form that which is counted. 
 
a)riqmo\j a)/ra tij o( xro/noj. e)pei\ d' a)riqmo/j e)sti dixw=j 
¨kai\ ga\r to\ a)riqmou/menon kai\ to\ a)riqmhto\n a)riqmo\n le/gomen, 
kai\ %(= a)riqmou=men©, o( dh\ xro/noj e)sti\n to\ a)riqmou/menon 
kai\ ou)x %(= a)riqmou=men. e)/sti d' e(/teron %(= a)riqmou=men 




For Aristotle, time is a kind of number in the sense that we measure motion by time in 
respect of before and after, just as we measure things by number in respect to more and 
less. And unities of time are discrete sequences of the temporal continuum divided by 
‘nows.’ But, since the temporal continuum is after all identified with the movement of 
heavenly bodies,
447
 time can be seen as an example of numbers whose units are concrete. 
The important point here is that Aristotle marks a distinction between the number with 
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which we count and the number of concrete unities counted. This explains how two 
qualitatively different groups may have the same number. One way to know the 
cardinality of a group of things is to correlate one-to-one members of the group to the 
elements of the number series:
448
 i.e., for two qualitatively different unities x and y, the 
number of [x] and the number of [y] is the same n iff each x and each y correlates 1-1 to 
the members in the number series from the first to the nth member, respectively. Since, 
then, the number of [x] is the result of the act of counting x’s by the ordinal number, the 
existence of the number of [x] is partly mind-dependent. 
 
 
One would ask whether if there were no soul, there would be time or not. 
For if that which counts cannot exist, there cannot be something to be 
counted, either, so that it is obvious that there cannot be number; for 
number is either what has been, or what can be, counted. But if nothing 
but soul, or intellect of soul, is qualified to count, it is impossible for there 
to be time if there is no soul.
 
     
 
po/teron de\ mh\ ou)/shj yuxh=j ei)/h a)\n o( xro/noj h)\ ou)/, a)porh/seien 
a)/n tij. a)duna/tou ga\r o)/ntoj ei)=nai tou= a)riqmh/sontoj a)du/naton 
kai\ a)riqmhto/n ti ei)=nai, w(/ste dh=lon o(/ti ou)d' a)riqmo/j. a)riqmo\j 
ga\r h)\ to\ h)riqmhme/non h)\ to\ a)riqmhto/n. ei) de\ mhde\n a)/llo 
pe/fuken a)riqmei=n h)\ yuxh\ kai\ yuxh=j nou=j, a)du/naton ei)=nai 




Nevertheless, it seems that the number with which we count does not have to be 
constituted purely subjectively. On the contrary, counting presupposes knowledge of this 
counting number. But what is the number with which we count? In fact, Aristotle 
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distinguishes arithmetical number from sensible numbers in several places, suggesting in 
each that by the counting number he means to designate arithmetical number.
450
 This 
conjecture is once more supported by his explanation of arithmetical number; among 
others, one passage suggests a procedure of the recursive generation of arithmetical 
numbers in their proper order.
451
 But these facts only show that by the counting number 
Aristotle means arithmetical number; we do not know yet what arithmetical number is. 
Although the texts do not provide any explicit indication, we still have some 
pointers to help us infer what Aristotle might mean in talking about arithmetical number. 
First, for Aristotle, a number is always a number of something; he defines number as the 
plurality of unities. So, it is quite reasonable to think that arithmetical number is also 
some sort of composition of unities. Secondly, it would appear that these unities cannot 
be sensible or concrete, because the counting number is distinguished from all numbers 
appertaining to sensible unities. Further to these pointers, we can find a further clue in the 
practice of Greek mathematics: in Greek arithmetic, number and its operations are 
represented in terms of a metrical geometry, in particular by the manipulation of line 
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 “Now where it is thought impossible to take away or to add, there the measure is exact, so that 
the measure of number is most exact; for we posit the unit as absolutely indivisible; and in all 
other cases we imitate this sort of measure (o(/pou me\n ou)=n dokei= mh\ ei)=nai a)felei=n h)\ 
prosqei=nai, tou=to a)kribe\j to\ me/tron dio\ to\ tou= a)riqmou= a)kribe/staton: th\n ga\r 
mona/da tiqe/asi pa/ntv a)diai/reton e)n de\ toi=j a)/lloij mimou=ntai to\ toiou=ton (Met., 
X, 1, 1052b35-1053a2)).” Also see Ibid., XIII, 8, 1083b16; XIV, 5, 1092b22-25.  
451
 He says, “…number must be produced by addition; e.g., 2 by adding 1 to another 1, and 3 by 
adding another 1 to the 2, and 4 similarly (a)na/gkh a)riqmei=sqai to\n a)riqmo\n 
kata\ pro/sqesin, oi(=on th\n dua/da pro\j t%= e(ni\ a)/llou e(no\j prosteqe/ntoj, kai\ th\n 
tria/da a)/llou e(no\j pro\j toi=j dusi\ prosteqe/ntoj, kai\ th\n tetra/da w(sau/twj (Ibid., 





 Thus, it may be suggested that, for Aristotle, the unities of arithmetical 
number are nothing other than geometrical line lengths; and that each number, n, is a 
notation for a line composed of n line lengths. While line length is distinguished from a 
concrete measure such as a foot or meter in that it has only one property, ‘being the same 
length,’ unlike platonic pure unit, it admits of differentiation by virtue of its position on 
the line.
453
 This allows us to avoid the problem of the individuation of units. In addition, 
we have seen that geometrical objects exist only as matter or in potentiality in sensible 
objects. Thus, to the extent that geometrical lines exist as matter in sensible substances, 
arithmetical number exists as matter in sensible substances; the unit of arithmetical 
number is geometrical line length. We can then say that, like geometrical objects, 
mathematical numbers also exist as matter in sensible or concrete objects. 
 Nevertheless, these formulations do not solve every problem. First of all, whether 
a number is arithmetical or sensible, it is always of plural things. This precludes 1 from 
membership in the set of numbers. In this instance, it is worth making the point that in the 
ancient Greek, 1 was not regarded as a number. For instance, Euclid defines a number as 
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“the plurality composed of units” (to\ e)k mona/dwn sugkei/menon plh=qoj).454 An 
obvious implication of this definition is that a unit is not a number; a single unity cannot 
compose a plurality. Nevertheless, Euclid sometimes treats 1 as a number, ignoring the 
distinction between number and unity. Aristotle’s treatment of 1 is similar to Euclid’s. On 
the one hand, he argues that a unit is not a number since it is the principle of number.
455
 
But he also treats 1 in the same way as other numbers in other places.
456
 This treatment is 
not necessarily inconsistent. Since Aristotle treats a number as a composite of unities, 
unity is always susceptible of combination with other unities. Thus, a unity can be used in 
arithmetical operations with numbers insofar as a number is nothing but combined unities. 
Aristotle should perhaps rather have thought that his explanation of number had the merit 
of providing a philosophical background for his contemporary concept of number.
457
  
In a similar vein, we can also question how Aristotle should deal with rational 
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456
 Ibid., XIII, 6, 1080a30-35; X, 6, 1056b25; XIII, 9, 1085b10; 6, 1080a24; 1080b35; Phys., IV, 
12, 220a27-32; III, 6, 206b 30-32; Cat., 6, 5a31 
457
 It is interesting that, even in modern English, numerical expression like ‘numerous,’ ‘a 
number of,’ etc., are used with plural terms. The issue as to whether 1 is a number or not came up 
again in the debate between Frege and Husserl. Frege argues that 0 and 1 should be seen as 
numbers on the grounds that they are adequate answers to the question, ‘How many?’ However, 
Husserl points out that 0 or 1 cannot be regarded as an answer to the question, because they are 
only negative response to that question, namely, to say that there is 0 or 1 thing amounts to saying 




and irrational numbers, in that both types of number fail to satisfy his definition of 
number. On the geometrical account of number, rational number was regarded as a 
proportion between numbers, rather than as another kind of number; before Eudoxus’ 
general proportional theory, it was customary to represent the ratio of two numbers by 
straight lines represented as perpendicular to one another. For instance, ‘three by two’ or 
‘thrice two’ referred to either a rectangle or a ratio of these quantities.
458
  In that sense, 
we might say that rational numbers are not instances of number for Aristotle. The more 
problematic case is of irrational number, especially since Aristotle was fully aware of the 
existence of incommensurables.
459
 On the question of incommensurability, an interesting 
point is that, unlike Plato, Aristotle does not seem to have been much worried by it. 
Among his remarks on the incommensurable, the most revealing is that some magnitudes 
are measured not by one, but two different measures.
460
 This seems to indicate that he 
just accepts that there is no measure by which every magnitude can be measured. But this 
really matters only to those who, like Pythagoras or later Plato, adopt a kind of 
mathematical reductionistic cosmology suggesting that everything is caused or explained 
in terms of number.
461
 This is an idea Aristotle resists. Thus, as a non-mathematical 
reductionist,
462
 Aristotle can admit the existence of quantity which cannot be expressed 
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by number or ratio of number, without being compelled to consider this under the 





Plato argues that there must exist objects of sciences apart from sensible 
particulars, based on the differences between them. One such difference is that sensible 
particulars have properties that the sciences are not concerned with, e.g., a sensible 
particular triangular thing differs from a geometrical triangle in that the former has non-
geometrical properties, besides its necessary properties of triangularity, such as its color, 
material and weight, etc. However, for Aristotle, the object of a science is to be conceived 
as a certain aspect of a sensible object, from which it may be conceptually separated by 
abstraction. For instance, we may ‘select out’ the circularity of a red bronze circular thing 
by abstracting or removing other irrelevant properties such as its redness and brazenness. 
Since such separation through abstraction is only conceptual, not ontological, Aristotle 
argues, there is no need to posit a geometrical circle apart from sensible circular things.   
In my view of Aristotle’s abstraction, when a science studies X qua Y, it studies 
only the kath’ hauta properties of Y among properties of X, and those kath’ hauta 
properties can be selected through abstraction. We also saw that Aristotle’s abstraction is 
distinguished from empiricists’ abstraction in that it can be described as a linguistic 
process picking out a certain group of predicates from a subject, rather than an epistemic 
process of obtaining a universal from particulars. My interpretation is also different from 
the traditional view. Traditionally Aristotle’s abstraction has been understood as a kind of 
mental activity such as thinking or paying attention or ignoring, etc; for instance, to 
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abstract a property, F, from an object, a, means conceiving of a only as F or paying 
attention only to a’s F-ness and ignoring a’s other properties. I showed that Aristotle’s 
abstraction has nothing to do with such mental activities and that no decisive textual 
evidence recommends the traditional mentalist line of interpretation. 
Since, by Aristotle’s theory of abstraction, the objects of the sciences are 
obtained from sensible particulars by abstraction, mathematical objects have to be 
properties of sensible particulars if mathematics is to be a science. Aristotle confirms his 
commitment to this naïve realism in several places. His mathematical naïve realism, 
however, comes up against the precision problem, namely that most mathematical objects 
are not perfectly instantiated by sensible particulars. Aware of this problem, Aristotle 
claims that mathematical objects are not in sensible objects as such but exist only as 
matter. This claim, though, raises two further issues: one of compatibility with his naïve 
realism, and another of the sense of ‘matter’ it invokes.  
On the first issue, I argued that the claim cannot be made consistent with his 
mathematical naïve realism, hypothesizing that Aristotle’s awareness of the precision 
problem compelled him to abandon his original naïve realism and later develop a second, 
distinct and incompatible theory. On the second issue, we examined four interpretations; 
my evaluation of each focused on its possible consistency with Aristotle’s scientific 
realism. 
We began with Lear’s view. According to Lear, what we abstract from sensible 
objects are only basic elements of geometrical figures, such as points, lines, and circles; a 
geometrical figure is constructed out of these elements. While sidestepping the precision 
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problem, Lear’s interpretation runs into, among others, the problem that it turns 
mathematical objects into fictional entities in Aristotle’s ontology.  Although Lear insists 
that a geometrical figure constructed out of elements abstracted from sensible objects has 
a link with reality, we saw that mathematical fictionalism is not compatible with 
Aristotle’s scientific realism, and that there is no way to explain mathematical truth in 
terms of Aristotle’s own theory of truth if mathematical objects are fictional. 
The second view we considered interprets the matter of mathematical objects as 
pure extension. According to this view, we obtain mathematical matter from sensible 
objects by abstraction and construct geometrical figures by imposing their forms on this 
‘matter’. Besides the difficulty of accounting how we can obtain Euclidean space by 
abstraction from the sensible world, this view, like Lear’s, made mathematical objects 
fictional. Although the matter of a figure ultimately derives from sensible objects, this 
alone does not guarantee the reality of mentally constructed geometrical figures.  
Since most geometrical objects do not exist in actuality, we tried to attest to their 
existence by identifying their matter with some sort of potential being; Aristotle certainly 
regarded some kinds of potentiality as modes of existence.  But we soon encountered 
difficulties in assimilating the matter of geometrical objects to potentiality understood as 
another mode of existence: according to Aristotle’s actualism, actuality is prior to 
potentiality in existence; so if geometrical objects do not exist in actuality, they cannot 
exist in potentiality, either. There is, though, one exception to Aristotle’s actualism: the 





 However, this did not seem to provide a ground for regarding 
mathematical objects as being existent, since, unlike the potentiality of artifacts, potential 
geometrical objects do not have actual counterparts. We finally considered infinity, a kind 
of potentiality which is never actualized, as a model of potentiality for the existence of 
mathematical entities. But Aristotle, it emerged, does not regard such an unactualizable 
potentiality as something existent. Thus, insofar as there is no actuality of geometrical 
objects, they cannot count as real entities in Aristotle’s ontological inventory.  
What other grounds might there be for thinking mathematical objects existent 
things for Aristotle? Finally, we examined Hintikka’s view that mathematical objects 
accede to a form of existence in their mental actualization. On the basis of Aristotle’s 
claim of the identity between the thinking intellect and objects of thinking, Hintikka 
argues that mental actualization is hardly different from physical actualization. But even 
if we accept that being in actuality in the intellect represents another mode of existence—
i.e., an intentional existence in contrast with natural existence, we saw, however, that only 
forms of externally existing things can be actualized in the intellect in Aristotelian sense. 
The alternative would blur the distinction between potential things and merely possible or 
imaginable things, which is utterly crucial to Aristotle’s scientific realism. Thus, insofar 
as the objects of mathematics are not externally actualized, they cannot be actualized in 
the intellect, either. And if there is no actuality of mathematical objects, they cannot exist 
in Aristotle’s ontology. 
Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics grows out of his desire to show that it is 
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not necessary to posit Platonic entities in order to account for mathematical truth. Given 
Aristotle’s own theory of truth and scientific realism, though, to show that mathematic is 
true, mathematical objects must be something existent in his metaphysics. Nevertheless, 
we saw that neither Aristotle himself nor any commentator was capable of demonstrating 
this. In this sense, Aristotle’s metaphysics cannot provide a model for mathematics; to the 
extent that Aristotle looked to his metaphysics to explain or secure the truth of 
mathematics, his project was unsuccessful.  
But that does not make Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics undeserving of our 
attention. His philosophy of mathematics can be said to fail only in the sense that it does 
not square with his realistic view of sciences and theory of truth. His view is still worth 
looking at in its own right. Aristotle’s failure at least demonstrates how difficult it is for 
anti-platonists to maintain mathematical realism. If there is no room for mathematical 
objects in Aristotle’s ontology, it can hardly be expected that other forms of anti-
platonism will be able to accommodate mathematical realism either; Aristotle’s ontology, 
a form of realism, is far more spacious than most other versions of anti-platonism. More 
positively, however, we can see in Aristotle’s theory of mathematics an anticipation of 
mathematical fictionalism and of mathematical constructivism in his emphasis on the 
constructive function of our intellect in the practice of mathematics. Thus, to the extent 
that mathematical fictionalism can be regarded as a plausible philosophical view of 
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